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| author | Mounir IDRASSI <mounir.idrassi@idrix.fr> | 2017-05-13 17:34:16 +0200 |
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| committer | Mounir IDRASSI <mounir.idrassi@idrix.fr> | 2017-05-15 01:16:36 +0200 |
| commit | 5e1fffa87191c3566bcbe20c6e8d29d5f21651d5 (patch) | |
| tree | 1d3d034ea91d11813459c5cdfe6630b384f3bbfc /doc/html/Wear-Leveling.html | |
| parent | 76167ceba3f0a3ec91174620283f451815daa288 (diff) | |
| download | VeraCrypt-5e1fffa87191c3566bcbe20c6e8d29d5f21651d5.tar.gz VeraCrypt-5e1fffa87191c3566bcbe20c6e8d29d5f21651d5.zip | |
Add HTML documentation.
Diffstat (limited to 'doc/html/Wear-Leveling.html')
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/html/Wear-Leveling.html | 64 |
1 files changed, 64 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/doc/html/Wear-Leveling.html b/doc/html/Wear-Leveling.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..10db9f2b --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/html/Wear-Leveling.html @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en"> +<head> +<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /> +<title>VeraCrypt - Free Open source disk encryption with strong security for the Paranoid</title> +<meta name="description" content="VeraCrypt is free open-source disk encryption software for Windows, Mac OS X and Linux. In case an attacker forces you to reveal the password, VeraCrypt provides plausible deniability. In contrast to file encryption, data encryption performed by VeraCrypt is real-time (on-the-fly), automatic, transparent, needs very little memory, and does not involve temporary unencrypted files."/> +<meta name="keywords" content="encryption, security"/> +<link href="styles.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" /> +</head> +<body> + +<div> +<a href="https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Home.html"><img src="VeraCrypt128x128.png" alt="VeraCrypt"/></a> +</div> + +<div id="menu"> + <ul> + <li><a href="Home.html">Home</a></li> + <li><a href="/code/">Source Code</a></li> + <li><a href="Downloads.html">Downloads</a></li> + <li><a class="active" href="Documentation.html">Documentation</a></li> + <li><a href="Donation.html">Donate</a></li> + <li><a href="https://sourceforge.net/p/veracrypt/discussion/" target="_blank">Forums</a></li> + </ul> +</div> + +<div> +<p> +<a href="Documentation.html">Documentation</a> +<img src="arrow_right.gif" alt=">>" style="margin-top: 5px"> +<a href="Security%20Requirements%20and%20Precautions.html">Security Requirements and Precautions</a> +<img src="arrow_right.gif" alt=">>" style="margin-top: 5px"> +<a href="Wear-Leveling.html">Wear-Leveling</a> +</p></div> + +<div class="wikidoc"> +<h1>Wear-Leveling</h1> +<div style="text-align:left; margin-top:19px; margin-bottom:19px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px"> +Some storage devices (e.g., some solid-state drives, including USB flash drives) and some file systems utilize so-called wear-leveling mechanisms to extend the lifetime of the storage device or medium. These mechanisms ensure that even if an application repeatedly + writes data to the same logical sector, the data is distributed evenly across the medium (logical sectors are remapped to different physical sectors). Therefore, multiple "versions" of a single sector may be available to an attacker. This may have various + security implications. For instance, when you change a volume password/keyfile(s), the volume header is, under normal conditions, overwritten with a re-encrypted version of the header. However, when the volume resides on a device that utilizes a wear-leveling + mechanism, VeraCrypt cannot ensure that the older header is really overwritten. If an adversary found the old volume header (which was to be overwritten) on the device, he could use it to mount the volume using an old compromised password (and/or using compromised + keyfiles that were necessary to mount the volume before the volume header was re-encrypted). Due to security reasons, we recommend that +<a href="VeraCrypt%20Volume.html" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none.html"> +VeraCrypt volumes</a> are not created/stored on devices (or in file systems) that utilize a wear-leveling mechanism (and that VeraCrypt is not used to encrypt any portions of such devices or filesystems).</div> +<div style="text-align:left; margin-top:19px; margin-bottom:19px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px"> +If you decide not to follow this recommendation and you intend to use in-place encryption on a drive that utilizes wear-leveling mechanisms, make sure the partition/drive does not contain any sensitive data before you fully encrypt it (VeraCrypt cannot reliably + perform secure in-place encryption of existing data on such a drive; however, after the partition/drive has been fully encrypted, any new data that will be saved to it will be reliably encrypted on the fly). That includes the following precautions: Before + you run VeraCrypt to set up pre-boot authentication, disable the paging files and restart the operating system (you can enable the +<a href="Paging%20File.html" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none.html"> +paging files</a> after the system partition/drive has been fully encrypted). <a href="Hibernation%20File.html" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none.html"> +Hibernation</a> must be prevented during the period between the moment when you start VeraCrypt to set up pre-boot authentication and the moment when the system partition/drive has been fully encrypted. However, note that even if you follow those steps, it + is <em style="text-align:left">not</em> guaranteed that you will prevent data leaks and that sensitive data on the device will be securely encrypted. For more information, see the sections +<a href="Data%20Leaks.html" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none.html"> +Data Leaks</a>, <a href="Paging%20File.html" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none.html"> +Paging File</a>, <a href="Hibernation%20File.html" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none.html"> +Hibernation File</a>, and <a href="Memory%20Dump%20Files.html" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none.html"> +Memory Dump Files</a>.</div> +<div style="text-align:left; margin-top:19px; margin-bottom:19px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px"> +If you need <a href="Plausible%20Deniability.html" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none.html"> +plausible deniability</a>, you must not use VeraCrypt to encrypt any part of (or create encrypted containers on) a device (or file system) that utilizes a wear-leveling mechanism.</div> +<p>To find out whether a device utilizes a wear-leveling mechanism, please refer to documentation supplied with the device or contact the vendor/manufacturer.</p> +</div><div class="ClearBoth"></div></body></html>
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