VeraCrypt
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@@ -210,41 +210,41 @@ Yes. For more information, please see the chapter <a href="Hardware%20Accelerati
Hardware Acceleration</a> in the <a href="https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Documentation.html" target="_blank" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none">
documentation</a>.</div>
<div style="text-align:left; margin-top:19px; margin-bottom:19px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
<br style="text-align:left">
<strong style="text-align:left">Is it possible to boot Windows installed in a hidden VeraCrypt volume?</strong></div>
<div style="text-align:left; margin-top:19px; margin-bottom:19px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
Yes, it is. For more information, please see the section <a href="Hidden%20Operating%20System.html" target="_blank" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none.html">
Hidden Operating System</a> in the <a href="https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Documentation.html" target="_blank" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none">
documentation</a>.</div>
<div style="text-align:left; margin-top:19px; margin-bottom:19px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
<br style="text-align:left">
<strong style="text-align:left">Will I be able to mount my VeraCrypt volume (container) on any computer?</strong></div>
<div style="text-align:left; margin-top:19px; margin-bottom:19px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
Yes, <a href="VeraCrypt%20Volume.html" target="_blank" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none.html">
VeraCrypt volumes</a> are independent of the operating system. You will be able to mount your VeraCrypt volume on any computer on which you can run VeraCrypt (see also the question '<em style="text-align:left">Can I use VeraCrypt on Windows if I do not have
administrator privileges?</em>').</div>
<div style="text-align:left; margin-top:19px; margin-bottom:19px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
<br style="text-align:left">
<strong style="text-align:left">Can I unplug or turn off a hot-plug device (for example, a USB flash drive or USB hard drive) when there is a mounted VeraCrypt volume on it?</strong></div>
<div style="text-align:left; margin-top:19px; margin-bottom:19px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
-Before you unplug or turn off the device, you should always dismount the VeraCrypt volume in VeraCrypt first, and then perform the '<em style="text-align:left">Eject</em>' operation if available (right-click the device in the '<em style="text-align:left">Computer</em>'
+Before you unplug or turn off the device, you should always unmount the VeraCrypt volume in VeraCrypt first, and then perform the '<em style="text-align:left">Eject</em>' operation if available (right-click the device in the '<em style="text-align:left">Computer</em>'
or '<em style="text-align:left">My Computer</em>' list), or use the '<em style="text-align:left">Safely Remove Hardware</em>' function (built in Windows, accessible via the taskbar notification area). Otherwise, data loss may occur.</div>
<div style="text-align:left; margin-top:19px; margin-bottom:19px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
<br style="text-align:left">
<strong style="text-align:left">What is a hidden operating system?</strong></div>
<div style="text-align:left; margin-top:19px; margin-bottom:19px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
See the section <a href="Hidden%20Operating%20System.html" target="_blank" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none.html">
Hidden Operating System</a> in the <a href="https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Documentation.html" target="_blank" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none">
documentation</a>.</div>
<div style="text-align:left; margin-top:19px; margin-bottom:19px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
<br style="text-align:left">
<strong style="text-align:left">What is plausible deniability?</strong></div>
<div style="text-align:left; margin-top:19px; margin-bottom:19px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
See the chapter <a href="Plausible%20Deniability.html" target="_blank" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none.html">
Plausible Deniability</a> in the <a href="https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Documentation.html" target="_blank" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none">
documentation</a>.</div>
<div id="SystemReinstallUpgrade" style="text-align:left; margin-top:19px; margin-bottom:19px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
<br style="text-align:left">
<strong style="text-align:left">Will I be able to mount my VeraCrypt partition/container after I reinstall or upgrade the operating system?</strong></div>
<div style="text-align:left; margin-top:19px; margin-bottom:19px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
Yes, <a href="VeraCrypt%20Volume.html" target="_blank" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none.html">
@@ -459,51 +459,51 @@ require</em> the attacker to have administrator privileges, or physical access t
<em style="text-align:left">However, if any of these conditions is met, it is actually impossible to secure the computer</em> (see below) and, therefore, you must stop using it (instead of relying on TPM).
<br style="text-align:left">
<br style="text-align:left">
If the attacker has administrator privileges, he can, for example, reset the TPM, capture the content of RAM (containing master keys) or content of files stored on mounted VeraCrypt volumes (decrypted on the fly), which can then be sent to the attacker over
the Internet or saved to an unencrypted local drive (from which the attacker might be able to read it later, when he gains physical access to the computer).
<br style="text-align:left">
<br style="text-align:left">
If the attacker can physically access the computer hardware (and you use it after such an access), he can, for example, attach a malicious component to it (such as a hardware keystroke logger) that will capture the password, the content of RAM (containing master
keys) or content of files stored on mounted VeraCrypt volumes (decrypted on the fly), which can then be sent to the attacker over the Internet or saved to an unencrypted local drive (from which the attacker might be able to read it later, when he gains physical
access to the computer again). <br style="text-align:left">
<br style="text-align:left">
The only thing that TPM is almost guaranteed to provide is a false sense of security (even the name itself, &quot;Trusted Platform Module&quot;, is misleading and creates a false sense of security). As for real security, TPM is actually redundant (and implementing redundant
features is usually a way to create so-called bloatware). <br style="text-align:left">
<br style="text-align:left">
For more information, please see the sections <a title="Physical%20Security&quot;" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none">
Physical Security</a> and <a href="Malware.html" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none.html">
Malware</a> in the <a href="https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Documentation.html" target="_blank" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none">
documentation</a>.</div>
<div style="text-align:left; margin-top:19px; margin-bottom:19px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
<br style="text-align:left">
-<strong style="text-align:left">Do I have to dismount VeraCrypt volumes before shutting down or restarting Windows?</strong></div>
+<strong style="text-align:left">Do I have to unmount VeraCrypt volumes before shutting down or restarting Windows?</strong></div>
<div style="text-align:left; margin-top:19px; margin-bottom:19px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
-No. VeraCrypt automatically dismounts all mounted VeraCrypt volumes on system shutdown/restart.</div>
+No. VeraCrypt automatically unmounts all mounted VeraCrypt volumes on system shutdown/restart.</div>
<div style="text-align:left; margin-top:19px; margin-bottom:19px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
<br style="text-align:left">
<strong style="text-align:left">Which type of VeraCrypt volume is better &ndash; partition or file container?</strong></div>
<div style="text-align:left; margin-top:19px; margin-bottom:19px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
<a href="VeraCrypt%20Volume.html" target="_blank" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none.html">File containers</a> are normal files so you can work with them as with any normal files (file containers
can be, for example, moved, renamed, and deleted the same way as normal files). <a href="VeraCrypt%20Volume.html" target="_blank" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none.html">
Partitions/drives</a> may be better as regards performance. Note that reading and writing to/from a file container may take significantly longer when the container is heavily fragmented. To solve this problem, defragment the file system in which the container
- is stored (when the VeraCrypt volume is dismounted).</div>
+ is stored (when the VeraCrypt volume is unmounted).</div>
<div style="text-align:left; margin-top:19px; margin-bottom:19px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
<br style="text-align:left">
<strong style="text-align:left">What's the recommended way to back up a VeraCrypt volume?</strong></div>
<div style="text-align:left; margin-top:19px; margin-bottom:19px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
See the chapter <a href="How%20to%20Back%20Up%20Securely.html" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none.html">
How to Back Up Securely</a> in the <a href="https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Documentation.html" target="_blank" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none">
documentation</a>.</div>
<div style="text-align:left; margin-top:19px; margin-bottom:19px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
<br style="text-align:left">
<strong style="text-align:left">What will happen if I format a VeraCrypt partition?</strong></div>
<div style="text-align:left; margin-top:19px; margin-bottom:19px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
See the question '<em style="text-align:left"><a href="#changing-filesystem" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none">Is it possible to change the file system of an encrypted volume?</a></em>'</div>
<div style="text-align:left; margin-top:19px; margin-bottom:19px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
<br style="text-align:left">
<strong style="text-align:left"><a name="changing-filesystem" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none"></a>Is it possible to change the file system of an encrypted volume?</strong></div>
<div style="text-align:left; margin-top:19px; margin-bottom:19px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
Yes, when mounted, VeraCrypt volumes can be formatted as FAT12, FAT16, FAT32, NTFS, or any other file system. VeraCrypt volumes behave as standard disk devices so you can right-click the device icon (for example in the '<em style="text-align:left">Computer</em>'
or '<em style="text-align:left">My Computer</em>' list) and select '<em style="text-align:left">Format</em>'. The actual volume contents will be lost. However, the whole volume will remain encrypted. If you format a VeraCrypt-encrypted partition when the VeraCrypt
volume that the partition hosts is not mounted, then the volume will be destroyed, and the partition will not be encrypted anymore (it will be empty).</div>
<div style="text-align:left; margin-top:19px; margin-bottom:19px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">