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<h1>Security Requirements and Precautions Pertaining to Hidden Volumes</h1>
<div style="text-align:left; margin-top:19px; margin-bottom:19px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
If you use a <a href="Hidden%20Volume.html" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none.html">
hidden VeraCrypt volume</a>, you must follow the security requirements and precautions listed below in this section. Disclaimer: This section is not guaranteed to contain a list of
<em style="text-align:left">all</em> security issues and attacks that might adversely affect or limit the ability of VeraCrypt to secure data stored in a hidden VeraCrypt volume and the ability to provide plausible deniability.</div>
<ul style="text-align:left; margin-top:18px; margin-bottom:19px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
<li style="text-align:left; margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
If an adversary has access to a (dismounted) VeraCrypt volume at several points over time, he may be able to determine which sectors of the volume are changing. If you change the contents of a
<a href="Hidden%20Volume.html" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none.html">
hidden volume</a> (e.g., create/copy new files to the hidden volume or modify/delete/rename/move files stored on the hidden volume, etc.), the contents of sectors (ciphertext) in the hidden volume area will change. After being given the password to the outer
volume, the adversary might demand an explanation why these sectors changed. Your failure to provide a plausible explanation might indicate the existence of a hidden volume within the outer volume.<br style="text-align:left">
<br style="text-align:left">
Note that issues similar to the one described above may also arise, for example, in the following cases:<br style="text-align:left">
<ul style="text-align:left; margin-top:18px; margin-bottom:19px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
<li style="text-align:left; margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
The file system in which you store a file-hosted VeraCrypt container has been defragmented and a copy of the VeraCrypt container (or of its fragment) remains in the free space on the host volume (in the defragmented file system). To prevent this, do one of
the following:
<ul style="text-align:left; margin-top:18px; margin-bottom:19px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
<li style="text-align:left; margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
Use a partition/device-hosted VeraCrypt volume instead of file-hosted. </li><li style="text-align:left; margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
Securely erase free space on the host volume (in the defragmented file system) after defragmenting. On Windows, this can be done using the Microsoft
<a href="https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897443.aspx">free utility SDelete</a>. On Linux, the
<em>shred</em> utility from GNU coreutils package can be used for this purpose. </li><li style="text-align:left; margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
Do not defragment file systems in which you store VeraCrypt volumes. </li></ul>
</li><li style="text-align:left; margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
A file-hosted VeraCrypt container is stored in a journaling file system (such as NTFS). A&nbsp;copy of the VeraCrypt container (or of its fragment) may remain on the host volume. To prevent this, do one the following:
@@ -138,36 +138,36 @@ decoy operating system</a>. Therefore, if an adversary had access to the data st
<br style="text-align:left">
For similar reasons, any software that requires activation must be installed and activated before you start creating the hidden operating system.
</li><li style="text-align:left; margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
When you need to shut down the hidden system and start the decoy system, do <em style="text-align:left">
not</em> restart the computer. Instead, shut it down or hibernate it and then leave it powered off for at least several minutes (the longer, the better) before turning the computer on and booting the decoy system. This is required to clear the memory, which
may contain sensitive data. For more information, see the section <a href="Unencrypted%20Data%20in%20RAM.html" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none.html">
Unencrypted Data in RAM</a> in the chapter <a href="Security%20Requirements%20and%20Precautions.html" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none.html">
Security Requirements and Precautions</a>. </li><li style="text-align:left; margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
The computer may be connected to a network (including the internet) only when the decoy operating system is running. When the hidden operating system is running, the computer should not be connected to any network, including the internet (one of the most reliable
ways to ensure it is to unplug the network cable, if there is one). Note that if data is downloaded from or uploaded to a remote server, the date and time of the connection, and other data, are typically logged on the server. Various kinds of data are also
logged on the operating system (e.g. Windows auto-update data, application logs, error logs, etc.) Therefore, if an adversary had access to the data stored on the server or intercepted your request to the server (and if you revealed the password for the decoy
operating system to him), he might find out that the connection was not made from within the decoy operating system, which might indicate the existence of a hidden operating system on your computer.
<br style="text-align:left">
<br style="text-align:left">
Also note that similar issues would affect you if there were any filesystem shared over a network under the hidden operating system (regardless of whether the filesystem is remote or local). Therefore, when the hidden operating system is running, there must
be no filesystem shared over a network (in any direction). </li><li style="text-align:left; margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
Any actions that can be detected by an adversary (or any actions that modify any data outside mounted hidden volumes) must be performed only when the decoy operating system is running (unless you have a plausible alternative explanation, such as using a &quot;live-CD&quot;
system to perform such actions). For example, the option '<em style="text-align:left">Auto-adjust for daylight saving time</em>' option may be enabled only on the decoy system.
</li><li style="text-align:left; margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
If the BIOS, EFI, or any other component logs power-down events or any other events that could indicate a hidden volume/system is used (e.g. by comparing such events with the events in the Windows event log), you must either disable such logging or ensure that
the log is securely erased after each session (or otherwise avoid such an issue in an appropriate way).
</li></ul>
</li></ul>
<div style="text-align:left; margin-top:19px; margin-bottom:19px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
<br style="text-align:left">
In addition to the above, you must follow the security requirements and precautions listed in the following chapters:</div>
<ul style="text-align:left; margin-top:18px; margin-bottom:19px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
<li style="text-align:left; margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
<a href="Security%20Requirements%20and%20Precautions.html" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none; font-weight:bold.html">Security Requirements and Precautions</a>
</li><li style="text-align:left; margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
<strong style="text-align:left"><a href="How%20to%20Back%20Up%20Securely.html" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none.html">How to Back Up Securely</a></strong>
</li></ul>
<p><a href="VeraCrypt%20Hidden%20Operating%20System.html" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none; font-weight:bold.html">Next Section &gt;&gt;</a></p>
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<p id="hidden_os_exception"><span style="text-align:left; font-size:10px; line-height:12px">* This does not apply to filesystems on CD/DVD-like media and on custom, untypical, or non-standard devices/media.</span></p>
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