diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/Common/Volumes.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/Common/Volumes.c | 1198 |
1 files changed, 1198 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/Common/Volumes.c b/src/Common/Volumes.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3aa1dde3 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/Common/Volumes.c @@ -0,0 +1,1198 @@ +/*
+ Legal Notice: Some portions of the source code contained in this file were
+ derived from the source code of Encryption for the Masses 2.02a, which is
+ Copyright (c) 1998-2000 Paul Le Roux and which is governed by the 'License
+ Agreement for Encryption for the Masses'. Modifications and additions to
+ the original source code (contained in this file) and all other portions
+ of this file are Copyright (c) 2003-2010 TrueCrypt Developers Association
+ and are governed by the TrueCrypt License 3.0 the full text of which is
+ contained in the file License.txt included in TrueCrypt binary and source
+ code distribution packages. */
+
+#include "Tcdefs.h"
+
+#ifndef TC_WINDOWS_BOOT
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include "EncryptionThreadPool.h"
+#endif
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <io.h>
+
+#ifndef DEVICE_DRIVER
+#include "Random.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "Crc.h"
+#include "Crypto.h"
+#include "Endian.h"
+#include "Volumes.h"
+#include "Pkcs5.h"
+
+
+/* Volume header v5 structure (used since TrueCrypt 7.0): */
+//
+// Offset Length Description
+// ------------------------------------------
+// Unencrypted:
+// 0 64 Salt
+// Encrypted:
+// 64 4 ASCII string 'TRUE'
+// 68 2 Header version
+// 70 2 Required program version
+// 72 4 CRC-32 checksum of the (decrypted) bytes 256-511
+// 76 16 Reserved (must contain zeroes)
+// 92 8 Size of hidden volume in bytes (0 = normal volume)
+// 100 8 Size of the volume in bytes (identical with field 92 for hidden volumes, valid if field 70 >= 0x600 or flag bit 0 == 1)
+// 108 8 Byte offset of the start of the master key scope (valid if field 70 >= 0x600 or flag bit 0 == 1)
+// 116 8 Size of the encrypted area within the master key scope (valid if field 70 >= 0x600 or flag bit 0 == 1)
+// 124 4 Flags: bit 0 set = system encryption; bit 1 set = non-system in-place encryption, bits 2-31 are reserved (set to zero)
+// 128 4 Sector size in bytes
+// 132 120 Reserved (must contain zeroes)
+// 252 4 CRC-32 checksum of the (decrypted) bytes 64-251
+// 256 256 Concatenated primary master key(s) and secondary master key(s) (XTS mode)
+
+
+/* Deprecated/legacy volume header v4 structure (used by TrueCrypt 6.x): */
+//
+// Offset Length Description
+// ------------------------------------------
+// Unencrypted:
+// 0 64 Salt
+// Encrypted:
+// 64 4 ASCII string 'TRUE'
+// 68 2 Header version
+// 70 2 Required program version
+// 72 4 CRC-32 checksum of the (decrypted) bytes 256-511
+// 76 16 Reserved (must contain zeroes)
+// 92 8 Size of hidden volume in bytes (0 = normal volume)
+// 100 8 Size of the volume in bytes (identical with field 92 for hidden volumes, valid if field 70 >= 0x600 or flag bit 0 == 1)
+// 108 8 Byte offset of the start of the master key scope (valid if field 70 >= 0x600 or flag bit 0 == 1)
+// 116 8 Size of the encrypted area within the master key scope (valid if field 70 >= 0x600 or flag bit 0 == 1)
+// 124 4 Flags: bit 0 set = system encryption; bit 1 set = non-system in-place encryption, bits 2-31 are reserved
+// 128 124 Reserved (must contain zeroes)
+// 252 4 CRC-32 checksum of the (decrypted) bytes 64-251
+// 256 256 Concatenated primary master key(s) and secondary master key(s) (XTS mode)
+
+
+/* Deprecated/legacy volume header v3 structure (used by TrueCrypt 5.x): */
+//
+// Offset Length Description
+// ------------------------------------------
+// Unencrypted:
+// 0 64 Salt
+// Encrypted:
+// 64 4 ASCII string 'TRUE'
+// 68 2 Header version
+// 70 2 Required program version
+// 72 4 CRC-32 checksum of the (decrypted) bytes 256-511
+// 76 8 Volume creation time
+// 84 8 Header creation time
+// 92 8 Size of hidden volume in bytes (0 = normal volume)
+// 100 8 Size of the volume in bytes (identical with field 92 for hidden volumes)
+// 108 8 Start byte offset of the encrypted area of the volume
+// 116 8 Size of the encrypted area of the volume in bytes
+// 124 132 Reserved (must contain zeroes)
+// 256 256 Concatenated primary master key(s) and secondary master key(s) (XTS mode)
+
+
+/* Deprecated/legacy volume header v2 structure (used before TrueCrypt 5.0): */
+//
+// Offset Length Description
+// ------------------------------------------
+// Unencrypted:
+// 0 64 Salt
+// Encrypted:
+// 64 4 ASCII string 'TRUE'
+// 68 2 Header version
+// 70 2 Required program version
+// 72 4 CRC-32 checksum of the (decrypted) bytes 256-511
+// 76 8 Volume creation time
+// 84 8 Header creation time
+// 92 8 Size of hidden volume in bytes (0 = normal volume)
+// 100 156 Reserved (must contain zeroes)
+// 256 32 For LRW (deprecated/legacy), secondary key
+// For CBC (deprecated/legacy), data used to generate IV and whitening values
+// 288 224 Master key(s)
+
+
+
+uint16 GetHeaderField16 (byte *header, int offset)
+{
+ return BE16 (*(uint16 *) (header + offset));
+}
+
+
+uint32 GetHeaderField32 (byte *header, int offset)
+{
+ return BE32 (*(uint32 *) (header + offset));
+}
+
+
+UINT64_STRUCT GetHeaderField64 (byte *header, int offset)
+{
+ UINT64_STRUCT uint64Struct;
+
+#ifndef TC_NO_COMPILER_INT64
+ uint64Struct.Value = BE64 (*(uint64 *) (header + offset));
+#else
+ uint64Struct.HighPart = BE32 (*(uint32 *) (header + offset));
+ uint64Struct.LowPart = BE32 (*(uint32 *) (header + offset + 4));
+#endif
+ return uint64Struct;
+}
+
+
+#ifndef TC_WINDOWS_BOOT
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ char DerivedKey[MASTER_KEYDATA_SIZE];
+ BOOL Free;
+ LONG KeyReady;
+ int Pkcs5Prf;
+} KeyDerivationWorkItem;
+
+
+BOOL ReadVolumeHeaderRecoveryMode = FALSE;
+
+int ReadVolumeHeader (BOOL bBoot, char *encryptedHeader, Password *password, PCRYPTO_INFO *retInfo, CRYPTO_INFO *retHeaderCryptoInfo)
+{
+ char header[TC_VOLUME_HEADER_EFFECTIVE_SIZE];
+ KEY_INFO keyInfo;
+ PCRYPTO_INFO cryptoInfo;
+ char dk[MASTER_KEYDATA_SIZE];
+ int enqPkcs5Prf, pkcs5_prf;
+ uint16 headerVersion;
+ int status = ERR_PARAMETER_INCORRECT;
+ int primaryKeyOffset;
+
+ TC_EVENT keyDerivationCompletedEvent;
+ TC_EVENT noOutstandingWorkItemEvent;
+ KeyDerivationWorkItem *keyDerivationWorkItems;
+ KeyDerivationWorkItem *item;
+ int pkcs5PrfCount = LAST_PRF_ID - FIRST_PRF_ID + 1;
+ size_t encryptionThreadCount = GetEncryptionThreadCount();
+ size_t queuedWorkItems = 0;
+ LONG outstandingWorkItemCount = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ if (retHeaderCryptoInfo != NULL)
+ {
+ cryptoInfo = retHeaderCryptoInfo;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ cryptoInfo = *retInfo = crypto_open ();
+ if (cryptoInfo == NULL)
+ return ERR_OUTOFMEMORY;
+ }
+
+ if (encryptionThreadCount > 1)
+ {
+ keyDerivationWorkItems = TCalloc (sizeof (KeyDerivationWorkItem) * pkcs5PrfCount);
+ if (!keyDerivationWorkItems)
+ return ERR_OUTOFMEMORY;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < pkcs5PrfCount; ++i)
+ keyDerivationWorkItems[i].Free = TRUE;
+
+#ifdef DEVICE_DRIVER
+ KeInitializeEvent (&keyDerivationCompletedEvent, SynchronizationEvent, FALSE);
+ KeInitializeEvent (&noOutstandingWorkItemEvent, SynchronizationEvent, TRUE);
+#else
+ keyDerivationCompletedEvent = CreateEvent (NULL, FALSE, FALSE, NULL);
+ if (!keyDerivationCompletedEvent)
+ {
+ TCfree (keyDerivationWorkItems);
+ return ERR_OUTOFMEMORY;
+ }
+
+ noOutstandingWorkItemEvent = CreateEvent (NULL, FALSE, TRUE, NULL);
+ if (!noOutstandingWorkItemEvent)
+ {
+ CloseHandle (keyDerivationCompletedEvent);
+ TCfree (keyDerivationWorkItems);
+ return ERR_OUTOFMEMORY;
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+
+#ifndef DEVICE_DRIVER
+ VirtualLock (&keyInfo, sizeof (keyInfo));
+ VirtualLock (&dk, sizeof (dk));
+#endif
+
+ crypto_loadkey (&keyInfo, password->Text, (int) password->Length);
+
+ // PKCS5 is used to derive the primary header key(s) and secondary header key(s) (XTS mode) from the password
+ memcpy (keyInfo.salt, encryptedHeader + HEADER_SALT_OFFSET, PKCS5_SALT_SIZE);
+
+ // Test all available PKCS5 PRFs
+ for (enqPkcs5Prf = FIRST_PRF_ID; enqPkcs5Prf <= LAST_PRF_ID || queuedWorkItems > 0; ++enqPkcs5Prf)
+ {
+ BOOL lrw64InitDone = FALSE; // Deprecated/legacy
+ BOOL lrw128InitDone = FALSE; // Deprecated/legacy
+
+ if (encryptionThreadCount > 1)
+ {
+ // Enqueue key derivation on thread pool
+ if (queuedWorkItems < encryptionThreadCount && enqPkcs5Prf <= LAST_PRF_ID)
+ {
+ for (i = 0; i < pkcs5PrfCount; ++i)
+ {
+ item = &keyDerivationWorkItems[i];
+ if (item->Free)
+ {
+ item->Free = FALSE;
+ item->KeyReady = FALSE;
+ item->Pkcs5Prf = enqPkcs5Prf;
+
+ EncryptionThreadPoolBeginKeyDerivation (&keyDerivationCompletedEvent, &noOutstandingWorkItemEvent,
+ &item->KeyReady, &outstandingWorkItemCount, enqPkcs5Prf, keyInfo.userKey,
+ keyInfo.keyLength, keyInfo.salt, get_pkcs5_iteration_count (enqPkcs5Prf, bBoot), item->DerivedKey);
+
+ ++queuedWorkItems;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (enqPkcs5Prf < LAST_PRF_ID)
+ continue;
+ }
+ else
+ --enqPkcs5Prf;
+
+ // Wait for completion of a key derivation
+ while (queuedWorkItems > 0)
+ {
+ for (i = 0; i < pkcs5PrfCount; ++i)
+ {
+ item = &keyDerivationWorkItems[i];
+ if (!item->Free && InterlockedExchangeAdd (&item->KeyReady, 0) == TRUE)
+ {
+ pkcs5_prf = item->Pkcs5Prf;
+ keyInfo.noIterations = get_pkcs5_iteration_count (pkcs5_prf, bBoot);
+ memcpy (dk, item->DerivedKey, sizeof (dk));
+
+ item->Free = TRUE;
+ --queuedWorkItems;
+ goto KeyReady;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (queuedWorkItems > 0)
+ TC_WAIT_EVENT (keyDerivationCompletedEvent);
+ }
+ continue;
+KeyReady: ;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ pkcs5_prf = enqPkcs5Prf;
+ keyInfo.noIterations = get_pkcs5_iteration_count (enqPkcs5Prf, bBoot);
+
+ switch (pkcs5_prf)
+ {
+ case RIPEMD160:
+ derive_key_ripemd160 (keyInfo.userKey, keyInfo.keyLength, keyInfo.salt,
+ PKCS5_SALT_SIZE, keyInfo.noIterations, dk, GetMaxPkcs5OutSize());
+ break;
+
+ case SHA512:
+ derive_key_sha512 (keyInfo.userKey, keyInfo.keyLength, keyInfo.salt,
+ PKCS5_SALT_SIZE, keyInfo.noIterations, dk, GetMaxPkcs5OutSize());
+ break;
+
+ case SHA1:
+ // Deprecated/legacy
+ derive_key_sha1 (keyInfo.userKey, keyInfo.keyLength, keyInfo.salt,
+ PKCS5_SALT_SIZE, keyInfo.noIterations, dk, GetMaxPkcs5OutSize());
+ break;
+
+ case WHIRLPOOL:
+ derive_key_whirlpool (keyInfo.userKey, keyInfo.keyLength, keyInfo.salt,
+ PKCS5_SALT_SIZE, keyInfo.noIterations, dk, GetMaxPkcs5OutSize());
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ // Unknown/wrong ID
+ TC_THROW_FATAL_EXCEPTION;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Test all available modes of operation
+ for (cryptoInfo->mode = FIRST_MODE_OF_OPERATION_ID;
+ cryptoInfo->mode <= LAST_MODE_OF_OPERATION;
+ cryptoInfo->mode++)
+ {
+ switch (cryptoInfo->mode)
+ {
+ case LRW:
+ case CBC:
+ case INNER_CBC:
+ case OUTER_CBC:
+
+ // For LRW (deprecated/legacy), copy the tweak key
+ // For CBC (deprecated/legacy), copy the IV/whitening seed
+ memcpy (cryptoInfo->k2, dk, LEGACY_VOL_IV_SIZE);
+ primaryKeyOffset = LEGACY_VOL_IV_SIZE;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ primaryKeyOffset = 0;
+ }
+
+ // Test all available encryption algorithms
+ for (cryptoInfo->ea = EAGetFirst ();
+ cryptoInfo->ea != 0;
+ cryptoInfo->ea = EAGetNext (cryptoInfo->ea))
+ {
+ int blockSize;
+
+ if (!EAIsModeSupported (cryptoInfo->ea, cryptoInfo->mode))
+ continue; // This encryption algorithm has never been available with this mode of operation
+
+ blockSize = CipherGetBlockSize (EAGetFirstCipher (cryptoInfo->ea));
+
+ status = EAInit (cryptoInfo->ea, dk + primaryKeyOffset, cryptoInfo->ks);
+ if (status == ERR_CIPHER_INIT_FAILURE)
+ goto err;
+
+ // Init objects related to the mode of operation
+
+ if (cryptoInfo->mode == XTS)
+ {
+ // Copy the secondary key (if cascade, multiple concatenated)
+ memcpy (cryptoInfo->k2, dk + EAGetKeySize (cryptoInfo->ea), EAGetKeySize (cryptoInfo->ea));
+
+ // Secondary key schedule
+ if (!EAInitMode (cryptoInfo))
+ {
+ status = ERR_MODE_INIT_FAILED;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (cryptoInfo->mode == LRW
+ && (blockSize == 8 && !lrw64InitDone || blockSize == 16 && !lrw128InitDone))
+ {
+ // Deprecated/legacy
+
+ if (!EAInitMode (cryptoInfo))
+ {
+ status = ERR_MODE_INIT_FAILED;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (blockSize == 8)
+ lrw64InitDone = TRUE;
+ else if (blockSize == 16)
+ lrw128InitDone = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ // Copy the header for decryption
+ memcpy (header, encryptedHeader, sizeof (header));
+
+ // Try to decrypt header
+
+ DecryptBuffer (header + HEADER_ENCRYPTED_DATA_OFFSET, HEADER_ENCRYPTED_DATA_SIZE, cryptoInfo);
+
+ // Magic 'TRUE'
+ if (GetHeaderField32 (header, TC_HEADER_OFFSET_MAGIC) != 0x54525545)
+ continue;
+
+ // Header version
+ headerVersion = GetHeaderField16 (header, TC_HEADER_OFFSET_VERSION);
+
+ if (headerVersion > VOLUME_HEADER_VERSION)
+ {
+ status = ERR_NEW_VERSION_REQUIRED;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ // Check CRC of the header fields
+ if (!ReadVolumeHeaderRecoveryMode
+ && headerVersion >= 4
+ && GetHeaderField32 (header, TC_HEADER_OFFSET_HEADER_CRC) != GetCrc32 (header + TC_HEADER_OFFSET_MAGIC, TC_HEADER_OFFSET_HEADER_CRC - TC_HEADER_OFFSET_MAGIC))
+ continue;
+
+ // Required program version
+ cryptoInfo->RequiredProgramVersion = GetHeaderField16 (header, TC_HEADER_OFFSET_REQUIRED_VERSION);
+ cryptoInfo->LegacyVolume = cryptoInfo->RequiredProgramVersion < 0x600;
+
+ // Check CRC of the key set
+ if (!ReadVolumeHeaderRecoveryMode
+ && GetHeaderField32 (header, TC_HEADER_OFFSET_KEY_AREA_CRC) != GetCrc32 (header + HEADER_MASTER_KEYDATA_OFFSET, MASTER_KEYDATA_SIZE))
+ continue;
+
+ // Now we have the correct password, cipher, hash algorithm, and volume type
+
+ // Check the version required to handle this volume
+ if (cryptoInfo->RequiredProgramVersion > VERSION_NUM)
+ {
+ status = ERR_NEW_VERSION_REQUIRED;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ // Header version
+ cryptoInfo->HeaderVersion = headerVersion;
+
+ // Volume creation time (legacy)
+ cryptoInfo->volume_creation_time = GetHeaderField64 (header, TC_HEADER_OFFSET_VOLUME_CREATION_TIME).Value;
+
+ // Header creation time (legacy)
+ cryptoInfo->header_creation_time = GetHeaderField64 (header, TC_HEADER_OFFSET_MODIFICATION_TIME).Value;
+
+ // Hidden volume size (if any)
+ cryptoInfo->hiddenVolumeSize = GetHeaderField64 (header, TC_HEADER_OFFSET_HIDDEN_VOLUME_SIZE).Value;
+
+ // Hidden volume status
+ cryptoInfo->hiddenVolume = (cryptoInfo->hiddenVolumeSize != 0);
+
+ // Volume size
+ cryptoInfo->VolumeSize = GetHeaderField64 (header, TC_HEADER_OFFSET_VOLUME_SIZE);
+
+ // Encrypted area size and length
+ cryptoInfo->EncryptedAreaStart = GetHeaderField64 (header, TC_HEADER_OFFSET_ENCRYPTED_AREA_START);
+ cryptoInfo->EncryptedAreaLength = GetHeaderField64 (header, TC_HEADER_OFFSET_ENCRYPTED_AREA_LENGTH);
+
+ // Flags
+ cryptoInfo->HeaderFlags = GetHeaderField32 (header, TC_HEADER_OFFSET_FLAGS);
+
+ // Sector size
+ if (headerVersion >= 5)
+ cryptoInfo->SectorSize = GetHeaderField32 (header, TC_HEADER_OFFSET_SECTOR_SIZE);
+ else
+ cryptoInfo->SectorSize = TC_SECTOR_SIZE_LEGACY;
+
+ if (cryptoInfo->SectorSize < TC_MIN_VOLUME_SECTOR_SIZE
+ || cryptoInfo->SectorSize > TC_MAX_VOLUME_SECTOR_SIZE
+ || cryptoInfo->SectorSize % ENCRYPTION_DATA_UNIT_SIZE != 0)
+ {
+ status = ERR_PARAMETER_INCORRECT;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ // Preserve scheduled header keys if requested
+ if (retHeaderCryptoInfo)
+ {
+ if (retInfo == NULL)
+ {
+ cryptoInfo->pkcs5 = pkcs5_prf;
+ cryptoInfo->noIterations = keyInfo.noIterations;
+ goto ret;
+ }
+
+ cryptoInfo = *retInfo = crypto_open ();
+ if (cryptoInfo == NULL)
+ {
+ status = ERR_OUTOFMEMORY;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ memcpy (cryptoInfo, retHeaderCryptoInfo, sizeof (*cryptoInfo));
+ }
+
+ // Master key data
+ memcpy (keyInfo.master_keydata, header + HEADER_MASTER_KEYDATA_OFFSET, MASTER_KEYDATA_SIZE);
+ memcpy (cryptoInfo->master_keydata, keyInfo.master_keydata, MASTER_KEYDATA_SIZE);
+
+ // PKCS #5
+ memcpy (cryptoInfo->salt, keyInfo.salt, PKCS5_SALT_SIZE);
+ cryptoInfo->pkcs5 = pkcs5_prf;
+ cryptoInfo->noIterations = keyInfo.noIterations;
+
+ // Init the cipher with the decrypted master key
+ status = EAInit (cryptoInfo->ea, keyInfo.master_keydata + primaryKeyOffset, cryptoInfo->ks);
+ if (status == ERR_CIPHER_INIT_FAILURE)
+ goto err;
+
+ switch (cryptoInfo->mode)
+ {
+ case LRW:
+ case CBC:
+ case INNER_CBC:
+ case OUTER_CBC:
+
+ // For LRW (deprecated/legacy), the tweak key
+ // For CBC (deprecated/legacy), the IV/whitening seed
+ memcpy (cryptoInfo->k2, keyInfo.master_keydata, LEGACY_VOL_IV_SIZE);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ // The secondary master key (if cascade, multiple concatenated)
+ memcpy (cryptoInfo->k2, keyInfo.master_keydata + EAGetKeySize (cryptoInfo->ea), EAGetKeySize (cryptoInfo->ea));
+
+ }
+
+ if (!EAInitMode (cryptoInfo))
+ {
+ status = ERR_MODE_INIT_FAILED;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ status = ERR_SUCCESS;
+ goto ret;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ status = ERR_PASSWORD_WRONG;
+
+err:
+ if (cryptoInfo != retHeaderCryptoInfo)
+ {
+ crypto_close(cryptoInfo);
+ *retInfo = NULL;
+ }
+
+ret:
+ burn (&keyInfo, sizeof (keyInfo));
+ burn (dk, sizeof(dk));
+
+#ifndef DEVICE_DRIVER
+ VirtualUnlock (&keyInfo, sizeof (keyInfo));
+ VirtualUnlock (&dk, sizeof (dk));
+#endif
+
+ if (encryptionThreadCount > 1)
+ {
+ TC_WAIT_EVENT (noOutstandingWorkItemEvent);
+
+ burn (keyDerivationWorkItems, sizeof (KeyDerivationWorkItem) * pkcs5PrfCount);
+ TCfree (keyDerivationWorkItems);
+
+#ifndef DEVICE_DRIVER
+ CloseHandle (keyDerivationCompletedEvent);
+ CloseHandle (noOutstandingWorkItemEvent);
+#endif
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+#else // TC_WINDOWS_BOOT
+
+int ReadVolumeHeader (BOOL bBoot, char *header, Password *password, PCRYPTO_INFO *retInfo, CRYPTO_INFO *retHeaderCryptoInfo)
+{
+#ifdef TC_WINDOWS_BOOT_SINGLE_CIPHER_MODE
+ char dk[32 * 2]; // 2 * 256-bit key
+ char masterKey[32 * 2];
+#else
+ char dk[32 * 2 * 3]; // 6 * 256-bit key
+ char masterKey[32 * 2 * 3];
+#endif
+
+ PCRYPTO_INFO cryptoInfo;
+ int status;
+
+ if (retHeaderCryptoInfo != NULL)
+ cryptoInfo = retHeaderCryptoInfo;
+ else
+ cryptoInfo = *retInfo = crypto_open ();
+
+ // PKCS5 PRF
+ derive_key_ripemd160 (password->Text, (int) password->Length, header + HEADER_SALT_OFFSET,
+ PKCS5_SALT_SIZE, bBoot ? 1000 : 2000, dk, sizeof (dk));
+
+ // Mode of operation
+ cryptoInfo->mode = FIRST_MODE_OF_OPERATION_ID;
+
+ // Test all available encryption algorithms
+ for (cryptoInfo->ea = EAGetFirst (); cryptoInfo->ea != 0; cryptoInfo->ea = EAGetNext (cryptoInfo->ea))
+ {
+ status = EAInit (cryptoInfo->ea, dk, cryptoInfo->ks);
+ if (status == ERR_CIPHER_INIT_FAILURE)
+ goto err;
+
+ // Secondary key schedule
+ EAInit (cryptoInfo->ea, dk + EAGetKeySize (cryptoInfo->ea), cryptoInfo->ks2);
+
+ // Try to decrypt header
+ DecryptBuffer (header + HEADER_ENCRYPTED_DATA_OFFSET, HEADER_ENCRYPTED_DATA_SIZE, cryptoInfo);
+
+ // Check magic 'TRUE' and CRC-32 of header fields and master keydata
+ if (GetHeaderField32 (header, TC_HEADER_OFFSET_MAGIC) != 0x54525545
+ || (GetHeaderField16 (header, TC_HEADER_OFFSET_VERSION) >= 4 && GetHeaderField32 (header, TC_HEADER_OFFSET_HEADER_CRC) != GetCrc32 (header + TC_HEADER_OFFSET_MAGIC, TC_HEADER_OFFSET_HEADER_CRC - TC_HEADER_OFFSET_MAGIC))
+ || GetHeaderField32 (header, TC_HEADER_OFFSET_KEY_AREA_CRC) != GetCrc32 (header + HEADER_MASTER_KEYDATA_OFFSET, MASTER_KEYDATA_SIZE))
+ {
+ EncryptBuffer (header + HEADER_ENCRYPTED_DATA_OFFSET, HEADER_ENCRYPTED_DATA_SIZE, cryptoInfo);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ // Header decrypted
+ status = 0;
+
+ // Hidden volume status
+ cryptoInfo->VolumeSize = GetHeaderField64 (header, TC_HEADER_OFFSET_HIDDEN_VOLUME_SIZE);
+ cryptoInfo->hiddenVolume = (cryptoInfo->VolumeSize.LowPart != 0 || cryptoInfo->VolumeSize.HighPart != 0);
+
+ // Volume size
+ cryptoInfo->VolumeSize = GetHeaderField64 (header, TC_HEADER_OFFSET_VOLUME_SIZE);
+
+ // Encrypted area size and length
+ cryptoInfo->EncryptedAreaStart = GetHeaderField64 (header, TC_HEADER_OFFSET_ENCRYPTED_AREA_START);
+ cryptoInfo->EncryptedAreaLength = GetHeaderField64 (header, TC_HEADER_OFFSET_ENCRYPTED_AREA_LENGTH);
+
+ // Flags
+ cryptoInfo->HeaderFlags = GetHeaderField32 (header, TC_HEADER_OFFSET_FLAGS);
+
+ memcpy (masterKey, header + HEADER_MASTER_KEYDATA_OFFSET, sizeof (masterKey));
+ EncryptBuffer (header + HEADER_ENCRYPTED_DATA_OFFSET, HEADER_ENCRYPTED_DATA_SIZE, cryptoInfo);
+
+ if (retHeaderCryptoInfo)
+ goto ret;
+
+ // Init the encryption algorithm with the decrypted master key
+ status = EAInit (cryptoInfo->ea, masterKey, cryptoInfo->ks);
+ if (status == ERR_CIPHER_INIT_FAILURE)
+ goto err;
+
+ // The secondary master key (if cascade, multiple concatenated)
+ EAInit (cryptoInfo->ea, masterKey + EAGetKeySize (cryptoInfo->ea), cryptoInfo->ks2);
+ goto ret;
+ }
+
+ status = ERR_PASSWORD_WRONG;
+
+err:
+ if (cryptoInfo != retHeaderCryptoInfo)
+ {
+ crypto_close(cryptoInfo);
+ *retInfo = NULL;
+ }
+
+ret:
+ burn (dk, sizeof(dk));
+ burn (masterKey, sizeof(masterKey));
+ return status;
+}
+
+#endif // TC_WINDOWS_BOOT
+
+
+#if !defined (DEVICE_DRIVER) && !defined (TC_WINDOWS_BOOT)
+
+#ifdef VOLFORMAT
+# include "../Format/TcFormat.h"
+# include "Dlgcode.h"
+#endif
+
+// Creates a volume header in memory
+int CreateVolumeHeaderInMemory (BOOL bBoot, char *header, int ea, int mode, Password *password,
+ int pkcs5_prf, char *masterKeydata, PCRYPTO_INFO *retInfo,
+ unsigned __int64 volumeSize, unsigned __int64 hiddenVolumeSize,
+ unsigned __int64 encryptedAreaStart, unsigned __int64 encryptedAreaLength, uint16 requiredProgramVersion, uint32 headerFlags, uint32 sectorSize, BOOL bWipeMode)
+{
+ unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) header;
+ static KEY_INFO keyInfo;
+
+ int nUserKeyLen = password->Length;
+ PCRYPTO_INFO cryptoInfo = crypto_open ();
+ static char dk[MASTER_KEYDATA_SIZE];
+ int x;
+ int retVal = 0;
+ int primaryKeyOffset;
+
+ if (cryptoInfo == NULL)
+ return ERR_OUTOFMEMORY;
+
+ memset (header, 0, TC_VOLUME_HEADER_EFFECTIVE_SIZE);
+
+ VirtualLock (&keyInfo, sizeof (keyInfo));
+ VirtualLock (&dk, sizeof (dk));
+
+ /* Encryption setup */
+
+ if (masterKeydata == NULL)
+ {
+ // We have no master key data (creating a new volume) so we'll use the TrueCrypt RNG to generate them
+
+ int bytesNeeded;
+
+ switch (mode)
+ {
+ case LRW:
+ case CBC:
+ case INNER_CBC:
+ case OUTER_CBC:
+
+ // Deprecated/legacy modes of operation
+ bytesNeeded = LEGACY_VOL_IV_SIZE + EAGetKeySize (ea);
+
+ // In fact, this should never be the case since volumes being newly created are not
+ // supposed to use any deprecated mode of operation.
+ TC_THROW_FATAL_EXCEPTION;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ bytesNeeded = EAGetKeySize (ea) * 2; // Size of primary + secondary key(s)
+ }
+
+ if (!RandgetBytes (keyInfo.master_keydata, bytesNeeded, TRUE))
+ return ERR_CIPHER_INIT_WEAK_KEY;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ // We already have existing master key data (the header is being re-encrypted)
+ memcpy (keyInfo.master_keydata, masterKeydata, MASTER_KEYDATA_SIZE);
+ }
+
+ // User key
+ memcpy (keyInfo.userKey, password->Text, nUserKeyLen);
+ keyInfo.keyLength = nUserKeyLen;
+ keyInfo.noIterations = get_pkcs5_iteration_count (pkcs5_prf, bBoot);
+
+ // User selected encryption algorithm
+ cryptoInfo->ea = ea;
+
+ // Mode of operation
+ cryptoInfo->mode = mode;
+
+ // Salt for header key derivation
+ if (!RandgetBytes (keyInfo.salt, PKCS5_SALT_SIZE, !bWipeMode))
+ return ERR_CIPHER_INIT_WEAK_KEY;
+
+ // PBKDF2 (PKCS5) is used to derive primary header key(s) and secondary header key(s) (XTS) from the password/keyfiles
+ switch (pkcs5_prf)
+ {
+ case SHA512:
+ derive_key_sha512 (keyInfo.userKey, keyInfo.keyLength, keyInfo.salt,
+ PKCS5_SALT_SIZE, keyInfo.noIterations, dk, GetMaxPkcs5OutSize());
+ break;
+
+ case SHA1:
+ // Deprecated/legacy
+ derive_key_sha1 (keyInfo.userKey, keyInfo.keyLength, keyInfo.salt,
+ PKCS5_SALT_SIZE, keyInfo.noIterations, dk, GetMaxPkcs5OutSize());
+ break;
+
+ case RIPEMD160:
+ derive_key_ripemd160 (keyInfo.userKey, keyInfo.keyLength, keyInfo.salt,
+ PKCS5_SALT_SIZE, keyInfo.noIterations, dk, GetMaxPkcs5OutSize());
+ break;
+
+ case WHIRLPOOL:
+ derive_key_whirlpool (keyInfo.userKey, keyInfo.keyLength, keyInfo.salt,
+ PKCS5_SALT_SIZE, keyInfo.noIterations, dk, GetMaxPkcs5OutSize());
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ // Unknown/wrong ID
+ TC_THROW_FATAL_EXCEPTION;
+ }
+
+ /* Header setup */
+
+ // Salt
+ mputBytes (p, keyInfo.salt, PKCS5_SALT_SIZE);
+
+ // Magic
+ mputLong (p, 0x54525545);
+
+ // Header version
+ mputWord (p, VOLUME_HEADER_VERSION);
+ cryptoInfo->HeaderVersion = VOLUME_HEADER_VERSION;
+
+ // Required program version to handle this volume
+ switch (mode)
+ {
+ case LRW:
+ // Deprecated/legacy
+ mputWord (p, 0x0410);
+ break;
+ case OUTER_CBC:
+ case INNER_CBC:
+ // Deprecated/legacy
+ mputWord (p, 0x0300);
+ break;
+ case CBC:
+ // Deprecated/legacy
+ mputWord (p, hiddenVolumeSize > 0 ? 0x0300 : 0x0100);
+ break;
+ default:
+ mputWord (p, requiredProgramVersion != 0 ? requiredProgramVersion : TC_VOLUME_MIN_REQUIRED_PROGRAM_VERSION);
+ }
+
+ // CRC of the master key data
+ x = GetCrc32(keyInfo.master_keydata, MASTER_KEYDATA_SIZE);
+ mputLong (p, x);
+
+ // Reserved fields
+ p += 2 * 8;
+
+ // Size of hidden volume (if any)
+ cryptoInfo->hiddenVolumeSize = hiddenVolumeSize;
+ mputInt64 (p, cryptoInfo->hiddenVolumeSize);
+
+ cryptoInfo->hiddenVolume = cryptoInfo->hiddenVolumeSize != 0;
+
+ // Volume size
+ cryptoInfo->VolumeSize.Value = volumeSize;
+ mputInt64 (p, volumeSize);
+
+ // Encrypted area start
+ cryptoInfo->EncryptedAreaStart.Value = encryptedAreaStart;
+ mputInt64 (p, encryptedAreaStart);
+
+ // Encrypted area size
+ cryptoInfo->EncryptedAreaLength.Value = encryptedAreaLength;
+ mputInt64 (p, encryptedAreaLength);
+
+ // Flags
+ cryptoInfo->HeaderFlags = headerFlags;
+ mputLong (p, headerFlags);
+
+ // Sector size
+ if (sectorSize < TC_MIN_VOLUME_SECTOR_SIZE
+ || sectorSize > TC_MAX_VOLUME_SECTOR_SIZE
+ || sectorSize % ENCRYPTION_DATA_UNIT_SIZE != 0)
+ {
+ TC_THROW_FATAL_EXCEPTION;
+ }
+
+ cryptoInfo->SectorSize = sectorSize;
+ mputLong (p, sectorSize);
+
+ // CRC of the header fields
+ x = GetCrc32 (header + TC_HEADER_OFFSET_MAGIC, TC_HEADER_OFFSET_HEADER_CRC - TC_HEADER_OFFSET_MAGIC);
+ p = header + TC_HEADER_OFFSET_HEADER_CRC;
+ mputLong (p, x);
+
+ // The master key data
+ memcpy (header + HEADER_MASTER_KEYDATA_OFFSET, keyInfo.master_keydata, MASTER_KEYDATA_SIZE);
+
+
+ /* Header encryption */
+
+ switch (mode)
+ {
+ case LRW:
+ case CBC:
+ case INNER_CBC:
+ case OUTER_CBC:
+
+ // For LRW (deprecated/legacy), the tweak key
+ // For CBC (deprecated/legacy), the IV/whitening seed
+ memcpy (cryptoInfo->k2, dk, LEGACY_VOL_IV_SIZE);
+ primaryKeyOffset = LEGACY_VOL_IV_SIZE;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ // The secondary key (if cascade, multiple concatenated)
+ memcpy (cryptoInfo->k2, dk + EAGetKeySize (cryptoInfo->ea), EAGetKeySize (cryptoInfo->ea));
+ primaryKeyOffset = 0;
+ }
+
+ retVal = EAInit (cryptoInfo->ea, dk + primaryKeyOffset, cryptoInfo->ks);
+ if (retVal != ERR_SUCCESS)
+ return retVal;
+
+ // Mode of operation
+ if (!EAInitMode (cryptoInfo))
+ return ERR_OUTOFMEMORY;
+
+
+ // Encrypt the entire header (except the salt)
+ EncryptBuffer (header + HEADER_ENCRYPTED_DATA_OFFSET,
+ HEADER_ENCRYPTED_DATA_SIZE,
+ cryptoInfo);
+
+
+ /* cryptoInfo setup for further use (disk format) */
+
+ // Init with the master key(s)
+ retVal = EAInit (cryptoInfo->ea, keyInfo.master_keydata + primaryKeyOffset, cryptoInfo->ks);
+ if (retVal != ERR_SUCCESS)
+ return retVal;
+
+ memcpy (cryptoInfo->master_keydata, keyInfo.master_keydata, MASTER_KEYDATA_SIZE);
+
+ switch (cryptoInfo->mode)
+ {
+ case LRW:
+ case CBC:
+ case INNER_CBC:
+ case OUTER_CBC:
+
+ // For LRW (deprecated/legacy), the tweak key
+ // For CBC (deprecated/legacy), the IV/whitening seed
+ memcpy (cryptoInfo->k2, keyInfo.master_keydata, LEGACY_VOL_IV_SIZE);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ // The secondary master key (if cascade, multiple concatenated)
+ memcpy (cryptoInfo->k2, keyInfo.master_keydata + EAGetKeySize (cryptoInfo->ea), EAGetKeySize (cryptoInfo->ea));
+ }
+
+ // Mode of operation
+ if (!EAInitMode (cryptoInfo))
+ return ERR_OUTOFMEMORY;
+
+
+#ifdef VOLFORMAT
+ if (showKeys && !bInPlaceEncNonSys)
+ {
+ BOOL dots3 = FALSE;
+ int i, j;
+
+ j = EAGetKeySize (ea);
+
+ if (j > NBR_KEY_BYTES_TO_DISPLAY)
+ {
+ dots3 = TRUE;
+ j = NBR_KEY_BYTES_TO_DISPLAY;
+ }
+
+ MasterKeyGUIView[0] = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < j; i++)
+ {
+ char tmp2[8] = {0};
+ sprintf (tmp2, "%02X", (int) (unsigned char) keyInfo.master_keydata[i + primaryKeyOffset]);
+ strcat (MasterKeyGUIView, tmp2);
+ }
+
+ HeaderKeyGUIView[0] = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < NBR_KEY_BYTES_TO_DISPLAY; i++)
+ {
+ char tmp2[8];
+ sprintf (tmp2, "%02X", (int) (unsigned char) dk[primaryKeyOffset + i]);
+ strcat (HeaderKeyGUIView, tmp2);
+ }
+
+ if (dots3)
+ {
+ DisplayPortionsOfKeys (hHeaderKey, hMasterKey, HeaderKeyGUIView, MasterKeyGUIView, !showKeys);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ SendMessage (hMasterKey, WM_SETTEXT, 0, (LPARAM) MasterKeyGUIView);
+ SendMessage (hHeaderKey, WM_SETTEXT, 0, (LPARAM) HeaderKeyGUIView);
+ }
+ }
+#endif // #ifdef VOLFORMAT
+
+ burn (dk, sizeof(dk));
+ burn (&keyInfo, sizeof (keyInfo));
+
+ *retInfo = cryptoInfo;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+BOOL ReadEffectiveVolumeHeader (BOOL device, HANDLE fileHandle, byte *header, DWORD *bytesRead)
+{
+#if TC_VOLUME_HEADER_EFFECTIVE_SIZE > TC_MAX_VOLUME_SECTOR_SIZE
+#error TC_VOLUME_HEADER_EFFECTIVE_SIZE > TC_MAX_VOLUME_SECTOR_SIZE
+#endif
+
+ byte sectorBuffer[TC_MAX_VOLUME_SECTOR_SIZE];
+ DISK_GEOMETRY geometry;
+
+ if (!device)
+ return ReadFile (fileHandle, header, TC_VOLUME_HEADER_EFFECTIVE_SIZE, bytesRead, NULL);
+
+ if (!DeviceIoControl (fileHandle, IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY, NULL, 0, &geometry, sizeof (geometry), bytesRead, NULL))
+ return FALSE;
+
+ if (geometry.BytesPerSector > sizeof (sectorBuffer) || geometry.BytesPerSector < TC_MIN_VOLUME_SECTOR_SIZE)
+ {
+ SetLastError (ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ if (!ReadFile (fileHandle, sectorBuffer, max (TC_VOLUME_HEADER_EFFECTIVE_SIZE, geometry.BytesPerSector), bytesRead, NULL))
+ return FALSE;
+
+ memcpy (header, sectorBuffer, min (*bytesRead, TC_VOLUME_HEADER_EFFECTIVE_SIZE));
+
+ if (*bytesRead > TC_VOLUME_HEADER_EFFECTIVE_SIZE)
+ *bytesRead = TC_VOLUME_HEADER_EFFECTIVE_SIZE;
+
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+
+BOOL WriteEffectiveVolumeHeader (BOOL device, HANDLE fileHandle, byte *header)
+{
+#if TC_VOLUME_HEADER_EFFECTIVE_SIZE > TC_MAX_VOLUME_SECTOR_SIZE
+#error TC_VOLUME_HEADER_EFFECTIVE_SIZE > TC_MAX_VOLUME_SECTOR_SIZE
+#endif
+
+ byte sectorBuffer[TC_MAX_VOLUME_SECTOR_SIZE];
+ DWORD bytesDone;
+ DISK_GEOMETRY geometry;
+
+ if (!device)
+ {
+ if (!WriteFile (fileHandle, header, TC_VOLUME_HEADER_EFFECTIVE_SIZE, &bytesDone, NULL))
+ return FALSE;
+
+ if (bytesDone != TC_VOLUME_HEADER_EFFECTIVE_SIZE)
+ {
+ SetLastError (ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+
+ if (!DeviceIoControl (fileHandle, IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY, NULL, 0, &geometry, sizeof (geometry), &bytesDone, NULL))
+ return FALSE;
+
+ if (geometry.BytesPerSector > sizeof (sectorBuffer) || geometry.BytesPerSector < TC_MIN_VOLUME_SECTOR_SIZE)
+ {
+ SetLastError (ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ if (geometry.BytesPerSector != TC_VOLUME_HEADER_EFFECTIVE_SIZE)
+ {
+ LARGE_INTEGER seekOffset;
+
+ if (!ReadFile (fileHandle, sectorBuffer, geometry.BytesPerSector, &bytesDone, NULL))
+ return FALSE;
+
+ if (bytesDone != geometry.BytesPerSector)
+ {
+ SetLastError (ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ seekOffset.QuadPart = -(int) bytesDone;
+ if (!SetFilePointerEx (fileHandle, seekOffset, NULL, FILE_CURRENT))
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ memcpy (sectorBuffer, header, TC_VOLUME_HEADER_EFFECTIVE_SIZE);
+
+ if (!WriteFile (fileHandle, sectorBuffer, geometry.BytesPerSector, &bytesDone, NULL))
+ return FALSE;
+
+ if (bytesDone != geometry.BytesPerSector)
+ {
+ SetLastError (ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+
+// Writes randomly generated data to unused/reserved header areas.
+// When bPrimaryOnly is TRUE, then only the primary header area (not the backup header area) is filled with random data.
+// When bBackupOnly is TRUE, only the backup header area (not the primary header area) is filled with random data.
+int WriteRandomDataToReservedHeaderAreas (HANDLE dev, CRYPTO_INFO *cryptoInfo, uint64 dataAreaSize, BOOL bPrimaryOnly, BOOL bBackupOnly)
+{
+ char temporaryKey[MASTER_KEYDATA_SIZE];
+ char originalK2[MASTER_KEYDATA_SIZE];
+
+ byte buf[TC_VOLUME_HEADER_GROUP_SIZE];
+
+ LARGE_INTEGER offset;
+ int nStatus = ERR_SUCCESS;
+ DWORD dwError;
+ DWORD bytesDone;
+ BOOL backupHeaders = bBackupOnly;
+
+ if (bPrimaryOnly && bBackupOnly)
+ TC_THROW_FATAL_EXCEPTION;
+
+ memcpy (originalK2, cryptoInfo->k2, sizeof (cryptoInfo->k2));
+
+ while (TRUE)
+ {
+ // Temporary keys
+ if (!RandgetBytes (temporaryKey, EAGetKeySize (cryptoInfo->ea), FALSE)
+ || !RandgetBytes (cryptoInfo->k2, sizeof (cryptoInfo->k2), FALSE))
+ {
+ nStatus = ERR_PARAMETER_INCORRECT;
+ goto final_seq;
+ }
+
+ nStatus = EAInit (cryptoInfo->ea, temporaryKey, cryptoInfo->ks);
+ if (nStatus != ERR_SUCCESS)
+ goto final_seq;
+
+ if (!EAInitMode (cryptoInfo))
+ {
+ nStatus = ERR_MODE_INIT_FAILED;
+ goto final_seq;
+ }
+
+ offset.QuadPart = backupHeaders ? dataAreaSize + TC_VOLUME_HEADER_GROUP_SIZE : TC_VOLUME_HEADER_OFFSET;
+
+ if (!SetFilePointerEx (dev, offset, NULL, FILE_BEGIN))
+ {
+ nStatus = ERR_OS_ERROR;
+ goto final_seq;
+ }
+
+ if (!ReadFile (dev, buf, sizeof (buf), &bytesDone, NULL))
+ {
+ nStatus = ERR_OS_ERROR;
+ goto final_seq;
+ }
+
+ if (bytesDone < TC_VOLUME_HEADER_EFFECTIVE_SIZE)
+ {
+ SetLastError (ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+ nStatus = ERR_OS_ERROR;
+ goto final_seq;
+ }
+
+ EncryptBuffer (buf + TC_VOLUME_HEADER_EFFECTIVE_SIZE, sizeof (buf) - TC_VOLUME_HEADER_EFFECTIVE_SIZE, cryptoInfo);
+
+ if (!SetFilePointerEx (dev, offset, NULL, FILE_BEGIN))
+ {
+ nStatus = ERR_OS_ERROR;
+ goto final_seq;
+ }
+
+ if (!WriteFile (dev, buf, sizeof (buf), &bytesDone, NULL))
+ {
+ nStatus = ERR_OS_ERROR;
+ goto final_seq;
+ }
+
+ if (bytesDone != sizeof (buf))
+ {
+ nStatus = ERR_PARAMETER_INCORRECT;
+ goto final_seq;
+ }
+
+ if (backupHeaders || bPrimaryOnly)
+ break;
+
+ backupHeaders = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ memcpy (cryptoInfo->k2, originalK2, sizeof (cryptoInfo->k2));
+
+ nStatus = EAInit (cryptoInfo->ea, cryptoInfo->master_keydata, cryptoInfo->ks);
+ if (nStatus != ERR_SUCCESS)
+ goto final_seq;
+
+ if (!EAInitMode (cryptoInfo))
+ {
+ nStatus = ERR_MODE_INIT_FAILED;
+ goto final_seq;
+ }
+
+final_seq:
+
+ dwError = GetLastError();
+
+ burn (temporaryKey, sizeof (temporaryKey));
+ burn (originalK2, sizeof (originalK2));
+
+ if (nStatus != ERR_SUCCESS)
+ SetLastError (dwError);
+
+ return nStatus;
+}
+
+#endif // !defined (DEVICE_DRIVER) && !defined (TC_WINDOWS_BOOT)
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