VeraCrypt
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2014-12-28Windows: implement wait dialog for benchmark operation.Mounir IDRASSI1-7/+30
2014-12-28Linux/MacOSX: Add possibility to choose 1-pass wipe mode without changing the...Mounir IDRASSI2-4/+4
2014-12-28Windows: Add possibility to choose 1-pass wipe mode in all cases without chan...Mounir IDRASSI1-4/+2
2014-12-27Windows: use the correct parent window when changing the password of the encr...Mounir IDRASSI3-8/+8
2014-12-27Windows: implement wait dialog for the backup/restore header operations.Mounir IDRASSI1-16/+62
2014-12-27Windows: use the correct window handle for creating message boxes. This becam...Mounir IDRASSI30-785/+793
2014-12-27Windows: implement wait dialog for the change password operation.Mounir IDRASSI1-38/+65
2014-12-27Windows: make the wait dialog mechanism more generic in order to reuse it mor...Mounir IDRASSI2-29/+65
2014-12-26Windows: workaround freezing of waiting dialog but setting its parent to the ...Mounir IDRASSI4-10/+65
2014-12-26Linux/MacOSX: Implement waiting dialog for lengthy operations in order to hav...Mounir IDRASSI17-18/+791
2014-12-22Windows: resize hot keys dialog to avoid displaying scroll-bars.Mounir IDRASSI1-19/+19
2014-12-22Windows: Solve issue of some dialogs not showing up and that was caused by wr...Mounir IDRASSI2-115/+117
2014-12-21MacOSX: Increment installer version to 1.0f-BETA3VeraCrypt_1.0f-BETA3Mounir IDRASSI1-1/+1
2014-12-20Linux: update the embedded data index inside the installer because the licens...Mounir IDRASSI1-1/+1
2014-12-20Linux: Update license file displayed in the installer.Mounir IDRASSI1-0/+23
2014-12-20Increment version to 1.0f-BETA3 and update language XML files with new fields.Mounir IDRASSI6-21/+21
2014-12-20Linux/MacOSX: Add a donation menu entryMounir IDRASSI4-0/+23
2014-12-20Linux/MacOSX: remove calls to non existent class VolumeLayoutV1HiddenMounir IDRASSI2-4/+4
2014-12-20Reduce time for reporting wrong password by removing support for legacy hidde...Mounir IDRASSI8-103/+5
2014-12-20Windows: Add a donation menu entryMounir IDRASSI4-1/+10
2014-12-20Windows: Add missing PRF selection combobox in password page of Format progra...Mounir IDRASSI1-5/+7
2014-12-19Windows: change command line switch for PRF selection to /hash in order to ma...Mounir IDRASSI1-4/+4
2014-12-19Linux/MacOSX: Enhance performance by implementing the possibility to choose t...Mounir IDRASSI26-36/+160
2014-12-19Correct small typo in language XML file.Mounir IDRASSI1-2/+2
2014-12-17Windows: replace stricmp by _stricmp to remove compilation warningMounir IDRASSI1-4/+4
2014-12-17Windows: in silent mode, don't show the wait dialog during mount operationMounir IDRASSI1-9/+17
2014-12-17Windows: Remove Truecrypt name is error message.Mounir IDRASSI2-3/+3
2014-12-16Windows: Enhance performance by implementing the possibility to choose the co...Mounir IDRASSI32-138/+426
2014-12-16Windows: display a wait dialog during the lengthy opening of a volume. There ...Mounir IDRASSI3-3/+101
2014-12-16Windows: Enable Visual Styles for a modern look-and-feelMounir IDRASSI3-0/+36
2014-12-11Linux/macOSX: always display random gathering dialog/interface before perform...Mounir IDRASSI3-0/+20
2014-12-11Windows: always display random gathering dialog when UserEnrichRandomPool is ...Mounir IDRASSI3-0/+14
2014-12-11Linux/MacOSX: Implement generating more than one keyfile, specifying the size...Mounir IDRASSI8-35/+990
2014-12-11Update license text to show VeraCrypt name while maintaining the TrueCrypt li...Mounir IDRASSI4-161/+475
2014-12-11Correct XML syntax for symbols '<' and '>'Mounir IDRASSI1-1/+1
2014-12-11Windows: Implement specifying the size of the generated keyfiles and also let...Mounir IDRASSI4-18/+77
2014-12-11Implement function RandgetBytesFull that enables generating random bytes of a...Mounir IDRASSI2-21/+55
2014-12-11Windows: correct lock issue in RandgetBytes by releasing critical section in ...Mounir IDRASSI1-0/+1
2014-12-11Windows Driver: change inherited TrueCrypt constants in kernel objects tags b...Mounir IDRASSI5-7/+7
2014-12-07MacOSX/Linux: Solve truncated text in some Wizard windows by defining a large...VeraCrypt_1.0f-BETA2Mounir IDRASSI3-9/+9
2014-12-07Windows: Implement creation of multiple keyfiles at once.Mounir IDRASSI4-43/+206
2014-12-07Windows: implement auto-dismount option when session is lockedMounir IDRASSI4-4/+99
2014-12-04Windows: correct issue in handling "More information on keyfiles" link that c...Mounir IDRASSI1-0/+2
2014-12-04Linux/macOSX: handle project URLs using the new valuesMounir IDRASSI1-38/+107
2014-12-04Windows: put back the tutorial prompt since we now have online documentation.Mounir IDRASSI1-2/+2
2014-12-04Windows: correct issue in displaying PDF of User Guide.Mounir IDRASSI1-2/+2
2014-12-04Windows: update URLs to points to the online documentation. Use a dedicated d...Mounir IDRASSI3-6/+106
2014-12-01Update VeraCrypt User GuideMounir IDRASSI1-0/+0
2014-12-01Add test vectors for HMAC-SHA256 and PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256Mounir IDRASSI1-0/+71
2014-11-11Windows: Avoid calling RegCloseKey on an invalid handle.Mounir IDRASSI1-6/+7
"><br> <br> If the <em>main</em> volume is a hidden VeraCrypt volume (see the section <a href="Hidden%20Volume.html"> <em>Hidden Volume</em></a>), the <em>backup</em> volume must be a hidden VeraCrypt volume too. Before you create the hidden <em>backup</em> volume, you must create a new host (outer) volume for it without enabling the <em>Quick Format</em> option. In addition, especially if the <em>backup</em> volume is file-hosted, the hidden <em>backup</em> volume should occupy only a very small portion of the container and the outer volume should be almost completely filled with files (otherwise, the plausible deniability of the hidden volume might be adversely affected). </li><li>Mount the newly created <em>backup</em> volume. </li><li>Mount the <em>main</em> volume. </li><li>Copy all files from the mounted <em>main</em> volume directly to the mounted <em> backup</em> volume. </li></ol> <h4>IMPORTANT: If you store the backup volume in any location that an adversary can repeatedly access (for example, on a device kept in a bank&rsquo;s safe deposit box), you should repeat all of the above steps (including the step 1) each time you want to back up the volume (see below).</h4> <p>If you follow the above steps, you will help prevent adversaries from finding out:</p> <ul> <li>Which sectors of the volumes are changing (because you always follow step 1). This is particularly important, for example, if you store the backup volume on a device kept in a bank&rsquo;s safe deposit box (or in any other location that an adversary can repeatedly access) and the volume contains a hidden volume (for more information, see the subsection <a href="Security%20Requirements%20for%20Hidden%20Volumes.html"> <em>Security Requirements and Precautions Pertaining to Hidden Volumes</em></a> in the chapter <a href="Plausible%20Deniability.html"><em>Plausible Deniability</em></a>). </li><li>That one of the volumes is a backup of the other. </li></ul> <h3>System Partitions</h3> <p>Note: In addition to backing up files, we recommend that you also back up your VeraCrypt Rescue Disk (select <em>System</em> &gt; <em>Create Rescue Disk</em>). For more information, see the section Vera<em>Crypt Rescue Disk</em>.</p> <p>To back up an encrypted system partition securely and safely, it is recommended to follow these steps:</p> <ol> <li>If you have multiple operating systems installed on your computer, boot the one that does not require pre-boot authentication.<br> <br> If you do not have multiple operating systems installed on your computer, you can boot a WinPE or BartPE CD/DVD (&lsquo;live&rsquo; Windows entirely stored on and booted from a CD/DVD; for more information, search the section <a href="FAQ.html"><em>Frequently Asked Questions</em></a> for the keyword &lsquo;BartPE&rsquo;).<br> <br> If none of the above is possible, connect your system drive as a secondary drive to another computer and then boot the operating system installed on the computer.<br> <br> Note: For security reasons, if the operating system that you want to back up resides in a hidden VeraCrypt volume (see the section <a href="Hidden%20Operating%20System.html"> <em>Hidden Operating System</em></a>), then the operating system that you boot in this step must be either another hidden operating system or a &quot;live- CD&quot; operating system (see above). For more information, see the subsection <a href="Security%20Requirements%20for%20Hidden%20Volumes.html"> <em>Security Requirements and Precautions Pertaining to Hidden Volumes</em></a> in the chapter <a href="Plausible%20Deniability.html"><em>Plausible Deniability</em></a>. </li><li>Create a new non-system VeraCrypt volume using the VeraCrypt Volume Creation Wizard (do not enable the <em>Quick Format</em> option or the <em>Dynamic</em> option). It will be your <em> backup</em> volume so its size should match (or be greater than) the size of the system partition that you want to back up.<br> <br> If the operating system that you want to back up is installed in a hidden VeraCrypt volume (see the section <em>Hidden Operating System</em>), the <em>backup</em> volume must be a hidden VeraCrypt volume too. Before you create the hidden <em>backup</em> volume, you must create a new host (outer) volume for it without enabling the <em>Quick Format</em> option. In addition, especially if the <em>backup</em> volume is file-hosted, the hidden <em>backup</em> volume should occupy only a very small portion of the container and the outer volume should be almost completely filled with files (otherwise, the plausible deniability of the hidden volume might be adversely affected). </li><li>Mount the newly created <em>backup</em> volume. </li><li>Mount the system partition that you want to back up by following these steps: <ol type="a"> <li>Click <em>Select Device</em> and then select the system partition that you want to back up (in case of a hidden operating system, select the partition containing the hidden volume in which the operating system is installed). </li><li>Click <em>OK</em>. </li><li>Select <em>System</em> &gt; <em>Mount Without Pre-Boot Authentication</em>. </li><li>Enter your pre-boot authentication password and click <em>OK</em>. </li></ol> </li><li>Mount the <em>backup</em> volume and then use a third-party program or a Windows tool to create an image of the filesystem that resides on the system partition (which was mounted as a regular VeraCrypt volume in the previous step) and store the image directly on the mounted backup volume. </li></ol> <h4>IMPORTANT: If you store the backup volume in any location that an adversary can repeatedly access (for example, on a device kept in a bank&rsquo;s safe deposit box), you should repeat all of the above steps (including the step 2) each time you want to back up the volume (see below).</h4> <p>If you follow the above steps, you will help prevent adversaries from finding out:</p> <ul> <li>Which sectors of the volumes are changing (because you always follow step 2). This is particularly important, for example, if you store the backup volume on a device kept in a bank&rsquo;s safe deposit box (or in any other location that an adversary can repeatedly access) and the volume contains a hidden volume (for more information, see the subsection <a href="Security%20Requirements%20for%20Hidden%20Volumes.html"> <em>Security Requirements and Precautions Pertaining to Hidden Volumes</em></a> in the chapter <a href="Plausible%20Deniability.html"><em>Plausible Deniability</em></a>). </li><li>That one of the volumes is a backup of the other. </li></ul> <h3>General Notes</h3> <p>If you store the backup volume in any location where an adversary can make a copy of the volume, consider encrypting the volume with a cascade of ciphers (for example, with AES-Twofish- Serpent). Otherwise, if the volume is encrypted only with a single encryption algorithm and the algorithm is later broken (for example, due to advances in cryptanalysis), the attacker might be able to decrypt his copies of the volume. The probability that three distinct encryption algorithms will be broken is significantly lower than the probability that only one of them will be broken.</p> </div> </div><div class="ClearBoth"></div></body></html>