VeraCrypt

Documentation >> Security Requirements and Precautions >> Changing Passwords and Keyfiles

Changing Passwords and Keyfiles

Note that the volume header (which is encrypted with a header key derived from a password/keyfile) contains the master key (not to be confused with the password) with which the volume is encrypted. If an adversary is allowed to make a copy of your volume before you change the volume password and/or keyfile(s), he may be able to use his copy or fragment (the old header) of the VeraCrypt volume to mount your volume using a compromised password and/or compromised keyfiles that were necessary to mount the volume before you changed the volume password and/or keyfile(s).

If you are not sure whether an adversary knows your password (or has your keyfiles) and whether he has a copy of your volume when you need to change its password and/or keyfiles, it is strongly recommended that you create a new VeraCrypt volume and move files from the old volume to the new volume (the new volume will have a different master key).

Also note that if an adversary knows your password (or has your keyfiles) and has access to your volume, he may be able to retrieve and keep its master key. If he does, he may be able to decrypt your volume even after you change its password and/or keyfile(s) (because the master key does not change when you change the volume password and/or keyfiles). In such a case, create a new VeraCrypt volume and move all files from the old volume to this new one.

The following sections of this chapter contain additional information pertaining to possible security issues connected with changing passwords and/or keyfiles:

f='#n7'>7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171
/*
  zip_crypto_mbedtls.c -- mbed TLS wrapper
  Copyright (C) 2018-2021 Dieter Baron and Thomas Klausner

  This file is part of libzip, a library to manipulate ZIP archives.
  The authors can be contacted at <info@libzip.org>

  Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  are met:
  1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
  notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
  notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
  the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
  distribution.
  3. The names of the authors may not be used to endorse or promote
  products derived from this software without specific prior
  written permission.

  THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS
  OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
  WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
  ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
  DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
  DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE
  GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
  INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER
  IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR
  OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN
  IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/

#include <stdlib.h>

#include "zipint.h"

#include "zip_crypto.h"

#include <mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h>
#include <mbedtls/entropy.h>
#include <mbedtls/pkcs5.h>

#include <limits.h>

_zip_crypto_aes_t *
_zip_crypto_aes_new(const zip_uint8_t *key, zip_uint16_t key_size, zip_error_t *error) {
    _zip_crypto_aes_t *aes;

    if ((aes = (_zip_crypto_aes_t *)malloc(sizeof(*aes))) == NULL) {
        zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_MEMORY, 0);
        return NULL;
    }

    mbedtls_aes_init(aes);
    mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(aes, (const unsigned char *)key, (unsigned int)key_size);

    return aes;
}

void
_zip_crypto_aes_free(_zip_crypto_aes_t *aes) {
    if (aes == NULL) {
        return;
    }

    mbedtls_aes_free(aes);
    free(aes);
}


_zip_crypto_hmac_t *
_zip_crypto_hmac_new(const zip_uint8_t *secret, zip_uint64_t secret_length, zip_error_t *error) {
    _zip_crypto_hmac_t *hmac;

    if (secret_length > INT_MAX) {
        zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INVAL, 0);
        return NULL;
    }

    if ((hmac = (_zip_crypto_hmac_t *)malloc(sizeof(*hmac))) == NULL) {
        zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_MEMORY, 0);
        return NULL;
    }

    mbedtls_md_init(hmac);

    if (mbedtls_md_setup(hmac, mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1), 1) != 0) {
        zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INTERNAL, 0);
        free(hmac);
        return NULL;
    }

    if (mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(hmac, (const unsigned char *)secret, (size_t)secret_length) != 0) {
        zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INTERNAL, 0);
        free(hmac);
        return NULL;
    }

    return hmac;
}


void
_zip_crypto_hmac_free(_zip_crypto_hmac_t *hmac) {
    if (hmac == NULL) {
        return;
    }

    mbedtls_md_free(hmac);
    free(hmac);
}


bool
_zip_crypto_pbkdf2(const zip_uint8_t *key, zip_uint64_t key_length, const zip_uint8_t *salt, zip_uint16_t salt_length, int iterations, zip_uint8_t *output, zip_uint64_t output_length) {
    mbedtls_md_context_t sha1_ctx;
    bool ok = true;

#if MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x03030000

    mbedtls_md_init(&sha1_ctx);

    if (mbedtls_md_setup(&sha1_ctx, mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1), 1) != 0) {
        ok = false;
    }

    if (ok && mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(&sha1_ctx, (const unsigned char *)key, (size_t)key_length, (const unsigned char *)salt, (size_t)salt_length, (unsigned int)iterations, (uint32_t)output_length, (unsigned char *)output) != 0) {
        ok = false;
    }

    mbedtls_md_free(&sha1_ctx);

#else

    ok = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac_ext(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, (const unsigned char *)key, (size_t)key_length, (const unsigned char *)salt, (size_t)salt_length, (unsigned int)iterations, (uint32_t)output_length, (unsigned char *)output) == 0;

#endif // !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) || MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x03030000

    return ok;
}


typedef struct {
    mbedtls_entropy_context entropy;
    mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg;
} zip_random_context_t;

ZIP_EXTERN bool
zip_secure_random(zip_uint8_t *buffer, zip_uint16_t length) {
    static zip_random_context_t *ctx = NULL;
    const unsigned char *pers = "zip_crypto_mbedtls";

    if (!ctx) {
        ctx = (zip_random_context_t *)malloc(sizeof(zip_random_context_t));
        if (!ctx) {
            return false;
        }
        mbedtls_entropy_init(&ctx->entropy);
        mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(&ctx->ctr_drbg);
        if (mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(&ctx->ctr_drbg, mbedtls_entropy_func, &ctx->entropy, pers, strlen(pers)) != 0) {
            mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(&ctx->ctr_drbg);
            mbedtls_entropy_free(&ctx->entropy);
            free(ctx);
            ctx = NULL;
            return false;
        }
    }

    return mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random(&ctx->ctr_drbg, (unsigned char *)buffer, (size_t)length) == 0;
}