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Frequently Asked Questions

Last Updated July 2nd, 2017
This document is not guaranteed to be error-free and is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. For more information, see Disclaimers.
Can TrueCrypt and VeraCrypt be running on the same machine?
Yes. There are generally no conflicts between TrueCrypt and VeraCrypt, thus they can be installed and used on the same machine. On Windows however, if they are both used to mount the same volume, two drives may appear when mounting it. This can be solved by running the following command in an elevated command prompt (using Run as an administrator) before mounting any volume: mountvol.exe /r.
Can I use my TrueCrypt volumes in VeraCrypt?
Yes. Starting from version 1.0f, VeraCrypt supports mounting TrueCrypt volumes.
Can I convert my TrueCrypt volumes to VeraCrypt format?
Yes. Starting from version 1.0f, VeraCrypt offers the possibility to convert TrueCrypt containers and non-system partitions to VeraCrypt format. This can achieved using the "Change Volume Password" or "Set Header Key Derivation Algorithm" actions. Just check the "TrueCrypt Mode", enter you TrueCrypt password and perform the operation. After that, you volume will have the VeraCrypt format.
Before doing the conversion, it is advised to backup the volume header using TrueCrypt. You can delete this backup safely once the conversion is done and after checking that the converted volume is mounted properly by VeraCrypt.
What's the difference between TrueCrypt and VeraCrypt?
VeraCrypt adds enhanced security to the algorithms used for system and partitions encryption making it immune to new developments in brute-force attacks.
It also solves many vulnerabilities and security issues found in TrueCrypt.
As an example, when the system partition is encrypted, TrueCrypt uses PBKDF2-RIPEMD160 with 1000 iterations whereas in VeraCrypt we use 327661. And for standard containers and other partitions, TrueCrypt uses at most 2000 iterations but VeraCrypt uses 500000 iterations.
This enhanced security adds some delay only to the opening of encrypted partitions without any performance impact to the application use phase. This is acceptable to the legitimate owner but it makes it much harder for an attacker to gain access to the encrypted data.

I forgot my password – is there any way ('backdoor') to recover the files from my VeraCrypt volume?
We have not implemented any 'backdoor' in VeraCrypt (and will never implement any even if asked to do so by a government agency), because it would defeat the purpose of the software. VeraCrypt does not allow decryption of data without knowing the correct password or key. We cannot recover your data because we do not know and cannot determine the password you chose or the key you generated using VeraCrypt. The only way to recover your files is to try to "crack" the password or the key, but it could take thousands or millions of years (depending on the length and quality of the password or keyfiles, on the software/hardware performance, algorithms, and other factors). Back in 2010, there was news about the FBI failing to decrypt a TrueCrypt volume after a year of trying. While we can't verify if this is true or just a "psy-op" stunt, in VeraCrypt we have increased the security of the key derivation to a level where any brute-force of the password is virtually impossible, provided that all security requirements are respected.

Is there a "Quick Start Guide" or some tutorial for beginners?
Yes. The first chapter, Beginner's Tutorial, in the VeraCrypt User Guide contains screenshots and step-by-step instructions on how to create, mount, and use a VeraCrypt volume.

Can I encrypt a partition/drive where Windows is installed?
Yes, see the chapter System Encryption in the VeraCrypt User Guide.
The system encryption Pre Test fails because the bootloader hangs with the messaging "booting" after successfully verifying the password. How to make the Pre Test succeed?
There two known workarounds for this issue (Both require having a Windows Installation disk):
  1. Boot your machine using a Windows Installation disk and select to repair your computer. Choose "Command Prompt" option and when it opens, type the commands below and then restart your system:
    • BootRec /fixmbr
    • BootRec /FixBoot
  2. Delete the 100 MB System Reserved partition located at the beginning of your drive and set the system partition next to it as the active partition (both can be done using diskpart utility available in Windows Installation disk repair option). After that, run Startup Repair after rebooting on Windows Installation disk. The following link contains detailed instructions: https://www.sevenforums.com/tutorials/71363-system-reserved-partition-delete.html
The system encryption Pre Test fails even though the password was correctly entered in the bootloader. How to make the Pre Test succeed?
This can be caused by the TrueCrypt driver that clears BIOS memory before VeraCrypt is able to read it. In this case, uninstalling TrueCrypt solves the issue.
This can also be caused by some hardware drivers and other software that access BIOS memory. There is no generic solution for this and affected users should identify such software and remove it from the system.

Can I directly play a video (.avi, .mpg, etc.) stored on a VeraCrypt volume?
Yes, VeraCrypt-encrypted volumes are like normal disks. You provide the correct password (and/or keyfile) and mount (open) the VeraCrypt volume. When you double click the icon of the video file, the operating system launches the application associated with the file type – typically a media player. The media player then begins loading a small initial portion of the video file from the VeraCrypt-encrypted volume to RAM (memory) in order to play it. While the portion is being loaded, VeraCrypt is automatically decrypting it (in RAM). The decrypted portion of the video (stored in RAM) is then played by the media player. While this portion is being played, the media player begins loading another small portion of the video file from the VeraCrypt-encrypted volume to RAM (memory) and the process repeats.

The same goes for video recording: Before a chunk of a video file is written to a VeraCrypt volume, VeraCrypt encrypts it in RAM and then writes it to the disk. This process is called on-the-fly encryption/decryption and it works for all file types (not only for video files).

Will VeraCrypt be open-source and free forever?
Yes, it will. We will never create a commercial version of VeraCrypt, as we believe in open-source and free security software.

Is it possible to donate to the VeraCrypt project?
Yes. You can use the donation buttons at https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Donation.html.

Why is VeraCrypt open-source? What are the advantages?
As the source code for VeraCrypt is publicly available, independent researchers can verify that the source code does not contain any security flaw or secret 'backdoor'. If the source code were not available, reviewers would need to reverse-engineer the executable files. However, analyzing and understanding such reverse-engineered code is so difficult that it is practically impossible to do (especially when the code is as large as the VeraCrypt code).

Remark: A similar problem also affects cryptographic hardware (for example, a self-encrypting storage device). It is very difficult to reverse-engineer it to verify that it does not contain any security flaw or secret 'backdoor'.

VeraCrypt is open-source, but has anybody actually reviewed the source code?
Yes. An audit has been performed by Quarkslab. The technical report can be downloaded from here. VeraCrypt 1.19 addressed the issues found by this audit.

As VeraCrypt is open-source software, independent researchers can verify that the source code does not contain any security flaw or secret 'backdoor'. Can they also verify that the official executable files were built from the published source code and contain no additional code?
Yes, they can. In addition to reviewing the source code, independent researchers can compile the source code and compare the resulting executable files with the official ones. They may find some differences (for example, timestamps or embedded digital signatures) but they can analyze the differences and verify that they do not form malicious code.

How can I use VeraCrypt on a USB flash drive?
You have three options:
  1. Encrypt the entire USB flash drive. However, you will not be able run VeraCrypt from the USB flash drive.
  2. Create two or more partitions on your USB flash drive. Leave the first partition non encrypted and encrypt the other partition(s). You can store VeraCrypt on the first partition in order to run it directly from the USB flash drive.
    Note: Windows can only access the primary partition of a USB flash drive, nevertheless the extra partitions remain accessible through VeraCrypt.
  3. Create a VeraCrypt file container on the USB flash drive (for information on how to do so, see the chapter Beginner's Tutorial, in the VeraCrypt User Guide). If you leave enough space on the USB flash drive (choose an appropriate size for the VeraCrypt container), you will also be able to store VeraCrypt on the USB flash drive (along with the container – not in the container) and you will be able to run VeraCrypt from the USB flash drive (see also the chapter Portable Mode in the VeraCrypt User Guide).

Does VeraCrypt also encrypt file names and folder names?
Yes. The entire file system within a VeraCrypt volume is encrypted (including file names, folder names, and contents of every file). This applies to both types of VeraCrypt volumes – i.e., to file containers (virtual VeraCrypt disks) and to VeraCrypt-encrypted partitions/devices.

Does VeraCrypt use parallelization?
Yes. Increase in encryption/decryption speed is directly proportional to the number of cores/processors your computer has. For more information, please see the chapter Parallelization in the documentation.

Can data be read from and written to an encrypted volume/drive as fast as if the drive was not encrypted?
Yes, since VeraCrypt uses pipelining and parallelization. For more information, please see the chapters Pipelining and Parallelization in the documentation.

Does VeraCrypt support hardware-accelerated encryption?
Yes. For more information, please see the chapter Hardware Acceleration in the documentation.

Is it possible to boot Windows installed in a hidden VeraCrypt volume?
Yes, it is. For more information, please see the section Hidden Operating System in the documentation.

Will I be able to mount my VeraCrypt volume (container) on any computer?
Yes, VeraCrypt volumes are independent of the operating system. You will be able to mount your VeraCrypt volume on any computer on which you can run VeraCrypt (see also the question 'Can I use VeraCrypt on Windows if I do not have administrator privileges?').

Can I unplug or turn off a hot-plug device (for example, a USB flash drive or USB hard drive) when there is a mounted VeraCrypt volume on it?
Before you unplug or turn off the device, you should always dismount the VeraCrypt volume in VeraCrypt first, and then perform the 'Eject' operation if available (right-click the device in the 'Computer' or 'My Computer' list), or use the 'Safely Remove Hardware' function (built in Windows, accessible via the taskbar notification area). Otherwise, data loss may occur.

What is a hidden operating system?
See the section Hidden Operating System in the documentation.

What is plausible deniability?
See the chapter Plausible Deniability in the documentation.

Will I be able to mount my VeraCrypt partition/container after I reinstall or upgrade the operating system?
Yes, VeraCrypt volumes are independent of the operating system. However, you need to make sure your operating system installer does not format the partition where your VeraCrypt volume resides.

Note: If the system partition/drive is encrypted and you want to reinstall or upgrade Windows, you need to decrypt it first (select System > Permanently Decrypt System Partition/Drive). However, a running operating system can be updated (security patches, service packs, etc.) without any problems even when the system partition/drive is encrypted.

Can I upgrade from an older version of VeraCrypt to the latest version without any problems?
Generally, yes. However, before upgrading, please read the release notes for all versions of VeraCrypt that have been released since your version was released. If there are any known issues or incompatibilities related to upgrading from your version to a newer one, they will be listed in the release notes.

Can I upgrade VeraCrypt if the system partition/drive is encrypted or do I have to decrypt it first?
Generally, you can upgrade to the latest version without decrypting the system partition/drive (just run the VeraCrypt installer and it will automatically upgrade VeraCrypt on the system). However, before upgrading, please read the release notes for all versions of VeraCrypt that have been released since your version was released. If there are any known issues or incompatibilities related to upgrading from your version to a newer one, they will be listed in the release notes. Note that this FAQ answer is also valid for users of a hidden operating system. Also note that you cannot downgrade VeraCrypt if the system partition/drive is encrypted.

I use pre-boot authentication. Can I prevent a person (adversary) that is watching me start my computer from knowing that I use VeraCrypt?
Yes. To do so, boot the encrypted system, start VeraCrypt, select Settings > System Encryption, enable the option 'Do not show any texts in the pre-boot authentication screen' and click OK. Then, when you start the computer, no texts will be displayed by the VeraCrypt boot loader (not even when you enter the wrong password). The computer will appear to be "frozen" while you can type your password. It is, however, important to note that if the adversary can analyze the content of the hard drive, he can still find out that it contains the VeraCrypt boot loader.

I use pre-boot authentication. Can I configure the VeraCrypt Boot Loader to display only a fake error message?
Yes. To do so, boot the encrypted system, start VeraCrypt, select Settings > System Encryption, enable the option 'Do not show any texts in the pre-boot authentication screen' and enter the fake error message in the corresponding field (for example, the "Missing operating system" message, which is normally displayed by the Windows boot loader if it finds no Windows boot partition). It is, however, important to note that if the adversary can analyze the content of the hard drive, he can still find out that it contains the VeraCrypt boot loader.

Can I configure VeraCrypt to mount automatically whenever Windows starts a non-system VeraCrypt volume that uses the same password as my system partition/drive (i.e. my pre-boot authentication password)?
Yes. To do so, follow these steps:
  1. Mount the volume (to the drive letter to which you want it to be mounted every time).
  2. Right-click the mounted volume in the drive list in the main VeraCrypt window and select 'Add to System Favorites'.
  3. The System Favorites Organizer window should appear now. In this window, enable the option 'Mount system favorite volumes when Windows starts' and click OK.
For more information, see the chapter System Favorite Volumes.

Can a volume be automatically mounted whenever I log on to Windows?
Yes. To do so, follow these steps:
  1. Mount the volume (to the drive letter to which you want it to be mounted every time).
  2. Right-click the mounted volume in the drive list in the main VeraCrypt window and select 'Add to Favorites'.
  3. The Favorites Organizer window should appear now. In this window, enable the option 'Mount selected volume upon logon' and click OK.
Then, when you log on to Windows, you will be asked for the volume password (and/or keyfiles) and if it is correct, the volume will be mounted.

Alternatively, if the volumes are partition/device-hosted and if you do not need to mount them to particular drive letters every time, you can follow these steps:
  1. Select Settings > Preferences. The Preferences window should appear now.
  2. In the section 'Actions to perform upon logon to Windows', enable the option 'Mount all devices-hosted VeraCrypt volumes' and click OK.
Note: VeraCrypt will not prompt you for a password if you have enabled caching of the pre-boot authentication password (Settings > 'System Encryption') and the volumes use the same password as the system partition/drive.

Can a volume be automatically mounted whenever its host device gets connected to the computer?
Yes. For example, if you have a VeraCrypt container on a USB flash drive and you want VeraCrypt to mount it automatically when you insert the USB flash drive into the USB port, follow these steps:
  1. Mount the volume (to the drive letter to which you want it to be mounted every time).
  2. Right-click the mounted volume in the drive list in the main VeraCrypt window and select 'Add to Favorites'.
  3. The Favorites Organizer window should appear now. In this window, enable the option 'Mount selected volume when its host device gets connected' and click OK.
Then, when you insert the USB flash drive into the USB port, you will be asked for the volume password (and/or keyfiles) (unless it is cached) and if it is correct, the volume will be mounted.

Note: VeraCrypt will not prompt you for a password if you have enabled caching of the pre-boot authentication password (Settings > 'System Encryption') and the volume uses the same password as the system partition/drive.

Can my pre-boot authentication password be cached so that I can use it mount non-system volumes during the session?
Yes. Select Settings > 'System Encryption' and enable the following option: 'Cache pre-boot authentication password in driver memory'.

I live in a country that violates basic human rights of its people. Is it possible to use VeraCrypt without leaving any 'traces' on unencrypted Windows?
Yes. This can be achieved by running VeraCrypt in portable mode under BartPE or in a similar environment. BartPE stands for "Bart's Preinstalled Environment", which is essentially the Windows operating system prepared in a way that it can be entirely stored on and booted from a CD/DVD (registry, temporary files, etc., are stored in RAM – hard drive is not used at all and does not even have to be present). The freeware Bart's PE Builder can transform a Windows XP installation CD into a BartPE CD. Note that you do not even need any special VeraCrypt plug-in for BartPE. Follow these steps:
  1. Create a BartPE CD and boot it. (Note: You must perform each of the following steps from within BartPE.)
  2. Download the VeraCrypt self-extracting package to the RAM disk (which BartPE automatically creates).

    Note: If the adversary can intercept data you send or receive over the Internet and you need to prevent the adversary from knowing you downloaded VeraCrypt, consider downloading it via I2P, Tor, or a similar anonymizing network.
  3. Verify the digital signatures of the downloaded file (see this section of the documentation for more information).
  4. Run the downloaded file, and select Extract (instead of Install) on the second page of the VeraCrypt Setup wizard. Extract the contents to the RAM disk.
  5. Run the file VeraCrypt.exe from the RAM disk.
Note: You may also want to consider creating a hidden operating system (see the section Hidden Operating System in the documentation). See also the chapter Plausible Deniability.

Can I encrypt my system partition/drive if I don't have a US keyboard?
Yes, VeraCrypt supports all keyboard layouts. Because of BIOS requirement, the pre-boot password is typed using US keyboard layout. During the system encryption process, VeraCrypt automatically and transparently switches the keyboard to US layout in order to ensure that the password value typed will match the one typed in pre-boot mode. Thus, in order to avoid wrong password errors, one must type the password using the same keys as when creating the system encryption.

Can I save data to the decoy system partition without risking damage to the hidden system partition?
Yes. You can write data to the decoy system partition anytime without any risk that the hidden volume will get damaged (because the decoy system is not installed within the same partition as the hidden system). For more information, see the section Hidden Operating System in the documentation.

Can I use VeraCrypt on Windows if I do not have administrator privileges?
See the chapter 'Using VeraCrypt Without Administrator Privileges' in the documentation.

Does VeraCrypt save my password to a disk?
No.

How does VeraCrypt verify that the correct password was entered?
See the section Encryption Scheme (chapter Technical Details) in the documentation.

Can I encrypt a partition/drive without losing the data currently stored on it?
Yes, but the following conditions must be met:

Can I run VeraCrypt if I don't install it?
Yes, see the chapter Portable Mode in the VeraCrypt User Guide.

Some encryption programs use TPM to prevent attacks. Will VeraCrypt use it too?
No. Those programs use TPM to protect against attacks that require the attacker to have administrator privileges, or physical access to the computer, and the attacker needs you to use the computer after such an access. However, if any of these conditions is met, it is actually impossible to secure the computer (see below) and, therefore, you must stop using it (instead of relying on TPM).

If the attacker has administrator privileges, he can, for example, reset the TPM, capture the content of RAM (containing master keys) or content of files stored on mounted VeraCrypt volumes (decrypted on the fly), which can then be sent to the attacker over the Internet or saved to an unencrypted local drive (from which the attacker might be able to read it later, when he gains physical access to the computer).

If the attacker can physically access the computer hardware (and you use it after such an access), he can, for example, attach a malicious component to it (such as a hardware keystroke logger) that will capture the password, the content of RAM (containing master keys) or content of files stored on mounted VeraCrypt volumes (decrypted on the fly), which can then be sent to the attacker over the Internet or saved to an unencrypted local drive (from which the attacker might be able to read it later, when he gains physical access to the computer again).

The only thing that TPM is almost guaranteed to provide is a false sense of security (even the name itself, "Trusted Platform Module", is misleading and creates a false sense of security). As for real security, TPM is actually redundant (and implementing redundant features is usually a way to create so-called bloatware).

For more information, please see the sections Physical Security and Malware in the documentation.

Do I have to dismount VeraCrypt volumes before shutting down or restarting Windows?
No. VeraCrypt automatically dismounts all mounted VeraCrypt volumes on system shutdown/restart.

Which type of VeraCrypt volume is better – partition or file container?
File containers are normal files so you can work with them as with any normal files (file containers can be, for example, moved, renamed, and deleted the same way as normal files). Partitions/drives may be better as regards performance. Note that reading and writing to/from a file container may take significantly longer when the container is heavily fragmented. To solve this problem, defragment the file system in which the container is stored (when the VeraCrypt volume is dismounted).

What's the recommended way to back up a VeraCrypt volume?
See the chapter How to Back Up Securely in the documentation.

What will happen if I format a VeraCrypt partition?
See the question 'Is it possible to change the file system of an encrypted volume?'

Is it possible to change the file system of an encrypted volume?
Yes, when mounted, VeraCrypt volumes can be formatted as FAT12, FAT16, FAT32, NTFS, or any other file system. VeraCrypt volumes behave as standard disk devices so you can right-click the device icon (for example in the 'Computer' or 'My Computer' list) and select 'Format'. The actual volume contents will be lost. However, the whole volume will remain encrypted. If you format a VeraCrypt-encrypted partition when the VeraCrypt volume that the partition hosts is not mounted, then the volume will be destroyed, and the partition will not be encrypted anymore (it will be empty).

Is it possible to mount a VeraCrypt container that is stored on a CD or DVD?
Yes. However, if you need to mount a VeraCrypt volume that is stored on a read-only medium (such as a CD or DVD) under Windows 2000, the file system within the VeraCrypt volume must be FAT (Windows 2000 cannot mount an NTFS file system on read-only media).

Is it possible to change the password for a hidden volume?
Yes, the password change dialog works both for standard and hidden volumes. Just type the password for the hidden volume in the 'Current Password' field of the 'Volume Password Change' dialog.
Remark: VeraCrypt first attempts to decrypt the standard volume header and if it fails, it attempts to decrypt the area within the volume where the hidden volume header may be stored (if there is a hidden volume within). In case it is successful, the password change applies to the hidden volume. (Both attempts use the password typed in the 'Current Password' field.)

How do I burn a VeraCrypt container larger than 2 GB onto a DVD?

The DVD burning software you use should allow you to select the format of the DVD. If it does, select the UDF format (ISO format does not support files larger than 2 GB).

Can I use tools like chkdsk, Disk Defragmenter, etc. on the contents of a mounted VeraCrypt volume?
Yes, VeraCrypt volumes behave like real physical disk devices, so it is possible to use any filesystem checking/repairing/defragmenting tools on the contents of a mounted VeraCrypt volume.

Does VeraCrypt support 64-bit versions of Windows?
Yes, it does. Note: 64-bit versions of Windows load only drivers that are digitally signed with a digital certificate issued by a certification authority approved for issuing kernel-mode code signing certificates. VeraCrypt complies with this requirement (the VeraCrypt driver is digitally signed with the digital certificate of IDRIX, which was issued by the certification authority Thawte).

Can I mount my VeraCrypt volume under Windows, Mac OS X, and Linux?
Yes, VeraCrypt volumes are fully cross-platform.
How can I uninstall VeraCrypt on Linux?
To uninstall VeraCrypt on Linux, run the following command in Terminal as root: veracrypt-uninstall.sh. On Ubuntu, you can use "sudo veracrypt-uninstall.sh".

Is there a list of all operating systems that VeraCrypt supports?
Yes, see the chapter Supported Operating Systems in the VeraCrypt User Guide.

Is it possible to install an application to a VeraCrypt volume and run it from there?
Yes.

What will happen when a part of a VeraCrypt volume becomes corrupted?
In encrypted data, one corrupted bit usually corrupts the whole ciphertext block in which it occurred. The ciphertext block size used by VeraCrypt is 16 bytes (i.e., 128 bits). The mode of operation used by VeraCrypt ensures that if data corruption occurs within a block, the remaining blocks are not affected. See also the question 'What do I do when the encrypted filesystem on my VeraCrypt volume is corrupted?

What do I do when the encrypted filesystem on my VeraCrypt volume is corrupted?
File system within a VeraCrypt volume may become corrupted in the same way as any normal unencrypted file system. When that happens, you can use filesystem repair tools supplied with your operating system to fix it. In Windows, it is the 'chkdsk' tool. VeraCrypt provides an easy way to use this tool on a VeraCrypt volume: Right-click the mounted volume in the main VeraCrypt window (in the drive list) and from the context menu select 'Repair Filesystem'.

We use VeraCrypt in a corporate/enterprise environment. Is there a way for an administrator to reset a volume password or pre-boot authentication password when a user forgets it (or loses a keyfile)?
Yes. Note that there is no "backdoor" implemented in VeraCrypt. However, there is a way to "reset" volume passwords/keyfiles and pre-boot authentication passwords. After you create a volume, back up its header to a file (select Tools -> Backup Volume Header) before you allow a non-admin user to use the volume. Note that the volume header (which is encrypted with a header key derived from a password/keyfile) contains the master key with which the volume is encrypted. Then ask the user to choose a password, and set it for him/her (Volumes -> Change Volume Password); or generate a user keyfile for him/her. Then you can allow the user to use the volume and to change the password/keyfiles without your assistance/permission. In case he/she forgets his/her password or loses his/her keyfile, you can "reset" the volume password/keyfiles to your original admin password/keyfiles by restoring the volume header from the backup file (Tools -> Restore Volume Header).

Similarly, you can reset a pre-boot authentication password. To create a backup of the master key data (that will be stored on a VeraCrypt Rescue Disk and encrypted with your administrator password), select 'System' > 'Create Rescue Disk'. To set a user pre-boot authentication password, select 'System' > 'Change Password'. To restore your administrator password, boot the VeraCrypt Rescue Disk, select 'Repair Options' > 'Restore key data' and enter your administrator password.
Note: It is not required to burn each VeraCrypt Rescue Disk ISO image to a CD/DVD. You can maintain a central repository of ISO images for all workstations (rather than a repository of CDs/DVDs). For more information see the section Command Line Usage (option /noisocheck).

Can our commercial company use VeraCrypt free of charge?
Provided that you comply with the terms and conditions of the VeraCrypt License, you can install and run VeraCrypt free of charge on an arbitrary number of your computers.

We share a volume over a network. Is there a way to have the network share automatically restored when the system is restarted?
Please see the chapter 'Sharing over Network' in the VeraCrypt User Guide.

It is possible to access a single VeraCrypt volume simultaneously from multiple operating systems (for example, a volume shared over a network)?
Please see the chapter 'Sharing over Network' in the VeraCrypt User Guide.

Can a user access his or her VeraCrypt volume via a network?
Please see the chapter 'Sharing over Network' in the VeraCrypt User Guide.

I encrypted a non-system partition, but its original drive letter is still visible in the 'My Computer' list. When I double click this drive letter, Windows asks if I want to format the drive. Is there a way to hide or free this drive letter?
Yes, to free the drive letter follow these steps:
  1. Right-click the 'Computer' (or 'My Computer') icon on your desktop or in the Start Menu and select Manage. The 'Computer Management' window should appear.
  2. From the list on the left, select 'Disk Management' (within the Storage sub-tree).
  3. Right-click the encrypted partition/device and select Change Drive Letter and Paths.
  4. Click Remove.
  5. If Windows prompts you to confirm the action, click Yes.

When I plug in my encrypted USB flash drive, Windows asks me if I want to format it. Is there a way to prevent that?
Yes, but you will need to remove the drive letter assigned to the device. For information on how to do so, see the question 'I encrypted a non-system partition, but its original drive letter is still visible in the 'My Computer' list.'

How do I remove or undo encryption if I do not need it anymore? How do I permanently decrypt a volume?
Please see the section 'How to Remove Encryption' in the VeraCrypt User Guide.

What will change when I enable the option 'Mount volumes as removable media'?
Please see the section 'Volume Mounted as Removable Medium' in the VeraCrypt User Guide.

Is the online documentation available for download as a single file?
Yes, the documentation is contained in the file VeraCrypt User Guide.chm that is included in official VeraCrypt installer for Windows. You can also download the CHM using the link available at the home page https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/downloads/. Note that you do not have to install VeraCrypt to obtain the CHM documentation. Just run the self-extracting installation package and then select Extract (instead of Install) on the second page of the VeraCrypt Setup wizard. Also note that when you do install VeraCrypt, the CHM documentation is automatically copied to the folder to which VeraCrypt is installed, and is accessible via the VeraCrypt user interface (by pressing F1 or choosing Help > User's Guide).

Do I have to "wipe" free space and/or files on a VeraCrypt volume?
Remark: to "wipe" = to securely erase; to overwrite sensitive data in order to render them unrecoverable.

If you believe that an adversary will be able to decrypt the volume (for example that he will make you reveal the password), then the answer is yes. Otherwise, it is not necessary, because the volume is entirely encrypted.

How does VeraCrypt know which encryption algorithm my VeraCrypt volume has been encrypted with?
Please see the section Encryption Scheme (chapter Technical Details) in the documentation.
How can I perform a Windows built-in backup on a VeraCrypt volume? The VeraCrypt volume doesn't show up in the list of available backup paths.
Windows built-in backup utility looks only for physical driver, that's why it doesn't display the VeraCrypt volume. Nevertheless, you can still backup on a VeraCrypt volume by using a trick: activate sharing on the VeraCrypt volume through Explorer interface (of course, you have to put the correct permission to avoid unauthorized access) and then choose the option "Remote shared folder" (it is not remote of course but Windows needs a network path). There you can type the path of the shared drive (for example \\ServerName\sharename) and the backup will be configured correctly.
Is the encryption used by VeraCrypt vulnerable to Quantum attacks?
VeraCrypt uses block ciphers (AES, Serpent, Twofish) for its encryption. Quantum attacks against these block ciphers are just a faster brute-force since the best know attack against these algorithms is exhaustive search (related keys attacks are irrelevant to our case because all keys are random and independent from each other).
Since VeraCrypt always uses 256-bit random and independent keys, we are assured of a 128-bit security
level against quantum algorithms which makes VeraCrypt encryption immune to such attacks.
How to make a VeraCrypt volume available for Windows Search indexing?
In order to be able to index a VeraCrypt volume through Windows Search, the volume must be mounted at boot time (System Favorite) or the Windows Search services must be restart after the volume is mounted. This is needed because Windows Search can only index drives that are available when it starts.
I'm encountering an "Operation not permitted" error with VeraCrypt on macOS when trying to mount a file container. How can I resolve this?

This specific error, which appears in the form "Operation not permitted: /var/folders/w6/d2xssyzx.../T/.veracrypt_aux_mnt1/control VeraCrypt::File::Open:232", has been reported by some users. It is the result of macOS not granting the necessary permissions to VeraCrypt. Here are a couple of solutions you can try:

  • A. Granting Full Disk Access to VeraCrypt:

    1. Go to Apple Menu > System Settings.
    2. Click on the Privacy & Security tab.
    3. Scroll down and select Full Disk Access.
    4. Click the + button, navigate to your Applications folder, select VeraCrypt, and click Open.
    5. Ensure that the checkbox next to VeraCrypt is ticked.
    6. Close the System Settings window and try using VeraCrypt again.
  • B. Using the sudo approach to launch VeraCrypt:

    You can launch VeraCrypt from the Terminal using elevated permissions:

    sudo /Applications/VeraCrypt.app/Contents/MacOS/VeraCrypt
    
    Running VeraCrypt with sudo often bypasses certain permission-related issues, but it's always a good practice to grant the necessary permissions via the system settings whenever possible.

I haven't found any answer to my question in the FAQ – what should I do?
Please search the VeraCrypt documentation and website.
ONT 8, "MS Shell Dlg", 0, 0, 0x1
+BEGIN
+ CONTROL " Normal",IDC_SYSENC_NORMAL,"Button", BS_AUTOCHECKBOX, 10,40,200,10
+ CONTROL " Hi&dden",IDC_SYSENC_HIDDEN,"Button", BS_AUTOCHECKBOX, 10,99,200,10
+ LTEXT "Select this option if you merely want to encrypt the system partition or the entire system drive.",-1,26,57,200,30
+ LTEXT "If you select this option, you will create a hidden operating system whose existence should be impossible to prove (provided that certain guidelines are followed). Thus, you will not have to decrypt or reveal the password to the hidden operating system.",-1,26,116,200,50
+ LTEXT "For a detailed explanation, please click the Help button. ",-1,26,180,200,10
+ LTEXT "IMPORTANT: Only advanced users should make modifications on this page.", -1, 10, 12, 217, 19,
+
+ GROUPBOX "", -1, 6, 30, 232, 178
+ DEFPUSHBUTTON "OK", IDOK, 129, 213, 50, 14
+ PUSHBUTTON "Cancel", IDCANCEL, 180, 213, 50, 14
+ PUSHBUTTON "&Help",IDHELP,15,213,50,14
END
-
IDD_SYSENC_HIDDEN_OS_REQ_CHECK_PAGE_DLG DIALOGEX 0, 0, 276, 193
@@ -455,2 +488,26 @@ END
+IDD_ADVANCE DIALOGEX 75, -62, 245, 362
+STYLE DS_SETFONT | DS_MODALFRAME | DS_FIXEDSYS | WS_POPUP | WS_CAPTION | WS_SYSMENU
+CAPTION "Advanced Algorithm Options"
+FONT 8, "MS Shell Dlg", 400, 0, 0x1
+BEGIN
+ DEFPUSHBUTTON "OK", IDOK, 129, 345, 50, 14
+ PUSHBUTTON "Cancel", IDCANCEL, 180, 345, 50, 14
+ COMBOBOX IDC_COMBO_BOX_HASH_ALGO, 21, 47, 137, 130, CBS_DROPDOWNLIST | WS_VSCROLL | WS_TABSTOP
+ LTEXT "", IDC_SHA512_HELP, 21, 65, 205, 40
+ COMBOBOX IDC_COMBO_BOX, 21, 113, 137, 126, CBS_DROPDOWNLIST | WS_VSCROLL | WS_TABSTOP
+ LTEXT "", IDC_BOX_HELP, 21, 131, 205, 40
+ PUSHBUTTON "&Verify", IDC_CIPHER_TEST, 40, 181, 59, 14
+ PUSHBUTTON "&Benchmark", IDC_BENCHMARK, 140, 181, 59, 14, BS_PUSHBUTTON | WS_TABSTOP | WS_VISIBLE
+ GROUPBOX "Encryption Algorithm", IDT_ENCRYPTION_ALGO, 14, 100, 217, 60
+ GROUPBOX "Hash Algorithm", IDT_HASH_ALGO, 14, 35, 217, 60
+ GROUPBOX "Test Algorithms", IDT_TEST_ALGO, 14, 168, 217, 35
+ GROUPBOX "PIM", -1, 14, 206, 217, 59
+ CONTROL "Modify P&IM", IDC_PIM_ENABLE, "Button", BS_AUTOCHECKBOX | WS_TABSTOP, 19, 217, 97, 10
+ LTEXT "", IDT_PIM_INFO, 21, 231, 203, 25
+ GROUPBOX "Wipe Mode", IDT_WIPE_MODE, 14, 270, 217, 71
+ COMBOBOX IDC_WIPE_MODE, 21, 284, 127, 90, CBS_DROPDOWNLIST | WS_TABSTOP
+ LTEXT "", IDT_WIPE_INFO, 21, 303, 200, 32
+ LTEXT "", IDT_IMPORTANT_NOTE, 18, 10, 217, 19
+END
@@ -625,2 +682,18 @@ BEGIN
+ IDD_ADVANCE, DIALOG
+ BEGIN
+ LEFTMARGIN, 7
+ RIGHTMARGIN, 238
+ TOPMARGIN, 7
+ BOTTOMMARGIN, 242
+ END
+
+ IDD_ADVANCE_MBR, DIALOG
+ BEGIN
+ LEFTMARGIN, 7
+ RIGHTMARGIN, 238
+ TOPMARGIN, 7
+ BOTTOMMARGIN, 242
+ END
+
IDD_SYSENC_KEYS_GEN_PAGE_DLG, DIALOG
@@ -743,2 +816 @@ END
#endif // not APSTUDIO_INVOKED
-
diff --git a/src/Format/Resource.h b/src/Format/Resource.h
index c37a6f4a..d031a7dd 100644
--- a/src/Format/Resource.h
+++ b/src/Format/Resource.h
@@ -120,3 +120,2 @@
#define IDT_PARTIAL_POOL_CONTENTS 1081
-#define IDC_DOWNLOAD_CD_BURN_SOFTWARE 1082
#define IDT_RESCUE_DISK_BURN_INFO 1083
@@ -148,2 +147,26 @@
#define SPARSE_FILE 1109
+#define IDC_ADVANCE_INTRO 1110
+#define IDD_ADVANCE 1111
+#define IDC_ADVANCE 1112
+#define PASSWORD_METER 1113
+#define IDC_REMEMBER_PASSWORD 1114
+#define IDC_STORE_RESCUE_DISK 1115
+#define IDC_BACKUP_DATA 1116
+#define IDT_REMEMBER_PASSWORD 1117
+#define IDT_STORE_RESCUE_DISK 1118
+#define IDT_BACKUP_DATA 1119
+#define IDC_CHECKLIST_A 1120
+#define IDC_CHECKLIST_B 1121
+#define IDC_CHECKLIST_C 1122
+#define IDD_ADVANCE_MBR 1123
+#define IDC_INFORMATION_TIP 1124
+#define IDC_SHA512_HELP 1125
+#define IDT_PASSWORD_STRENGTH 1126
+#define IDT_RESCUE_DISK_INFO_2 1127
+#define IDT_SYSENC_INFO_2 1128
+#define IDT_IMPORTANT_NOTE 1129
+#define IDT_PIM_INFO 1130
+#define IDT_WIPE_INFO 1131
+#define IDT_TEST_ALGO 1132
+#define IDC_CHECKBOX_PRETEST 1133
diff --git a/src/Format/Tcformat.c b/src/Format/Tcformat.c
index efd95caf..db0a8209 100644
--- a/src/Format/Tcformat.c
+++ b/src/Format/Tcformat.c
@@ -15,2 +15,6 @@
+#include <iostream>
+#include <fstream>
+#include <set>
+#include <iterator>
#include <stdlib.h>
@@ -22,2 +26,3 @@
#include <shlobj.h>
+#include <commctrl.h>
@@ -130,2 +135,11 @@ enum sys_encryption_cmd_line_switches
+enum password_status
+{
+ very_weak = 0,
+ weak,
+ medium,
+ strong,
+ very_strong
+};
+
typedef struct
@@ -162,3 +176,10 @@ BOOL DirectCreationMode = FALSE;
-volatile BOOL bInPlaceEncNonSys = FALSE; /* If TRUE, existing data on a non-system partition/volume are to be encrypted (or decrypted if bInPlaceDecNonSys is TRUE) in place (for system encryption, this flag is ignored) */
+int iIconX=0;
+int iIconY=0;
+HWND hDlgItemTooltip = NULL;
+HANDLE hIconTooltip = NULL;
+char tempPassword[MAX_PASSWORD + 1];
+int iPasswordStrength;
+
+volatile BOOL bInPlaceEncNonSys = TRUE; /* If TRUE, existing data on a non-system partition/volume are to be encrypted (or decrypted if bInPlaceDecNonSys is TRUE) in place (for system encryption, this flag is ignored) */
volatile BOOL bInPlaceDecNonSys = FALSE; /* If TRUE, existing data on a non-system partition/volume are to be decrypted in place (for system encryption, this flag is ignored) */
@@ -238,2 +259,3 @@ char szVerify[MAX_PASSWORD + 1]; /* Tmp password buffer */
char szRawPassword[MAX_PASSWORD + 1]; /* Password before keyfile was applied to it */
+BOOL bNextButtonClicked = FALSE;
@@ -303,2 +325,7 @@ vector <HostDevice> DeferredNonSysInPlaceEncDevices;
+BOOL bChecklistA;
+BOOL bChecklistB;
+BOOL bChecklistC;
+BOOL bCheckboxPretest;
+
int iMaxPasswordLength = MAX_PASSWORD;
@@ -1421,6 +1448,2 @@ void ComboSelChangeEA (HWND hwndDlg)
wchar_t name[100];
- wchar_t auxLine[4096];
- wchar_t hyperLink[256] = { 0 };
- int cipherIDs[5];
- int i, cnt = 0;
@@ -1429,77 +1452,3 @@ void ComboSelChangeEA (HWND hwndDlg)
- if (wcscmp (name, L"AES") == 0)
- {
- StringCbPrintfW (hyperLink, sizeof(hyperLink) / 2, GetString ("MORE_INFO_ABOUT"), name);
-
- SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_BOX_HELP), GetString ("AES_HELP"));
- }
- else if (wcscmp (name, L"Serpent") == 0)
- {
- StringCbPrintfW (hyperLink, sizeof(hyperLink) / 2, GetString ("MORE_INFO_ABOUT"), name);
-
- SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_BOX_HELP), GetString ("SERPENT_HELP"));
- }
- else if (wcscmp (name, L"Twofish") == 0)
- {
- StringCbPrintfW (hyperLink, sizeof(hyperLink) / 2, GetString ("MORE_INFO_ABOUT"), name);
-
- SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_BOX_HELP), GetString ("TWOFISH_HELP"));
- }
- else if (wcscmp (name, L"Kuznyechik") == 0)
- {
- StringCbPrintfW (hyperLink, sizeof(hyperLink) / 2, GetString ("MORE_INFO_ABOUT"), name);
-
- SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_BOX_HELP), GetString ("KUZNYECHIK_HELP"));
- }
- else if (wcscmp (name, L"Camellia") == 0)
- {
- StringCbPrintfW (hyperLink, sizeof(hyperLink) / 2, GetString ("MORE_INFO_ABOUT"), name);
-
- SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_BOX_HELP), GetString ("CAMELLIA_HELP"));
- }
- else if (EAGetCipherCount (nIndex) > 1)
- {
- // Cascade
- cipherIDs[cnt++] = i = EAGetLastCipher(nIndex);
- while (i = EAGetPreviousCipher(nIndex, i))
- {
- cipherIDs[cnt] = i;
- cnt++;
- }
-
- switch (cnt) // Number of ciphers in the cascade
- {
- case 2:
- StringCbPrintfW (auxLine, sizeof(auxLine), GetString ("TWO_LAYER_CASCADE_HELP"),
- CipherGetName (cipherIDs[1]),
- CipherGetKeySize (cipherIDs[1])*8,
- CipherGetName (cipherIDs[0]),
- CipherGetKeySize (cipherIDs[0])*8);
- break;
-
- case 3:
- StringCbPrintfW (auxLine, sizeof(auxLine), GetString ("THREE_LAYER_CASCADE_HELP"),
- CipherGetName (cipherIDs[2]),
- CipherGetKeySize (cipherIDs[2])*8,
- CipherGetName (cipherIDs[1]),
- CipherGetKeySize (cipherIDs[1])*8,
- CipherGetName (cipherIDs[0]),
- CipherGetKeySize (cipherIDs[0])*8);
- break;
- }
-
- StringCbCopyW (hyperLink, sizeof(hyperLink), GetString ("IDC_LINK_MORE_INFO_ABOUT_CIPHER"));
-
- SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_BOX_HELP), auxLine);
- }
- else
- {
- // No info available for this encryption algorithm
- SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_BOX_HELP), L"");
- }
-
-
- // Update hyperlink
- SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_LINK_MORE_INFO_ABOUT_CIPHER), hyperLink);
- AccommodateTextField (hwndDlg, IDC_LINK_MORE_INFO_ABOUT_CIPHER, FALSE, hUserUnderlineFont);
+ SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_BOX_HELP), GetString ("AES_HELP_NEW"));
}
@@ -3778,2 +3727,3 @@ BOOL CALLBACK PageDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
case SYSENC_TYPE_PAGE:
+ {
@@ -3781,16 +3731,61 @@ BOOL CALLBACK PageDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
- SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (GetParent (hwndDlg), IDC_BOX_TITLE), GetString ("SYSENC_TYPE_PAGE_TITLE"));
-
- SendMessage (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_SYSENC_HIDDEN), WM_SETFONT, (WPARAM) hUserBoldFont, (LPARAM) TRUE);
- SendMessage (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_SYSENC_NORMAL), WM_SETFONT, (WPARAM) hUserBoldFont, (LPARAM) TRUE);
+ wchar_t finalMsg[8024] = {0};
- DisableIfGpt(GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_SYSENC_HIDDEN));
+ try
+ {
+ StringCbPrintfW (finalMsg, sizeof(finalMsg),
+ GetString ("SYSENC_TYPE_PAGE_TITLE"),
+ GetSystemDriveLetter ());
+ }
+ catch (Exception &e)
+ {
+ e.Show (hwndDlg);
+ EndMainDlg (MainDlg);
+ return 0;
+ }
- CheckButton (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, bHiddenOS ? IDC_SYSENC_HIDDEN : IDC_SYSENC_NORMAL));
+ SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (GetParent (hwndDlg), IDC_BOX_TITLE), finalMsg);
- SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_BOX_HELP), GetString ("SYSENC_HIDDEN_TYPE_HELP"));
- SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_BOX_HELP_SYSENC_NORMAL), GetString ("SYSENC_NORMAL_TYPE_HELP"));
+ memset (finalMsg, 0, sizeof (finalMsg));
+ try
+ {
+ StringCbPrintfW (finalMsg, sizeof(finalMsg),
+ GetString ("SYSENC_INFO"),
+ GetSystemDriveLetter ());
+ }
+ catch (Exception &e)
+ {
+ e.Show (hwndDlg);
+ EndMainDlg (MainDlg);
+ return 0;
+ }
- ToHyperlink (hwndDlg, IDC_HIDDEN_SYSENC_INFO_LINK);
+ SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_BOX_HELP), finalMsg);
+ SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDT_SYSENC_INFO_2), GetString ("SYSENC_INFO_2"));
+
+ if (bSystemIsGPT)
+ {
+ ShowWindow (GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_ADVANCE_INTRO), SW_HIDE);
+ ShowWindow (GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_INFORMATION_TIP), SW_HIDE);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ EnableWindow (GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_ADVANCE_INTRO), TRUE);
+ iIconX = GetSystemMetrics (SM_CXSMICON);
+ iIconY = GetSystemMetrics (SM_CYSMICON);
+ hIconTooltip = LoadImage (NULL, MAKEINTRESOURCE (104), IMAGE_ICON, iIconX, iIconY, LR_DEFAULTCOLOR);
+ SendDlgItemMessage (hwndDlg, IDC_INFORMATION_TIP, STM_SETICON, (WPARAM) hIconTooltip, 0);
+
+ hDlgItemTooltip = GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_INFORMATION_TIP);
+ if (hDlgItemTooltip)
+ {
+ CreateToolTip (hwndDlg, hDlgItemTooltip, GetString ("ADV_FEATURES_INTRO_TOOLTIP"));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ MessageBox (0, TEXT("Cannot find dialog item"), 0, 0);
+ }
+ }
+
EnableWindow (GetDlgItem (GetParent (hwndDlg), IDC_NEXT), TRUE);
@@ -3801,4 +3796,7 @@ BOOL CALLBACK PageDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (MainDlg, IDCANCEL), GetString ("CANCEL"));
+
+ // Start loading the password dictonary into memory ("need" is just a random word for initializing the process)
+ CheckWord("need");
break;
-
+ }
case SYSENC_HIDDEN_OS_REQ_CHECK_PAGE:
@@ -3837,3 +3835,2 @@ BOOL CALLBACK PageDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
-
case SYSENC_PRE_DRIVE_ANALYSIS_PAGE:
@@ -4365,2 +4362,4 @@ BOOL CALLBACK PageDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
+ EnableWindow(GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_VERIFY), FALSE);
+
hPasswordInputField = GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_PASSWORD);
@@ -4376,7 +4375,7 @@ BOOL CALLBACK PageDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
- StringCbPrintfW (OrigKeyboardLayout, sizeof(OrigKeyboardLayout), L"%08X", (DWORD) GetKeyboardLayout (NULL) & 0xFFFF);
+ StringCbPrintfW(OrigKeyboardLayout, sizeof(OrigKeyboardLayout), L"%08X", (DWORD)GetKeyboardLayout(NULL) & 0xFFFF);
- if ((DWORD) GetKeyboardLayout (NULL) != 0x00000409 && (DWORD) GetKeyboardLayout (NULL) != 0x04090409)
+ if ((DWORD)GetKeyboardLayout(NULL) != 0x00000409 && (DWORD)GetKeyboardLayout(NULL) != 0x04090409)
{
- DWORD keybLayout = (DWORD) LoadKeyboardLayout (L"00000409", KLF_ACTIVATE);
+ DWORD keybLayout = (DWORD)LoadKeyboardLayout(L"00000409", KLF_ACTIVATE);
@@ -4384,4 +4383,4 @@ BOOL CALLBACK PageDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
{
- Error ("CANT_CHANGE_KEYB_LAYOUT_FOR_SYS_ENCRYPTION", MainDlg);
- EndMainDlg (MainDlg);
+ Error("CANT_CHANGE_KEYB_LAYOUT_FOR_SYS_ENCRYPTION", MainDlg);
+ EndMainDlg(MainDlg);
return 1;
@@ -4391,3 +4390,2 @@ BOOL CALLBACK PageDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
-
if (SetTimer (MainDlg, TIMER_ID_KEYB_LAYOUT_GUARD, TIMER_INTERVAL_KEYB_LAYOUT_GUARD, NULL) == 0)
@@ -4398,2 +4396,16 @@ BOOL CALLBACK PageDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
}
+
+ ShowWindow(GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_KEYFILES_ENABLE), SW_HIDE);
+ ShowWindow(GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_KEY_FILES), SW_HIDE);
+ ShowWindow(GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_PIM_ENABLE), SW_HIDE);
+
+ ShowWindow(GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_ADVANCE), SW_SHOW);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ SetCheckBox (hwndDlg, IDC_PIM_ENABLE, PimEnable);
+
+ SetCheckBox (hwndDlg, IDC_KEYFILES_ENABLE, KeyFilesEnable && !SysEncInEffect());
+ EnableWindow (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_KEY_FILES), KeyFilesEnable && !SysEncInEffect());
+ EnableWindow (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_KEYFILES_ENABLE), !SysEncInEffect());
}
@@ -4412,7 +4424,7 @@ BOOL CALLBACK PageDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
{
- StringCbCopyW (str, sizeof(str), GetString ("PASSWORD_HELP"));
+ StringCbCopyW (str, sizeof(str), GetString ("PASSWORD_HELP_SYSENC"));
}
- SetPassword (hwndDlg, IDC_PASSWORD, szRawPassword);
- SetPassword (hwndDlg, IDC_VERIFY, szVerify);
+ SetPassword(hwndDlg, IDC_PASSWORD, szRawPassword);
+ SetPassword(hwndDlg, IDC_VERIFY, szVerify);
@@ -4420,8 +4432,2 @@ BOOL CALLBACK PageDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
- SetCheckBox (hwndDlg, IDC_PIM_ENABLE, PimEnable);
-
- SetCheckBox (hwndDlg, IDC_KEYFILES_ENABLE, KeyFilesEnable && !SysEncInEffect());
- EnableWindow (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_KEY_FILES), KeyFilesEnable && !SysEncInEffect());
- EnableWindow (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_KEYFILES_ENABLE), !SysEncInEffect());
-
SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_BOX_HELP), str);
@@ -4433,3 +4439,3 @@ BOOL CALLBACK PageDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
else if (WizardMode == WIZARD_MODE_SYS_DEVICE)
- SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (GetParent (hwndDlg), IDC_BOX_TITLE), GetString ("PASSWORD"));
+ SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (GetParent (hwndDlg), IDC_BOX_TITLE), GetString ("CHOOSE_PASSWORD_TITLE"));
else
@@ -4449,3 +4455,36 @@ BOOL CALLBACK PageDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
volumePassword.Length = (unsigned __int32) strlen ((char *) volumePassword.Text);
+
+ if(SysEncInEffect ())
+ {
+ /* Random pool parameter is here because random page is removed */
+
+ mouseEntropyGathered = 0xFFFFFFFF;
+ mouseEventsInitialCount = 0;
+ bUseMask = FALSE;
+
+ {
+ HCRYPTPROV hRngProv;
+ if (CryptAcquireContext (&hRngProv, NULL, MS_ENHANCED_PROV, PROV_RSA_FULL, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT | CRYPT_SILENT))
+ {
+ if (CryptGenRandom (hRngProv, sizeof (maskRandPool), maskRandPool))
+ bUseMask = TRUE;
+ CryptReleaseContext (hRngProv, 0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ SetTimer(GetParent(hwndDlg), TIMER_ID_RANDVIEW, TIMER_INTERVAL_RANDVIEW, NULL);
+ hRandPoolSys = GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_SYS_POOL_CONTENTS);
+ hEntropyBar = GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_ENTROPY_BAR);
+ SendMessage(hEntropyBar, PBM_SETRANGE32, 0, maxEntropyLevel);
+ SendMessage(hEntropyBar, PBM_SETSTEP, 1, 0);
+ SendMessage(GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_SYS_POOL_CONTENTS), WM_SETFONT, (WPARAM)hFixedDigitFont, (LPARAM)TRUE);
+
+ /* set default values */
+
+ hash_algo = bSystemIsGPT ? SHA512 : DEFAULT_HASH_ALGORITHM_BOOT;
+ RandSetHashFunction(hash_algo);
+
+ nWipeMode = TC_WIPE_NONE;
+ }
}
@@ -4579,2 +4618,4 @@ BOOL CALLBACK PageDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDT_RESCUE_DISK_INFO), bSystemIsGPT? GetString ("RESCUE_DISK_EFI_INFO"): GetString ("RESCUE_DISK_INFO"));
+ SetWindowTextW(GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDT_RESCUE_DISK_INFO_2), GetString("RESCUE_DISK_INFO_2"));
+
SetCheckBox (hwndDlg, IDC_SKIP_RESCUE_VERIFICATION, bDontVerifyRescueDisk);
@@ -4610,21 +4651,5 @@ BOOL CALLBACK PageDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
- /* The 'Back' button must be disabled now because the user could burn a Rescue Disk, then go back, and
- generate a different master key, which would cause the Rescue Disk verification to fail (the result
- would be confusion and bug reports). */
- EnableWindow (GetDlgItem (GetParent (hwndDlg), IDC_PREV), FALSE);
-
- if (bSystemIsGPT)
- {
- ShowWindow (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_DOWNLOAD_CD_BURN_SOFTWARE), SW_HIDE);
- }
- else
- {
- if (IsWindowsIsoBurnerAvailable())
- SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_DOWNLOAD_CD_BURN_SOFTWARE), GetString ("LAUNCH_WIN_ISOBURN"));
-
- ToHyperlink (hwndDlg, IDC_DOWNLOAD_CD_BURN_SOFTWARE);
-
- if (IsWindowsIsoBurnerAvailable() && !bDontVerifyRescueDisk)
- LaunchWindowsIsoBurner (hwndDlg, szRescueDiskISO);
- }
+ /* The 'Back' button is enabled but user can't go back, instead warning is provided */
+ EnableWindow(GetDlgItem(GetParent(hwndDlg), IDC_PREV), TRUE);
+
}
@@ -4653,20 +4678,72 @@ BOOL CALLBACK PageDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
{
- if (nWipeMode == TC_WIPE_1_RAND)
- nWipeMode = TC_WIPE_NONE;
-
- SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (GetParent (hwndDlg), IDC_BOX_TITLE), GetString ("WIPE_MODE_TITLE"));
- SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDT_WIPE_MODE_INFO), GetString ("INPLACE_ENC_WIPE_MODE_INFO"));
-
- PopulateWipeModeCombo (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_WIPE_MODE),
- SystemEncryptionStatus == SYSENC_STATUS_DECRYPTING && !bInPlaceEncNonSys,
- TRUE,
- FALSE);
+ if (SysEncInEffect ())
+ {
+ /* Wipe mode page is now checklist page */
+ ShowWindow (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_WIPE_MODE), SW_HIDE);
+ ShowWindow (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDT_WIPE_MODE), SW_HIDE);
+ ShowWindow (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDT_WIPE_MODE_INFO), SW_HIDE);
+
+ SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_REMEMBER_PASSWORD), GetString ("REMEMBER_PASSWORD"));
+ SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_STORE_RESCUE_DISK), GetString ("STORE_RESCUE_DISK"));
+ SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_BACKUP_DATA), GetString ("BACKUP_DATA"));
+
+ SendMessage(GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_REMEMBER_PASSWORD), WM_SETFONT, (WPARAM)hUserBoldFont, (LPARAM)TRUE);
+ SendMessage(GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_STORE_RESCUE_DISK), WM_SETFONT, (WPARAM)hUserBoldFont, (LPARAM)TRUE);
+ SendMessage(GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_BACKUP_DATA), WM_SETFONT, (WPARAM)hUserBoldFont, (LPARAM)TRUE);
+
+ bChecklistA = FALSE;
+ bChecklistB = FALSE;
+ bChecklistC = FALSE;
+
+ SetWindowTextW(GetDlgItem(GetParent(hwndDlg), IDC_BOX_TITLE), GetString("CHECKLIST_TITLE"));
+
+ SetDlgItemText(hwndDlg, IDC_BROWSE, GetString ("OPEN_PATH_CHECKLIST_PAGE"));
+ SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDT_STORE_RESCUE_DISK), GetString ("RESCUE_DISK_CHECKLIST_B"));
+ SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDT_REMEMBER_PASSWORD), GetString ("RESCUE_DISK_CHECKLIST_A"));
+ SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDT_BACKUP_DATA), GetString ("RESCUE_DISK_CHECKLIST_C"));
+
+ EnableWindow(GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_REMEMBER_PASSWORD), TRUE);
+ EnableWindow(GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_STORE_RESCUE_DISK), TRUE);
+ EnableWindow(GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_BACKUP_DATA), TRUE);
+
+ SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (GetParent (hwndDlg), IDC_NEXT), GetString ("NEXT"));
+
+ SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (GetParent (hwndDlg), IDC_PREV), GetString ("PREV"));
+ EnableWindow (GetDlgItem (GetParent (hwndDlg), IDC_PREV), TRUE);
+ EnableWindow (GetDlgItem (GetParent (hwndDlg), IDC_NEXT), FALSE);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Hide elements from Checklist page and show Wipe mode page */
+ ShowWindow (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_CHECKLIST_A), SW_HIDE);
+ ShowWindow (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_CHECKLIST_B), SW_HIDE);
+ ShowWindow (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_CHECKLIST_C), SW_HIDE);
+ ShowWindow (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_STORE_RESCUE_DISK), SW_HIDE);
+ ShowWindow (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_REMEMBER_PASSWORD), SW_HIDE);
+ ShowWindow (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_BACKUP_DATA), SW_HIDE);
+ ShowWindow (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDT_REMEMBER_PASSWORD), SW_HIDE);
+ ShowWindow (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDT_STORE_RESCUE_DISK), SW_HIDE);
+ ShowWindow (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDT_BACKUP_DATA), SW_HIDE);
+ ShowWindow (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_BROWSE), SW_HIDE);
+ ShowWindow (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_RESCUE_DISK_ISO_PATH), SW_HIDE);
+
+ if (nWipeMode == TC_WIPE_1_RAND)
+ nWipeMode = TC_WIPE_NONE;
+
+ SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (GetParent (hwndDlg), IDC_BOX_TITLE), GetString ("WIPE_MODE_TITLE"));
+ SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDT_WIPE_MODE_INFO), GetString ("INPLACE_ENC_WIPE_MODE_INFO"));
+
+ PopulateWipeModeCombo (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_WIPE_MODE),
+ SystemEncryptionStatus == SYSENC_STATUS_DECRYPTING && !bInPlaceEncNonSys,
+ TRUE,
+ FALSE);
- SelectAlgo (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_WIPE_MODE), (int *) &nWipeMode);
+ SelectAlgo (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_WIPE_MODE), (int *) &nWipeMode);
- SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (GetParent (hwndDlg), IDC_NEXT), GetString ("NEXT"));
+ SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (GetParent (hwndDlg), IDC_NEXT), GetString ("NEXT"));
- SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (GetParent (hwndDlg), IDC_PREV), GetString ("PREV"));
- EnableWindow (GetDlgItem (GetParent (hwndDlg), IDC_PREV), TRUE);
- EnableWindow (GetDlgItem (GetParent (hwndDlg), IDC_NEXT), TRUE);
+ SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (GetParent (hwndDlg), IDC_PREV), GetString ("PREV"));
+ EnableWindow (GetDlgItem (GetParent (hwndDlg), IDC_PREV), TRUE);
+ EnableWindow (GetDlgItem (GetParent (hwndDlg), IDC_NEXT), TRUE);
+ }
}
@@ -4693,3 +4770,3 @@ BOOL CALLBACK PageDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
GetString ("SYS_ENCRYPTION_PRETEST_INFO"),
- BootEncObj->GetSystemDriveConfiguration().DriveNumber);
+ GetSystemDriveLetter ());
}
@@ -4717,2 +4794,7 @@ BOOL CALLBACK PageDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
+ ShowWindow (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_CHECKBOX_PRETEST), SW_SHOW);
+ SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_CHECKBOX_PRETEST), GetString ("PRETEST_CHECKBOX"));
+
+ bCheckboxPretest = FALSE;
+
SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (GetParent (hwndDlg), IDC_NEXT), GetString ("ENCRYPT"));
@@ -4721,6 +4803,17 @@ BOOL CALLBACK PageDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
- EnableWindow (GetDlgItem (GetParent (hwndDlg), IDC_NEXT), TRUE);
- EnableWindow (GetDlgItem (GetParent (hwndDlg), IDC_PREV), FALSE);
+ EnableWindow (GetDlgItem (GetParent (hwndDlg), IDC_NEXT), FALSE);
+ EnableWindow (GetDlgItem (GetParent (hwndDlg), IDC_PREV), TRUE);
EnableWindow (GetDlgItem (GetParent (hwndDlg), IDCANCEL), TRUE);
+ HWND hTooltip;
+ hTooltip = GetDlgItem (GetParent (hwndDlg), IDC_PREV);
+ if (hTooltip)
+ {
+ CreateToolTip (hwndDlg, hTooltip, GetString ("PRETEST_BACK_BUTTON"));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ MessageBox (0, TEXT ("Cannot find dialog item for tooltip!"), 0, 0);
+ }
+
break;
@@ -4746,4 +4839,5 @@ BOOL CALLBACK PageDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
GetString (SystemEncryptionStatus != SYSENC_STATUS_DECRYPTING ? "ENCRYPTION" : "DECRYPTION"));
-
- SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_BOX_HELP), GetString ("SYSENC_ENCRYPTION_PAGE_INFO"));
+
+ SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_BOX_HELP),
+ GetString (SystemEncryptionStatus != SYSENC_STATUS_DECRYPTING ? "SYSENC_ENCRYPTION_PAGE_INFO" : "SYSENC_DECRYPTION_PAGE_INFO"));
@@ -4765,4 +4859,2 @@ BOOL CALLBACK PageDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
- ToHyperlink (hwndDlg, IDC_MORE_INFO_SYS_ENCRYPTION);
-
if (SystemEncryptionStatus == SYSENC_STATUS_DECRYPTING)
@@ -4782,2 +4874,9 @@ BOOL CALLBACK PageDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
+ if (nWipeMode == TC_WIPE_NONE)
+ {
+ ShowWindow (GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_WIPE_MODE), SW_HIDE);
+ ShowWindow (GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDT_FORMAT_OPTIONS), SW_HIDE);
+ ShowWindow (GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDT_WIPE_MODE), SW_HIDE);
+ }
+
PostMessage (hwndDlg, TC_APPMSG_PERFORM_POST_SYSENC_WMINIT_TASKS, 0, 0);
@@ -5271,2 +5370,34 @@ BOOL CALLBACK PageDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
{
+ if ((HWND)lParam == GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, PASSWORD_METER) && iPasswordStrength == 1)
+ {
+ // we're about to draw the static
+ // set the text colour in (HDC)lParam
+ SetBkMode ((HDC)wParam, TRANSPARENT);
+ SetTextColor ((HDC)wParam, RGB(255, 0, 0)); // password weak red
+ return (BOOL)GetSysColorBrush(COLOR_MENU);
+ }
+
+ if ((HWND)lParam == GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, PASSWORD_METER) && iPasswordStrength == 2)
+ {
+ // we're about to draw the static
+ // set the text colour in (HDC)lParam
+ SetBkMode ((HDC)wParam, TRANSPARENT);
+ SetTextColor ((HDC)wParam, RGB (255, 165, 0)); // password medium orange
+ return (BOOL) GetSysColorBrush (COLOR_MENU);
+ }
+
+ if ((HWND)lParam == GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, PASSWORD_METER) && iPasswordStrength == 3)
+ {
+ SetBkMode ((HDC)wParam, TRANSPARENT);
+ SetTextColor ((HDC)wParam, RGB (218, 218, 0)); // password strong yellow
+ return (BOOL) GetSysColorBrush (COLOR_MENU);
+ }
+
+ if ((HWND)lParam == GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, PASSWORD_METER) && iPasswordStrength == 4)
+ {
+ SetBkMode((HDC)wParam, TRANSPARENT);
+ SetTextColor((HDC)wParam, RGB(50, 205, 50)); // password very strong green
+ return (BOOL) GetSysColorBrush (COLOR_MENU);
+ }
+
if (PimValueChangedWarning && ((HWND)lParam == GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_PIM_HELP)) )
@@ -5333,2 +5464,18 @@ BOOL CALLBACK PageDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
+ if (lw == IDC_ADVANCE_INTRO && nCurPageNo == SYSENC_TYPE_PAGE)
+ {
+ DialogBoxParamW(hInst,
+ MAKEINTRESOURCEW(IDD_ADVANCE_MBR), hwndDlg,
+ (DLGPROC)AdvanceDlgProcIntro, NULL);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (lw == IDC_ADVANCE && nCurPageNo == PASSWORD_PAGE)
+ {
+ DialogBoxParamW(hInst,
+ MAKEINTRESOURCEW(IDD_ADVANCE), hwndDlg,
+ (DLGPROC)AdvanceDlgProc, NULL);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
if (nCurPageNo == SYSENC_HIDDEN_OS_REQ_CHECK_PAGE && lw == IDC_HIDDEN_SYSENC_INFO_LINK)
@@ -5681,10 +5828,52 @@ BOOL CALLBACK PageDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
{
- VerifyPasswordAndUpdate (hwndDlg, GetDlgItem (GetParent (hwndDlg), IDC_NEXT),
- GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_PASSWORD),
- GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_VERIFY),
- NULL,
- NULL,
- KeyFilesEnable && FirstKeyFile!=NULL && !SysEncInEffect());
+ // If 'Next' button was clicked (and keyboard layout is not US), don't verify
+ if (!bNextButtonClicked)
+ {
+ VerifyPasswordAndUpdate (hwndDlg, GetDlgItem (GetParent (hwndDlg), IDC_NEXT),
+ GetDlgItem(hCurPage, IDC_PASSWORD),
+ GetDlgItem(hCurPage, IDC_VERIFY),
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ KeyFilesEnable && FirstKeyFile != NULL && !SysEncInEffect());
+
+ bNextButtonClicked = FALSE;
+ }
+
volumePassword.Length = (unsigned __int32) strlen ((char *) volumePassword.Text);
+
+ SendMessage (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, PASSWORD_METER), WM_SETFONT, (WPARAM)hUserBoldFont, (LPARAM)TRUE);
+
+ memset (&tempPassword[0], 0, sizeof (tempPassword));
+
+ if (GetPassword (hCurPage, IDC_PASSWORD, tempPassword, iMaxPasswordLength + 1, FALSE, TRUE))
+ iPasswordStrength = PrintStrongness (tempPassword, strlen (tempPassword));
+ else
+ Error ("ERROR_GETTING_PWD", hwndDlg);
+
+ burn (tempPassword, sizeof (tempPassword));
+ if (iPasswordStrength == very_strong)
+ {
+ SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, PASSWORD_METER), GetString ("VERY_STRONG_PASSWORD"));
+ EnableWindow (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_VERIFY), TRUE);
+ }
+ else if (iPasswordStrength == strong)
+ {
+ SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, PASSWORD_METER), GetString ("STRONG_PASSWORD"));
+ EnableWindow (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_VERIFY), TRUE);
+ }
+ else if (iPasswordStrength == medium)
+ {
+ EnableWindow (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_VERIFY), TRUE);
+ SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, PASSWORD_METER), GetString ("MEDIUM_PASSWORD"));
+ }
+ else if (iPasswordStrength == weak)
+ {
+ EnableWindow (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_VERIFY), FALSE);
+ SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, PASSWORD_METER), GetString ("WEAK_PASSWORD"));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, PASSWORD_METER), GetString ("VERY_WEAK_PASSWORD"));
+ }
return 1;
@@ -5723,2 +5912,28 @@ BOOL CALLBACK PageDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
+ if (lw == IDC_CHECKLIST_A)
+ {
+ bChecklistA = GetCheckBox (hwndDlg, IDC_CHECKLIST_A);
+ bChecklistB = GetCheckBox (hwndDlg, IDC_CHECKLIST_B);
+ bChecklistC = GetCheckBox (hwndDlg, IDC_CHECKLIST_C);
+ }
+
+ if (lw == IDC_CHECKLIST_B)
+ {
+ bChecklistA = GetCheckBox (hwndDlg, IDC_CHECKLIST_A);
+ bChecklistB = GetCheckBox (hwndDlg, IDC_CHECKLIST_B);
+ bChecklistC = GetCheckBox (hwndDlg, IDC_CHECKLIST_C);
+ }
+
+ if (lw == IDC_CHECKLIST_C)
+ {
+ bChecklistA = GetCheckBox (hwndDlg, IDC_CHECKLIST_A);
+ bChecklistB = GetCheckBox (hwndDlg, IDC_CHECKLIST_B);
+ bChecklistC = GetCheckBox (hwndDlg, IDC_CHECKLIST_C);
+ }
+
+ if (lw == IDC_CHECKBOX_PRETEST)
+ {
+ bCheckboxPretest = GetCheckBox (hwndDlg, IDC_CHECKBOX_PRETEST);
+ }
+
if (lw == IDC_PIM_ENABLE)
@@ -6052,10 +6267,43 @@ BOOL CALLBACK PageDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
- if (nCurPageNo == SYSENC_RESCUE_DISK_BURN_PAGE && lw == IDC_DOWNLOAD_CD_BURN_SOFTWARE)
+ /* The password and rescue checkbox have to be clicked in order to enable the next button */
+ if ((nCurPageNo == SYSENC_WIPE_MODE_PAGE || nCurPageNo == NONSYS_INPLACE_ENC_WIPE_MODE_PAGE) &&
+ (lw == IDC_CHECKLIST_A || lw == IDC_CHECKLIST_B || lw == IDC_CHECKLIST_C))
{
- if (IsWindowsIsoBurnerAvailable())
- LaunchWindowsIsoBurner (hwndDlg, szRescueDiskISO);
- else
- Applink ("isoburning");
+ if (SysEncInEffect ())
+ {
+ if (bChecklistA && bChecklistB && bChecklistC)
+ EnableWindow (GetDlgItem (GetParent (hwndDlg), IDC_NEXT), TRUE);
+ else
+ EnableWindow (GetDlgItem (GetParent (hwndDlg), IDC_NEXT), FALSE);
+ }
+ }
- return 1;
+ if (lw == IDC_BROWSE && (nCurPageNo == SYSENC_WIPE_MODE_PAGE || nCurPageNo == NONSYS_INPLACE_ENC_WIPE_MODE_PAGE))
+ {
+ wchar_t tmpszRescueDiskISO [TC_MAX_PATH+1];
+
+ StringCbCopyW (tmpszRescueDiskISO, sizeof(tmpszRescueDiskISO), szRescueDiskISO);
+
+ //detects the last '\' in order to remove the name of the zip file and save file name
+ for (int i = wcslen(tmpszRescueDiskISO); i > 1; i--)
+ {
+ if (tmpszRescueDiskISO[i] == '\\')
+ {
+ for (int j = i + 1; i < wcslen(tmpszRescueDiskISO); i++)
+ tmpszRescueDiskISO[j] = '\0';
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(!BrowseFile (hwndDlg, "RESCUE_DISK_PATH", tmpszRescueDiskISO))
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (nCurPageNo == SYSENC_PRETEST_RESULT_PAGE && lw == IDC_CHECKBOX_PRETEST)
+ {
+ if (bCheckboxPretest)
+ EnableWindow (GetDlgItem (GetParent (hwndDlg), IDC_NEXT), TRUE);
+ else
+ EnableWindow (GetDlgItem (GetParent (hwndDlg), IDC_NEXT), FALSE);
}
@@ -6373,7 +6621,5 @@ BOOL CALLBACK MainDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
SHGetFolderPath (NULL, CSIDL_MYDOCUMENTS, NULL, 0, szRescueDiskISO);
- if (bSystemIsGPT)
- StringCbCatW (szRescueDiskISO, sizeof(szRescueDiskISO), L"\\VeraCrypt Rescue Disk.zip");
- else
- StringCbCatW (szRescueDiskISO, sizeof(szRescueDiskISO), L"\\VeraCrypt Rescue Disk.iso");
+ StringCbCatW (szRescueDiskISO, sizeof(szRescueDiskISO), L"\\VeraCrypt Rescue Disk.zip");
+
if (IsOSAtLeast (WIN_VISTA))
@@ -6661,2 +6907,3 @@ BOOL CALLBACK MainDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
+ // East Asian languages are not translated to US keyboard layout so we need to change keyboard layout
if (keybLayout != 0x00000409 && keybLayout != 0x04090409)
@@ -6668,5 +6915,4 @@ BOOL CALLBACK MainDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
}
-
+
bKeyboardLayoutChanged = TRUE;
-
wchar_t szTmp [4096];
@@ -6676,17 +6922,16 @@ BOOL CALLBACK MainDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
MessageBoxW (MainDlg, szTmp, lpszTitle, MB_ICONWARNING | MB_SETFOREGROUND | MB_TOPMOST);
- }
-
- /* Watch the right Alt key (which is used to enter various characters on non-US keyboards) */
- if (bKeyboardLayoutChanged && !bKeybLayoutAltKeyWarningShown)
- {
- if (GetAsyncKeyState (VK_RMENU) < 0)
+ if (bKeyboardLayoutChanged && !bKeybLayoutAltKeyWarningShown)
{
- bKeybLayoutAltKeyWarningShown = TRUE;
+ if (GetAsyncKeyState (VK_RMENU) < 0)
+ {
+ bKeybLayoutAltKeyWarningShown = TRUE;
- wchar_t szTmp [4096];
- StringCbCopyW (szTmp, sizeof(szTmp), GetString ("ALT_KEY_CHARS_NOT_FOR_SYS_ENCRYPTION"));
- StringCbCatW (szTmp, sizeof(szTmp), L"\n\n");
- StringCbCatW (szTmp, sizeof(szTmp), GetString ("KEYB_LAYOUT_SYS_ENC_EXPLANATION"));
- MessageBoxW (MainDlg, szTmp, lpszTitle, MB_ICONINFORMATION | MB_SETFOREGROUND | MB_TOPMOST);
+
+ wchar_t szTmp [4096];
+ StringCbCopyW (szTmp, sizeof(szTmp), GetString ("ALT_KEY_CHARS_NOT_FOR_SYS_ENCRYPTION"));
+ StringCbCatW (szTmp, sizeof(szTmp), L"\n\n");
+ StringCbCatW (szTmp, sizeof(szTmp), GetString ("KEYB_LAYOUT_SYS_ENC_EXPLANATION"));
+ MessageBoxW (MainDlg, szTmp, lpszTitle, MB_ICONINFORMATION | MB_SETFOREGROUND | MB_TOPMOST);
+ }
}
@@ -6695,3 +6940,2 @@ BOOL CALLBACK MainDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
return 1;
-
case TIMER_ID_SYSENC_DRIVE_ANALYSIS_PROGRESS:
@@ -7016,3 +7260,16 @@ BOOL CALLBACK MainDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
{
- OpenPageHelp (hwndDlg, nCurPageNo);
+ if (nCurPageNo == SYSENC_RESCUE_DISK_CREATION_PAGE ||
+ nCurPageNo == SYSENC_RESCUE_DISK_BURN_PAGE ||
+ nCurPageNo == SYSENC_RESCUE_DISK_VERIFIED_PAGE)
+ {
+ Applink("rescue");
+ }
+ else if (nCurPageNo == PASSWORD_PAGE)
+ {
+ Applink("passwords");
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ OpenPageHelp(hwndDlg, nCurPageNo);
+ }
return 1;
@@ -7085,3 +7342,3 @@ BOOL CALLBACK MainDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
if (!bHiddenOS)
- nNewPageNo = SYSENC_SPAN_PAGE - 1; // Skip irrelevant pages
+ nNewPageNo = PASSWORD_PAGE - 1; // Skip irrelevant pages
}
@@ -7629,2 +7886,7 @@ BOOL CALLBACK MainDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
{
+ if (SysEncInEffect ())
+ {
+ wchar_t tmpPwd[MAX_PASSWORD + 1];
+ GetWindowText (GetDlgItem (hCurPage, IDC_PASSWORD), tmpPwd, iMaxPasswordLength + 1);
+ }
VerifyPasswordAndUpdate (hwndDlg, GetDlgItem (MainDlg, IDC_NEXT),
@@ -7646,3 +7908,3 @@ BOOL CALLBACK MainDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
}
- // Check password length (check also done for outer volume which is not the case in TrueCrypt).
+ // Check password length (check also done for outer volume which is not the case in TrueCrypt).
else if (!CheckPasswordLength (hwndDlg, volumePassword.Length, 0, SysEncInEffect(), SysEncInEffect()? hash_algo : 0, FALSE, FALSE))
@@ -7685,3 +7947,2 @@ BOOL CALLBACK MainDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
}
-
}
@@ -7706,7 +7967,2 @@ BOOL CALLBACK MainDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
- if (SysEncInEffect ())
- {
- nNewPageNo = SYSENC_COLLECTING_RANDOM_DATA_PAGE - 1; // Skip irrelevant pages
- }
-
if (bInPlaceEncNonSys)
@@ -7723,2 +7979,37 @@ BOOL CALLBACK MainDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
}
+
+
+ if (SysEncInEffect ())
+ {
+ if (PimEnable)
+ nNewPageNo = PIM_PAGE - 1;
+ else
+ {
+ nNewPageNo = SYSENC_RESCUE_DISK_CREATION_PAGE - 1; // Skip irrelevant pages
+
+ wchar_t tmp[RANDPOOL_DISPLAY_SIZE + 1];
+ if (!bInPlaceEncNonSys)
+ {
+ /* Generate master key and other related data (except the rescue disk) for system encryption. */
+ try
+ {
+ WaitCursor();
+ BootEncObj->PrepareInstallation(!bWholeSysDrive, volumePassword, nVolumeEA, FIRST_MODE_OF_OPERATION_ID, hash_algo, volumePim, L"");
+ }
+ catch (Exception &e)
+ {
+ e.Show(hwndDlg);
+ NormalCursor();
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ KillTimer(hwndDlg, TIMER_ID_RANDVIEW);
+ // Attempt to wipe the GUI field showing portions of randpool
+ wmemset(tmp, L'X', ARRAYSIZE(tmp));
+ tmp[ARRAYSIZE(tmp) - 1] = 0;
+ SetWindowText(hRandPoolSys, tmp);
+ NormalCursor();
+ }
+
+ }
}
@@ -7758,3 +8049,3 @@ BOOL CALLBACK MainDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
// Check password length (check also done for outer volume which is not the case in TrueCrypt).
- else if (!CheckPasswordLength (hwndDlg, volumePassword.Length, volumePim, SysEncInEffect(), SysEncInEffect()? hash_algo : 0, TRUE, FALSE))
+ else if (!CheckPasswordLength (hwndDlg, volumePassword.Length, volumePim, SysEncInEffect(), SysEncInEffect()? hash_algo : 0, FALSE, FALSE))
{
@@ -7764,8 +8055,2 @@ BOOL CALLBACK MainDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
- if (SysEncInEffect ())
- {
-
- nNewPageNo = SYSENC_COLLECTING_RANDOM_DATA_PAGE - 1; // Skip irrelevant pages
- }
-
if (bInPlaceEncNonSys)
@@ -7780,2 +8065,30 @@ BOOL CALLBACK MainDialogProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT uMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lPa
}
+
+ if (SysEncInEffect ())
+ {
+ nNewPageNo = SYSENC_RESCUE_DISK_CREATION_PAGE - 1; // Skip irrelevant pages
+
+ wchar_t tmp[RANDPOOL_DISPLAY_SIZE + 1];
+ if (!bInPlaceEncNonSys)
+ {
+ /* Generate master key and other related data (except the rescue disk) for system encryption. */
+ try
+ {
+ WaitCursor();
+ BootEncObj->PrepareInstallation(!bWholeSysDrive, volumePassword, nVolumeEA, FIRST_MODE_OF_OPERATION_ID, hash_algo, volumePim, L"");
+ }
+ catch (Exception &e)
+ {
+ e.Show(hwndDlg);
+ NormalCursor();
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ KillTimer(hwndDlg, TIMER_ID_RANDVIEW);
+ // Attempt to wipe the GUI field showing portions of randpool
+ wmemset(tmp, L'X', ARRAYSIZE(tmp));
+ tmp[ARRAYSIZE(tmp) - 1] = 0;
+ SetWindowText(hRandPoolSys, tmp);
+ NormalCursor();
+ }
}
@@ -8805,2 +9118,22 @@ ovf_end:
}
+
+ if (nCurPageNo == SYSENC_RESCUE_DISK_CREATION_PAGE)
+ {
+ if (SysEncInEffect ())
+ {
+ nNewPageNo = (PimEnable? PIM_PAGE : PASSWORD_PAGE) + 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (nCurPageNo == SYSENC_RESCUE_DISK_BURN_PAGE)
+ {
+ nNewPageNo = SYSENC_RESCUE_DISK_BURN_PAGE + 1; // Stay on the same page
+ Warning("RESCUE_DISK_BACK_BUTTON", hwndDlg);
+ }
+
+ if (nCurPageNo == SYSENC_PRETEST_RESULT_PAGE)
+ {
+ nNewPageNo = SYSENC_PRETEST_RESULT_PAGE + 1; // Stay on the same page
+ }
+
if (nCurPageNo == SYSENC_MULTI_BOOT_MODE_PAGE)
@@ -8930,3 +9263,6 @@ ovf_end:
{
- nNewPageNo = CIPHER_PAGE + 1; // Skip irrelevant pages
+ if (!bHiddenOS)
+ nNewPageNo = SYSENC_TYPE_PAGE + 1; // Skip irrelevant pages
+ else
+ nNewPageNo = CIPHER_PAGE + 1; // Skip irrelevant pages
@@ -10633 +10969,510 @@ static DWORD GetFormatSectorSize ()
}
+
+/* This function is called when advanced dialog in intro page is open */
+BOOL CALLBACK AdvanceDlgProcIntro (HWND hwndDlg, UINT msg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam)
+{
+ WORD lw = LOWORD(wParam);
+
+ switch (msg)
+ {
+ case WM_INITDIALOG:
+
+ bHiddenVolHost = bHiddenVol = bHiddenOS;
+
+ SendMessage (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_SYSENC_HIDDEN), WM_SETFONT, (WPARAM) hUserBoldFont, (LPARAM) TRUE);
+ SendMessage (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_SYSENC_NORMAL), WM_SETFONT, (WPARAM) hUserBoldFont, (LPARAM) TRUE);
+
+ CheckButton (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, bHiddenOS ? IDC_SYSENC_HIDDEN : IDC_SYSENC_NORMAL));
+
+ return 1;
+ case WM_COMMAND:
+ {
+ if (lw == IDCANCEL)
+ {
+ EndDialog(hwndDlg, lw);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if(lw == IDOK)
+ {
+ if (bHiddenOS)
+ {
+ bWholeSysDrive = FALSE;
+ bHiddenVolDirect = FALSE;
+ }
+ EndDialog(hwndDlg, lw);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (lw == IDC_SYSENC_HIDDEN)
+ {
+ SendMessage (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_SYSENC_NORMAL), BM_SETCHECK, BST_UNCHECKED, 0);
+
+ bHiddenOS = TRUE;
+ bHiddenVol = TRUE;
+ bHiddenVolHost = TRUE;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (lw == IDC_SYSENC_NORMAL)
+ {
+ SendMessage (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_SYSENC_HIDDEN), BM_SETCHECK, BST_UNCHECKED, 0);
+
+ bHiddenOS = FALSE;
+ bHiddenVol = FALSE;
+ bHiddenVolHost = FALSE;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if(lw == IDHELP)
+ {
+ Applink ("hiddensysenc");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* AES, HASH, Pim and Wipe mode can be selected here */
+BOOL CALLBACK AdvanceDlgProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT msg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam)
+{
+ WORD lw = LOWORD(wParam);
+ WORD hw = HIWORD(wParam);
+ int ea, hid;
+ wchar_t buf[100];
+ BOOL bNTFSallowed = FALSE;
+ BOOL bFATallowed = FALSE;
+ BOOL bEXFATallowed = FALSE;
+ BOOL bReFSallowed = FALSE;
+ BOOL bNoFSallowed = FALSE;
+ hCurPage = hwndDlg;
+
+ switch (msg)
+ {
+ case WM_INITDIALOG:
+ {
+ SetWindowTextW ( GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDT_IMPORTANT_NOTE), GetString ("ADV_FEATURES_NOTE"));
+ SetWindowTextW ( GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDT_PIM_INFO), GetString ("PIM_INFO"));
+ SetWindowTextW ( GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDT_WIPE_INFO), GetString ("WIPE_INFO"));
+
+ /* Encryption algorithms */
+
+ SendMessage(GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_COMBO_BOX), CB_RESETCONTENT, 0, 0);
+
+ for (ea = EAGetFirst (); ea != 0; ea = EAGetNext (ea))
+ {
+ if (EAIsFormatEnabled (ea) && (!SysEncInEffect () || bSystemIsGPT || EAIsMbrSysEncEnabled (ea)))
+ AddComboPair (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_COMBO_BOX), EAGetName (buf, ARRAYSIZE(buf), ea, 1), ea);
+ }
+
+ SelectAlgo (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_COMBO_BOX), &nVolumeEA);
+ ComboSelChangeEA (hwndDlg);
+ SetFocus (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_COMBO_BOX));
+
+ /* Hash algorithms */
+ if (SysEncInEffect())
+ {
+ RandSetHashFunction(hash_algo);
+ for (hid = FIRST_PRF_ID; hid <= LAST_PRF_ID; hid++)
+ {
+ // Use blake2s for hashing
+ if (((hid == BLAKE2S) || !HashIsDeprecated(hid)) && (bSystemIsGPT || HashForSystemEncryption(hid)))
+ AddComboPair(GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_COMBO_BOX_HASH_ALGO), HashGetName(hid), hid);
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ hash_algo = RandGetHashFunction();
+ for (hid = FIRST_PRF_ID; hid <= LAST_PRF_ID; hid++)
+ {
+ if (!HashIsDeprecated(hid))
+ AddComboPair(GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_COMBO_BOX_HASH_ALGO), HashGetName(hid), hid);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (CreatingHiddenSysVol())
+ Warning ("HIDDEN_OS_PRE_CIPHER_WARNING", MainDlg);
+
+ SetWindowText(GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_SHA512_HELP), GetString("SHA512_HELP"));
+ SelectAlgo(GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_COMBO_BOX_HASH_ALGO), &hash_algo);
+
+ /* file system options */
+ SetTimer(GetParent(hwndDlg), TIMER_ID_RANDVIEW, TIMER_INTERVAL_RANDVIEW, NULL);
+
+ hMasterKey = GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_DISK_KEY);
+ hHeaderKey = GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_HEADER_KEY);
+ hRandPool = GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_RANDOM_BYTES);
+
+ SendMessage(GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_RANDOM_BYTES), WM_SETFONT, (WPARAM)hFixedDigitFont, (LPARAM)TRUE);
+ SendMessage(GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_DISK_KEY), WM_SETFONT, (WPARAM)hFixedDigitFont, (LPARAM)TRUE);
+ SendMessage(GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_HEADER_KEY), WM_SETFONT, (WPARAM)hFixedDigitFont, (LPARAM)TRUE);
+
+ /* Quick/Dynamic */
+
+ if (bHiddenVol)
+ {
+ quickFormat = !bHiddenVolHost;
+ dynamicFormat = FALSE;
+ bSparseFileSwitch = FALSE;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (bDevice)
+ {
+ dynamicFormat = FALSE;
+ bSparseFileSwitch = FALSE;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ wchar_t root[TC_MAX_PATH];
+ DWORD fileSystemFlags = 0;
+
+ /* Check if the host file system supports sparse files */
+
+ if (GetVolumePathName (szFileName, root, array_capacity (root)))
+ {
+ GetVolumeInformation (root, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, &fileSystemFlags, NULL, 0);
+ bSparseFileSwitch = fileSystemFlags & FILE_SUPPORTS_SPARSE_FILES;
+ }
+ else
+ bSparseFileSwitch = FALSE;
+ if (!bSparseFileSwitch)
+ {
+ dynamicFormat = FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ SendMessage (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_SHOW_KEYS), BM_SETCHECK, showKeys ? BST_CHECKED : BST_UNCHECKED, 0);
+ SetWindowText (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_RANDOM_BYTES), showKeys ? L"" : L"******************************** ");
+ SetWindowText (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_HEADER_KEY), showKeys ? L"" : L"******************************** ");
+ SetWindowText (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_DISK_KEY), showKeys ? L"" : L"******************************** ");
+
+ SendMessage(GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_CLUSTERSIZE), CB_RESETCONTENT, 0, 0);
+ AddComboPairW(GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_CLUSTERSIZE), GetString("DEFAULT"), 0);
+ SendMessage(GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_CLUSTERSIZE), CB_SETCURSEL, 0, 0);
+ EnableWindow(GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_CLUSTERSIZE), TRUE);
+
+ /* Filesystems */
+ bNTFSallowed = FALSE;
+ bFATallowed = FALSE;
+ bEXFATallowed = FALSE;
+ bReFSallowed = FALSE;
+ bNoFSallowed = FALSE;
+
+ SendMessage(GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_FILESYS), CB_RESETCONTENT, 0, 0);
+ EnableWindow(GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_FILESYS), TRUE);
+
+ uint64 dataAreaSize = GetVolumeDataAreaSize (bHiddenVol && !bHiddenVolHost, nVolumeSize);
+
+ if (!CreatingHiddenSysVol())
+ {
+ if (dataAreaSize >= TC_MIN_NTFS_FS_SIZE && dataAreaSize <= TC_MAX_NTFS_FS_SIZE)
+ {
+ AddComboPair (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_FILESYS), L"NTFS", FILESYS_NTFS);
+ bNTFSallowed = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ if (dataAreaSize >= TC_MIN_FAT_FS_SIZE && dataAreaSize <= TC_MAX_FAT_SECTOR_COUNT * GetFormatSectorSize())
+ {
+ AddComboPair (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_FILESYS), L"FAT", FILESYS_FAT);
+ bFATallowed = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ //exFAT support added starting from Vista SP1
+ if (IsOSVersionAtLeast (WIN_VISTA, 1) && dataAreaSize >= TC_MIN_EXFAT_FS_SIZE && dataAreaSize <= TC_MAX_EXFAT_FS_SIZE)
+ {
+ AddComboPair (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_FILESYS), L"exFAT", FILESYS_EXFAT);
+ bEXFATallowed = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ //ReFS write support activated by default starting from Windows 10
+ //We don't support it yet for the creation of hidden volumes
+ if ((!bHiddenVolHost) && IsOSVersionAtLeast (WIN_10, 0) && dataAreaSize >= TC_MIN_REFS_FS_SIZE && dataAreaSize <= TC_MAX_REFS_FS_SIZE)
+ {
+ AddComboPair (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_FILESYS), L"ReFS", FILESYS_REFS);
+ bReFSallowed = TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ // We're creating a hidden volume for a hidden OS, so we don't need to format it with
+ // any filesystem (the entire OS will be copied to the hidden volume sector by sector).
+ EnableWindow (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_FILESYS), FALSE);
+ EnableWindow (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_CLUSTERSIZE), FALSE);
+ }
+ if (!bHiddenVolHost)
+ {
+ AddComboPairW(GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_FILESYS), GetString("NONE"), FILESYS_NONE);
+ bNoFSallowed = TRUE;
+ }
+ if (fileSystem == FILESYS_NONE) // If no file system has been previously selected
+ {
+ // Set default file system
+
+ if (bFATallowed && !(nNeedToStoreFilesOver4GB == 1 && (bNTFSallowed || bEXFATallowed || bReFSallowed)))
+ fileSystem = FILESYS_FAT;
+ else if (bEXFATallowed)
+ fileSystem = FILESYS_EXFAT;
+ else if (bNTFSallowed)
+ fileSystem = FILESYS_NTFS;
+ else if (bReFSallowed)
+ fileSystem = FILESYS_REFS;
+ else if (bNoFSallowed)
+ fileSystem = FILESYS_NONE;
+ else
+ {
+ AddComboPair (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_FILESYS), L"---", 0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ SendMessage(GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_FILESYS), CB_SETCURSEL, 0, 0);
+ SelectAlgo(GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_FILESYS), (int *)&fileSystem);
+
+ /* PIM and Wipe mode */
+ SetCheckBox(hwndDlg, IDC_PIM_ENABLE, PimEnable);
+
+ PopulateWipeModeCombo(GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_WIPE_MODE),
+ SystemEncryptionStatus == SYSENC_STATUS_DECRYPTING && !bInPlaceEncNonSys,
+ TRUE,
+ FALSE);
+ SelectAlgo(GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_WIPE_MODE), (int *)&nWipeMode);
+ SetFocus(GetDlgItem(GetParent(hwndDlg), IDOK));
+ }
+ return 1;
+ case WM_COMMAND:
+ if (lw == IDCANCEL)
+ {
+ EndDialog(hwndDlg, lw);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (lw == IDOK)
+ {
+ /* Save hash and encryption algo */
+ LPARAM nIndex;
+ nIndex = SendMessage (GetDlgItem (hCurPage, IDC_COMBO_BOX), CB_GETCURSEL, 0, 0);
+ nVolumeEA = (int) SendMessage (GetDlgItem (hCurPage, IDC_COMBO_BOX), CB_GETITEMDATA, nIndex, 0);
+
+ if (!bSystemIsGPT && SysEncInEffect ()
+ && EAGetCipherCount (nVolumeEA) > 1) // Cascade?
+ {
+ if (AskWarnNoYes ("CONFIRM_CASCADE_FOR_SYS_ENCRYPTION", hwndDlg) == IDNO)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!bHiddenOS)
+ Info ("NOTE_CASCADE_FOR_SYS_ENCRYPTION", hwndDlg);
+ }
+
+ nIndex = SendMessage (GetDlgItem (hCurPage, IDC_COMBO_BOX_HASH_ALGO), CB_GETCURSEL, 0, 0);
+ hash_algo = (int) SendMessage (GetDlgItem (hCurPage, IDC_COMBO_BOX_HASH_ALGO), CB_GETITEMDATA, nIndex, 0);
+
+ RandSetHashFunction (hash_algo);
+
+ /* Save PIM and Wipe mode */
+ nWipeMode = (WipeAlgorithmId)SendMessage(GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_WIPE_MODE),
+ CB_GETITEMDATA,
+ SendMessage(GetDlgItem(hwndDlg, IDC_WIPE_MODE), CB_GETCURSEL, 0, 0),
+ 0);
+
+ PimEnable = GetCheckBox(hwndDlg, IDC_PIM_ENABLE);
+ SetCheckBox(hwndDlg, IDC_PIM_ENABLE, PimEnable);
+
+ EndDialog(hwndDlg, lw);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (lw == IDC_CIPHER_TEST)
+ {
+ LPARAM nIndex;
+ int c;
+
+ nIndex = SendMessage (GetDlgItem (hCurPage, IDC_COMBO_BOX), CB_GETCURSEL, 0, 0);
+ nVolumeEA = (int) SendMessage (GetDlgItem (hCurPage, IDC_COMBO_BOX), CB_GETITEMDATA, nIndex, 0);
+
+ for (c = EAGetLastCipher (nVolumeEA); c != 0; c = EAGetPreviousCipher (nVolumeEA, c))
+ {
+ DialogBoxParamW (hInst, MAKEINTRESOURCEW (IDD_CIPHER_TEST_DLG),
+ GetParent (hwndDlg), (DLGPROC) CipherTestDialogProc, (LPARAM) c);
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (lw == IDC_BENCHMARK)
+ {
+ // Reduce CPU load
+ bFastPollEnabled = FALSE;
+ bRandmixEnabled = FALSE;
+
+ DialogBoxParamW (hInst,
+ MAKEINTRESOURCEW (IDD_BENCHMARK_DLG), hwndDlg,
+ (DLGPROC) BenchmarkDlgProc, (LPARAM) bSystemIsGPT);
+
+ bFastPollEnabled = TRUE;
+ bRandmixEnabled = TRUE;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (lw == IDC_WIPE_MODE && hw == CBN_SELCHANGE)
+ {
+ Warning ("WIPE_WARNING", hwndDlg);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (hw == CBN_SELCHANGE && lw == IDC_COMBO_BOX)
+ {
+ ComboSelChangeEA (hwndDlg);
+ SetWindowTextW (GetDlgItem (hCurPage, IDC_BENCHMARK), GetString ("IDC_BENCHMARK"));
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (hw == CBN_SELCHANGE && lw == IDC_COMBO_BOX_HASH_ALGO)
+ {
+ ShowWindow (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDT_HASH_ALGO), SW_SHOW);
+ if (SysEncInEffect())
+ {
+ HWND hHashAlgoItem = GetDlgItem (hCurPage, IDC_COMBO_BOX_HASH_ALGO);
+ int selectedAlgo = (int)SendMessage (hHashAlgoItem, CB_GETITEMDATA, SendMessage (hHashAlgoItem, CB_GETCURSEL, 0, 0), 0);
+
+ if (!bSystemIsGPT && !HashForSystemEncryption (selectedAlgo))
+ {
+ hash_algo = DEFAULT_HASH_ALGORITHM_BOOT;
+ RandSetHashFunction (DEFAULT_HASH_ALGORITHM_BOOT);
+ Info ("ALGO_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_SYS_ENCRYPTION", MainDlg);
+ SelectAlgo (GetDlgItem (hCurPage, IDC_COMBO_BOX_HASH_ALGO), &hash_algo);
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (lw == IDC_PIM_ENABLE)
+ {
+ PimEnable = GetCheckBox (hwndDlg, IDC_PIM_ENABLE);
+ if (!PimEnable)
+ volumePim = 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+AddComboPairW (HWND hComboBox, const wchar_t *lpszItem, int value)
+{
+ LPARAM nIndex;
+ nIndex = SendMessageW(hComboBox, CB_ADDSTRING, 0, (LPARAM)lpszItem);
+ nIndex = SendMessage(hComboBox, CB_SETITEMDATA, nIndex, (LPARAM)value);
+}
+
+/* Acording to NIST, only a blacklist check and at least 8 character should be compulsary, no special character check... */
+int PrintStrongness (char input[], unsigned int length)
+{
+ unsigned int n = length;
+ int iReturnValue = 0;
+ if (n < 10)
+ {
+ burn (input, sizeof(input));
+ return iReturnValue = weak;
+ }
+ else if (CheckWord(input))
+ {
+ burn (input, sizeof(input));
+ return iReturnValue = weak;
+ }
+ //Tetermine the strength of the passsord
+ if ((n >= 13))
+ {
+ iReturnValue = very_strong;
+ }
+ //if 3 out of 4 paramters are true
+ else if (n >= 10)
+ {
+ iReturnValue = strong;
+ }
+ //if 2 out of 4 values are true
+ else if (n >= 8)
+ {
+ iReturnValue = medium;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ iReturnValue = weak;
+ }
+ burn (input, sizeof(input));
+ return iReturnValue;
+}
+
+/* Check if password is in list
+Credits go Martin York from https://codereview.stackexchange.com/questions/52702/how-to-search-for-a-word-in-a-sorted-text-file-efficiently */
+BOOL CheckWord (char* search)
+{
+
+ bool isWordInDict(std::string const& word);
+ {
+ struct MyDict : std::set<std::string>
+ {
+ typedef std::set<std::string>::const_iterator const_iterator;
+ MyDict()
+ {
+ wchar_t path[TC_MAX_PATH];
+ wchar_t tmp[TC_MAX_PATH];
+ wchar_t destFileName[TC_MAX_PATH] = L"password1000000.txt";
+
+ if (GetModuleFileName (NULL, path, ARRAYSIZE (path)) == 0)
+ {
+ Error ("ERROR_GETTING_PATH", MainDlg);
+ }
+
+ StringCbCopyW(tmp, ARRAYSIZE(tmp), path);
+
+ //detects the last '\' in order to remove the name of the exe file. Afterwards add .txt file in the path
+ for (int i = wcslen(path); i > 1; i--)
+ {
+ if (tmp[i] == '\\')
+ {
+ for(unsigned int j = i + 1; j < wcslen(path); j++)
+ {
+ tmp[j] = '\0';
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ StringCbCatW(tmp, sizeof(tmp), destFileName);
+
+ std::ifstream fin(tmp);
+ std::copy(std::istream_iterator<std::string>(fin), std::istream_iterator<std::string>(),
+ std::inserter(*this, end()));
+ }
+ };
+ static const MyDict dict;
+ MyDict::const_iterator find = dict.find(search);
+
+ return find != dict.end();
+ }
+}
+
+/* Credits go to Barmak Shemirani from https://stackoverflow.com/questions/31407492/c-tooltip-function-for-checkbox */
+void CreateToolTip(HWND hWndParent, HWND hControlItem, PTSTR pszText)
+{
+ if (!hControlItem || !hWndParent || !pszText)
+ return;
+
+ HWND hwndTip = CreateWindowEx(NULL, TOOLTIPS_CLASS, NULL,
+ WS_POPUP | TTS_NOFADE | TTS_ALWAYSTIP /*| TTS_BALLOON*/,
+ CW_USEDEFAULT, CW_USEDEFAULT, CW_USEDEFAULT, CW_USEDEFAULT,
+ hWndParent, NULL, GetModuleHandle(NULL), NULL);
+
+ if (!hwndTip)
+ return;
+
+ TOOLINFO toolInfo = { 0 };
+ toolInfo.cbSize = sizeof(toolInfo);
+ toolInfo.hwnd = hWndParent;
+ toolInfo.uFlags = TTF_IDISHWND | TTF_SUBCLASS;
+ toolInfo.uId = (UINT_PTR)hControlItem;
+ toolInfo.lpszText = pszText;
+ GetClientRect(hWndParent, &toolInfo.rect);
+ if (!SendMessage(hwndTip, TTM_ADDTOOL, 0, (LPARAM)&toolInfo))
+ {
+ MessageBox(0, TEXT("TTM_ADDTOOL failed\nWrong project manifest!"), 0, 0);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/src/Format/Tcformat.h b/src/Format/Tcformat.h
index f9328afd..a8237521 100644
--- a/src/Format/Tcformat.h
+++ b/src/Format/Tcformat.h
@@ -106,2 +106,10 @@ extern volatile int NonSysInplaceEncStatus;
+BOOL CALLBACK AdvanceDlgProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT msg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam);
+BOOL CALLBACK FinishDlgProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT msg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam);
+void AddComboPairW (HWND hComboBox, const wchar_t *lpszItem, int value);
+int PrintStrongness (char* input, unsigned int length);
+BOOL CheckWord (char search[]);
+BOOL CALLBACK AdvanceDlgProcIntro (HWND hwndDlg, UINT msg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam);
+void CreateToolTip (HWND hWndParent, HWND hControlItem, PTSTR pszText);
+
#ifdef __cplusplus
diff --git a/src/Release/Setup Files/Product64.wxs b/src/Release/Setup Files/Product64.wxs
index e20fd1dc..2f43edd1 100644
--- a/src/Release/Setup Files/Product64.wxs
+++ b/src/Release/Setup Files/Product64.wxs
@@ -869,5 +869,2 @@
</Component>
- <Component Id="cmp960F36632D3FB602421D1195E4EB6FE1" Guid="{321F49A5-8A1B-4881-A32D-12EDA99D1B85}">
- <File Id="fil324009D5856BF4C5270D40F1EC4110EB" KeyPath="yes" Source="$(sys.CURRENTDIR)\docs\html\en\RIPEMD-160.html" DiskId="1" />
- </Component>
<Component Id="cmpB4C7B1A7A3EC0CB2DE805AC5CC5FC0D7" Guid="{4534E8B2-114E-4173-AE3E-75E0D96EB573}">
@@ -1385,3 +1382,2 @@
<ComponentRef Id="cmpFB2313AB16EF2467366ED136C0E61CE6" />
- <ComponentRef Id="cmp960F36632D3FB602421D1195E4EB6FE1" />
<ComponentRef Id="cmpB4C7B1A7A3EC0CB2DE805AC5CC5FC0D7" />
@@ -1708,2 +1704,2 @@
-</Wix> \ No newline at end of file
+</Wix>
diff --git a/src/Release/Setup Files/password1000000.txt b/src/Release/Setup Files/password1000000.txt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e6e50bf5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/Release/Setup Files/password1000000.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,999999 @@
+123456
+password
+12345678
+qwerty
+123456789
+12345
+1234
+111111
+1234567
+dragon
+123123
+baseball
+abc123
+football
+monkey
+letmein
+696969
+shadow
+master
+666666
+qwertyuiop
+123321
+mustang
+1234567890
+michael
+654321
+pussy
+superman
+1qaz2wsx
+7777777
+fuckyou
+121212
+000000
+qazwsx
+123qwe
+killer
+trustno1
+jordan
+jennifer
+zxcvbnm
+asdfgh
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