When a file-hosted VeraCrypt container is stored in a journaling file system (such as NTFS or Ext3), a copy of the VeraCrypt container (or of its fragment) may remain in the free space on the host volume. This may have various security implications. For example, if you change the volume password/keyfile(s) and an adversary finds the old copy or fragment (the old header) of the VeraCrypt volume, he might use it to mount the volume using an old compromised password (and/or using compromised keyfiles using an old compromised password (and/or using compromised keyfiles that were necessary to mount the volume before the volume header was re- encrypted). Some journaling file systems also internally record file access times and other potentially sensitive information. If you need plausible deniability (see section Plausible Deniability), you must not store file-hosted VeraCrypt containers in journaling file systems. To prevent possible security issues related to journaling file systems, do one the following:
