VeraCrypt
aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/src/Common/libzip/zip_stat_index.c
blob: a2ef59bba8a0597605d061f99fd3b5cb360ca1f7 (plain)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
.highlight .hll { background-color: #ffffcc }
.highlight .c { color: #888888 } /* Comment */
.highlight .err { color: #a61717; background-color: #
/*
  zip_stat_index.c -- get information about file by index
  Copyright (C) 1999-2016 Dieter Baron and Thomas Klausner

  This file is part of libzip, a library to manipulate ZIP archives.
  The authors can be contacted at <libzip@nih.at>

  Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  are met:
  1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
     the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
     distribution.
  3. The names of the authors may not be used to endorse or promote
     products derived from this software without specific prior
     written permission.
 
  THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS
  OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
  WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
  ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
  DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
  DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE
  GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
  INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER
  IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR
  OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN
  IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/


#include "zipint.h"


ZIP_EXTERN int
zip_stat_index(zip_t *za, zip_uint64_t index, zip_flags_t flags,
	       zip_stat_t *st)
{
    const char *name;
    zip_dirent_t *de;

    if ((de=_zip_get_dirent(za, index, flags, NULL)) == NULL)
	return -1;

    if ((name=zip_get_name(za, index, flags)) == NULL)
	return -1;
    

    if ((flags & ZIP_FL_UNCHANGED) == 0
	&& ZIP_ENTRY_DATA_CHANGED(za->entry+index)) {
	if (zip_source_stat(za->entry[index].source, st) < 0) {
	    zip_error_set(&za->error, ZIP_ER_CHANGED, 0);
	    return -1;
	}
    }
    else {
	zip_stat_init(st);

	st->crc = de->crc;
	st->size = de->uncomp_size;
	st->mtime = de->last_mod;
	st->comp_size = de->comp_size;
	st->comp_method = (zip_uint16_t)de->comp_method;
	st->encryption_method = de->encryption_method;
	st->valid = (de->crc_valid ? ZIP_STAT_CRC : 0) | ZIP_STAT_SIZE|ZIP_STAT_MTIME
	    |ZIP_STAT_COMP_SIZE|ZIP_STAT_COMP_METHOD|ZIP_STAT_ENCRYPTION_METHOD;
    }

    st->index = index;
    st->name = name;
    st->valid |= ZIP_STAT_INDEX|ZIP_STAT_NAME;
    
    return 0;
}
href="Hidden%20Volume.html" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none; font-weight:bold.html"> Hidden Volume</a>) and hidden operating systems (see the section <a href="Hidden%20Operating%20System.html" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none.html"> <strong style="text-align:left">Hidden Operating System</strong></a>). </li><li style="text-align:left; margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px"> Until decrypted, a VeraCrypt partition/device appears to consist of nothing more than random data (it does not contain any kind of &quot;signature&quot;). Therefore, it should be impossible to prove that a partition or a device is a VeraCrypt volume or that it has been encrypted (provided that the security requirements and precautions listed in the chapter <a href="Security%20Requirements%20and%20Precautions.html" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none.html"> Security Requirements and Precautions</a> are followed). A possible plausible explanation for the existence of a partition/device containing solely random data is that you have wiped (securely erased) the content of the partition/device using one of the tools that erase data by overwriting it with random data (in fact, VeraCrypt can be used to securely erase a partition/device too, by creating an empty encrypted partition/device-hosted volume within it). However, you need to prevent data leaks (see the section <a href="Data%20Leaks.html" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none.html"> Data Leaks</a>) and also note that, for <a href="System%20Encryption.html" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none.html"> system encryption</a>, the first drive track contains the (unencrypted) VeraCrypt Boot Loader, which can be easily identified as such (for more information, see the chapter <a href="System%20Encryption.html" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none.html"> System Encryption</a>). When using <a href="System%20Encryption.html" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none.html"> system encryption</a>, plausible deniability can be achieved by creating a hidden operating system (see the section <a href="Hidden%20Operating%20System.html" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none.html"> Hidden Operating System</a>).<br style="text-align:left"> <br style="text-align:left"> Although file-hosted VeraCrypt volumes (containers) do not contain any kind of &quot;signature&quot; either (until decrypted, they appear to consist solely of random data), they cannot provide this kind of plausible deniability, because there is practically no plausible explanation for the existence of a file containing solely random data. However, plausible deniability can still be achieved with a file-hosted VeraCrypt volume (container) by creating a hidden volume within it (see above). </li></ol> <h4 style="text-align:left; font-family:Arial,Helvetica,Verdana,sans-serif; font-weight:bold; margin-top:0px; font-size:12px; margin-bottom:1px"> <br style="text-align:left"> Notes</h4> <ul style="text-align:left; margin-top:18px; margin-bottom:19px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px"> <li style="text-align:left; margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px"> When formatting a hard disk partition as a VeraCrypt volume (or encrypting a partition in place), the partition table (including the partition type) is <em style="text-align:left">never</em> modified (no VeraCrypt &quot;signature&quot; or &quot;ID&quot; is written to the partition table). </li><li style="text-align:left; margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px"> There are methods to find files or devices containing random data (such as VeraCrypt volumes). Note, however, that this should <em style="text-align:left">not </em>affect plausible deniability in any way. The adversary still should not be able to <em style="text-align:left">prove</em> that the partition/device is a VeraCrypt volume or that the file, partition, or device, contains a hidden VeraCrypt volume (provided that you follow the security requirements and precautions listed in the chapter <a href="Security%20Requirements%20and%20Precautions.html" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none.html"> Security Requirements and Precautions</a> and in the subsection <a href="Security%20Requirements%20for%20Hidden%20Volumes.html" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none.html"> Security Requirements and Precautions Pertaining to Hidden Volumes</a>). </li></ul> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p><a href="Hidden%20Volume.html" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none; font-weight:bold.html">Next Section &gt;&gt;</a></p> </div><div class="ClearBoth"></div></body></html>