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| author | Mounir IDRASSI <mounir.idrassi@idrix.fr> | 2025-01-11 23:22:40 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Mounir IDRASSI <mounir.idrassi@idrix.fr> | 2025-01-14 14:59:45 +0100 |
| commit | 078d1410dd3307956638d9c90f40ec15032ef01f (patch) | |
| tree | 5b1bba6f7d7e9509a14642d9182b518ba40c8a2c /src/Core/Unix/CoreService.cpp | |
| parent | 2cca2e1dafa405addc3af8724baf8563f352ac1c (diff) | |
| download | VeraCrypt-078d1410dd3307956638d9c90f40ec15032ef01f.tar.gz VeraCrypt-078d1410dd3307956638d9c90f40ec15032ef01f.zip | |
Linux/FreeBSD: Prevent mounting volumes on system directories and PATH (CVE-2025-23021, reported by SivertPL @__tfr)
Added security checks to prevent mounting VeraCrypt volumes on system directories (like /usr/bin) or directories in the user's PATH, which could theoretically allow execution of malicious binaries instead of legitimate system binaries.
Key changes:
- Block mounting on protected system directories (/usr, /bin, /lib, etc.)
This restriction cannot be overridden
- Block mounting on directories present in user's PATH environment variable
This can be overridden with --allow-insecure-mount flag
- Add visual warnings (red border, "[INSECURE MODE]") when mounting on PATH directories is allowed
- Handle symlinks properly when checking paths
- Add new error messages for blocked mount points
To override PATH-based restrictions only (system directories remain protected):
veracrypt --allow-insecure-mount [options] volume mountpoint
Security Impact: Low to Medium
The attack requires either:
- User explicitly choosing a system directory as mount point instead of using VeraCrypt's default mount points
- Or attacker having both filesystem access to modify favorites configuration AND knowledge of the volume password
Default mount points are not affected by this vulnerability.
Security: CVE-2025-23021
Diffstat (limited to 'src/Core/Unix/CoreService.cpp')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/Core/Unix/CoreService.cpp | 14 |
1 files changed, 12 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/src/Core/Unix/CoreService.cpp b/src/Core/Unix/CoreService.cpp index c2eb2bf0..712dbab4 100644 --- a/src/Core/Unix/CoreService.cpp +++ b/src/Core/Unix/CoreService.cpp @@ -99,6 +99,11 @@ namespace VeraCrypt { shared_ptr <CoreServiceRequest> request = Serializable::DeserializeNew <CoreServiceRequest> (inputStream); + // Update Core properties based on the received request + Core->SetUserEnvPATH (request->UserEnvPATH); + Core->ForceUseDummySudoPassword(request->UseDummySudoPassword); + Core->SetAllowInsecureMount(request->AllowInsecureMount); + try { // ExitRequest @@ -283,12 +288,17 @@ namespace VeraCrypt static Mutex mutex; ScopeLock lock (mutex); + // Copy Core properties to the request so that they can be transferred to the elevated process + request.ApplicationExecutablePath = Core->GetApplicationExecutablePath(); + request.UserEnvPATH = Core->GetUserEnvPATH(); + request.UseDummySudoPassword = Core->GetUseDummySudoPassword(); + request.AllowInsecureMount = Core->GetAllowInsecureMount(); + if (request.RequiresElevation()) { request.ElevateUserPrivileges = true; request.FastElevation = !ElevatedServiceAvailable; - request.ApplicationExecutablePath = Core->GetApplicationExecutablePath(); - + while (!ElevatedServiceAvailable) { // Test if the user has an active "sudo" session. |