Added security checks to prevent mounting VeraCrypt volumes on system directories (like /usr/bin) or directories in the user's PATH, which could theoretically allow execution of malicious binaries instead of legitimate system binaries. Key changes: - Block mounting on protected system directories (/usr, /bin, /lib, etc.) This restriction cannot be overridden - Block mounting on directories present in user's PATH environment variable This can be overridden with --allow-insecure-mount flag - Add visual warnings (red border, "[INSECURE MODE]") when mounting on PATH directories is allowed - Handle symlinks properly when checking paths - Add new error messages for blocked mount points To override PATH-based restrictions only (system directories remain protected): veracrypt --allow-insecure-mount [options] volume mountpoint Security Impact: Low to Medium The attack requires either: - User explicitly choosing a system directory as mount point instead of using VeraCrypt's default mount points - Or attacker having both filesystem access to modify favorites configuration AND knowledge of the volume password Default mount points are not affected by this vulnerability. Security: CVE-2025-23021