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authorMounir IDRASSI <mounir.idrassi@idrix.fr>2025-01-11 23:22:40 +0100
committerMounir IDRASSI <mounir.idrassi@idrix.fr>2025-01-14 14:59:45 +0100
commit078d1410dd3307956638d9c90f40ec15032ef01f (patch)
tree5b1bba6f7d7e9509a14642d9182b518ba40c8a2c /src/Main/UserInterface.cpp
parent2cca2e1dafa405addc3af8724baf8563f352ac1c (diff)
downloadVeraCrypt-078d1410dd3307956638d9c90f40ec15032ef01f.tar.gz
VeraCrypt-078d1410dd3307956638d9c90f40ec15032ef01f.zip
Linux/FreeBSD: Prevent mounting volumes on system directories and PATH (CVE-2025-23021, reported by SivertPL @__tfr)
Added security checks to prevent mounting VeraCrypt volumes on system directories (like /usr/bin) or directories in the user's PATH, which could theoretically allow execution of malicious binaries instead of legitimate system binaries. Key changes: - Block mounting on protected system directories (/usr, /bin, /lib, etc.) This restriction cannot be overridden - Block mounting on directories present in user's PATH environment variable This can be overridden with --allow-insecure-mount flag - Add visual warnings (red border, "[INSECURE MODE]") when mounting on PATH directories is allowed - Handle symlinks properly when checking paths - Add new error messages for blocked mount points To override PATH-based restrictions only (system directories remain protected): veracrypt --allow-insecure-mount [options] volume mountpoint Security Impact: Low to Medium The attack requires either: - User explicitly choosing a system directory as mount point instead of using VeraCrypt's default mount points - Or attacker having both filesystem access to modify favorites configuration AND knowledge of the volume password Default mount points are not affected by this vulnerability. Security: CVE-2025-23021
Diffstat (limited to 'src/Main/UserInterface.cpp')
-rw-r--r--src/Main/UserInterface.cpp18
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/Main/UserInterface.cpp b/src/Main/UserInterface.cpp
index 5798cb31..8da77f5b 100644
--- a/src/Main/UserInterface.cpp
+++ b/src/Main/UserInterface.cpp
@@ -541,6 +541,9 @@ namespace VeraCrypt
EX2MSG (HigherFuseVersionRequired, LangString["LINUX_EX2MSG_HIGHERFUSEVERSIONREQUIRED"]);
#endif
+ EX2MSG (MountPointBlocked, LangString["MOUNTPOINT_BLOCKED"]);
+ EX2MSG (MountPointNotAllowed, LangString["MOUNTPOINT_NOTALLOWED"]);
+
#undef EX2MSG
return L"";
}
@@ -560,6 +563,7 @@ namespace VeraCrypt
SetPreferences (CmdLine->Preferences);
Core->SetApplicationExecutablePath (Application::GetExecutablePath());
+ Core->SetUserEnvPATH (getenv ("PATH"));
if (!Preferences.NonInteractive)
{
@@ -572,6 +576,10 @@ namespace VeraCrypt
Core->ForceUseDummySudoPassword (CmdLine->ArgUseDummySudoPassword);
+#if defined(TC_UNIX)
+ Core->SetAllowInsecureMount (CmdLine->ArgAllowInsecureMount);
+#endif
+
Core->WarningEvent.Connect (EventConnector <UserInterface> (this, &UserInterface::OnWarning));
Core->VolumeMountedEvent.Connect (EventConnector <UserInterface> (this, &UserInterface::OnVolumeMounted));
@@ -1646,6 +1654,13 @@ const FileManager fileManagers[] = {
return sResult;
}
+#ifdef TC_UNIX
+ bool UserInterface::InsecureMountAllowed () const
+ {
+ return CmdLine->ArgAllowInsecureMount;
+ }
+#endif
+
#define VC_CONVERT_EXCEPTION(NAME) if (dynamic_cast<NAME*> (ex)) throw (NAME&) *ex;
void UserInterface::ThrowException (Exception* ex)
@@ -1734,6 +1749,9 @@ const FileManager fileManagers[] = {
VC_CONVERT_EXCEPTION (EMVKeyfileDataNotFound);
VC_CONVERT_EXCEPTION (EMVPANNotFound);
+ VC_CONVERT_EXCEPTION (MountPointBlocked);
+ VC_CONVERT_EXCEPTION (MountPointNotAllowed);
+
throw *ex;
}
}